儒家思想的现代诠释

道德转化中的自我与他人：初探《荀子》中的自主[1]

王华

“他人”（others）对于成就儒家的理想自我（ideal self）极为关键：自我的发展与转化，以家庭为起点，先与家人——家里的“他人”——联系，继而推及社群，最终扩展至国家天下。儒家所理解的自我并不是独立的，而是与他人相互依存的。这个对“人我联结”的强调，在《论语·雍也》中表达得很清楚：“夫仁者，己欲立而立人，己欲达而达人。”杜维明对这个看法提出了很有启发性的说明，他指出：儒家强调的是“经由参与不断扩充之人际关联并与其交流，自身教化得以完成”[2]。对这个看法，吾人可能会问：他人以及自身与他人的关系，在儒家理想自我与自我转化中扮演着何种角色？再者，自我与他人在这个自我转化的说法中，是否存有紧张的关系？比如说，这个说法所强调的“人我关联”，是否能与“自我是具反思性、自主性（autonomous）[3]的”这个当代广为接受的看法相容？

关于这些问题，学者在厘清孔子与孟子的看法上多有贡献[4]，专门讨论荀子见解的文章则较少。虽然在大方向上荀子与孔孟对理想自我看法有相似之处，但荀子思想也有其独特之处：荀子不同意孟子“性善”的说法，而强调理想的自我——圣——是来自于“伪”，即是对有可能导向“恶”的本始材质，人为地进行创造性与累积性的加工[5]。这个加工的关键，在于有意识地、努力地学习并实践儒家的礼，这样，人才可能逐渐转化成理想的自我。在这个转化过程中，一个人的心、性以及他人，均扮演十分重要的角色。荀子思想的特色，引发笔者有兴趣进一步探究自我与他人在《荀子》道德转化观之中扮演的角色，这也是本文关注的重点。

邓小虎近年提供了一个有说服力的论点，指出儒礼具现了一套包含规范个人行为与人际关系的规范性框架，而这套框架根植于文化与群众对人性的诠释。学习与实践礼，使吾人采纳甚至内化这套框架，进而理解到对自身整体来说的善（overall good）是什么，并得以整全自我[6]。邓小虎进一步立论：学习并实践礼，使人能完全“控制”自身与自己的人生，这便是现代理想“自主”（autonomy）[7]的展现。

笔者认同邓氏的基本立场，但对他强调“道德转化作为成就现代自主理想的一种方式”，则有所斟酌。本文采取较为不同的立场：虽然儒家理想中个人具有“反思决断能力”而因此在某个意义上人是“自主”的，但《荀子》中的自我转化其实与强调“自我控制”和“独立”的“现代自主理想”（以及与强调“自我控制”的“实质自我控制”式自主）有着重要的差别；而且这份“自主”的根源——“反思决断力”——与儒家所强调的“人我联结”，两者之间也有张力。这份张力存在于儒家对“自我”理解中的两个面向，笔者称之为“社会面向”以及“反思行动者面向”。笔者进一步论证：这份张力并不会让这两个面向互不相容，反而有利于成就理想自我。事实上，就是这份张力让一个人能持续完善自我，整合两个面向而“成己”“成人”。

以下首先介绍儒家自我的“社会面向”和“反思行动者面向”，以及两者之间可能存在的紧张关系；接着介绍邓小虎对礼与社群在自我转化中角色的论述，并承续其基本立场，发展笔者对《荀子》中理想自我与自我转化的诠释。笔者意图借由探讨这个诠释所牵涉的“自主”问题，研究在这个诠释中自我两个面向之间可能的紧张关系。首先厘清《荀子》中理想自我在何种意义下可称为“自主”，以及此种自主（笔者称之为“实质性自我导正”）、另一种笔者称为“实质性自我控制”式自主与“现代自主理想”三者间的差异；并进一步论证：“实质性自我控制”以及“现代自主理想”这类强调（强意义下的）“自我控制”或“独立”的自主，并非《荀子》中自我转化的重要目标，理想自我也不是这类“自主”理想的终极展现。诚然，荀子强调“心”的反省与主宰能力，但他对道德转化主要的关心并非在于达成完全的“自我控制”，而是在于对自我加工，创造出一个美好的、与他人实质上紧密相连的自我。笔者最后指出，相对于强调“自我控制”的“自主”理想，在这个转化过程中，个人其实会在三个意义下失去自我。实际上，荀子的自我转化是透过失去自我和与他人联结而达成的。

一、儒家自我的两个面向与其间的紧张关系

许多学者已指出儒家将人视为社会性的存在，而儒家“自我”的概念牵涉到他人以及个人的社会角色。一些学者甚至认为，儒家对“自我”这个概念的理解总是牵涉到关系，没有可以孤立出来的“自我”[8]。

对荀子而言，社会关系与社会规范对自我与自我转化亦极为重要。人类不仅对家人与朋友有自然情感，对食物、安适、荣誉、安定、利益等有自然欲望，人类也有特殊的潜能做社会关系上的区分，并遵守社会规范。[9]由于人必然与他人活在一个资源有限的世界上，荀子特别强调这个区分能力的重要性；若不适当发展与应用这份能力，人类就会面临混乱与灾祸[10]。人们应参与社会关系、遵循社会规范、学习并实践礼，并依礼满足自己的欲望。最终人们应在社会脉络下依礼培养相关能力与品德[11]，转化成美好的、理想的存在。

值得注意的是，儒家认为，遵循社会规范不应是盲目的。许多学者注意到儒家常强调“心”的反思能力，以及依据所思做决定、发动行为的能力。[12]儒家一般认为，人心不但能做出评价，反思自身的选择与整体人生，也能根据这些评价与反思主导自身选择，不被外在因素所决定。[13]荀子对心的看法似乎比这更强一些：在《荀子》中“心”作为智慧的主宰、形之君、神明之主，只发命令而不受命令[14]；并且，“心”必然会对行动做评价与选择、发出许可，而其评价并不由欲望或其他外在影响所决定[15]。诚然，荀子表明治乱的重点是在使人心之所可中理：“心之所可中理，则欲虽多，奚伤于治？欲不及而动过之，心使之也。心之所可失理，则欲虽寡，奚止于乱？故治乱在于心之所可，亡于情之所欲。”（《正名》）

这反思决断能力不只让人能不陷在关系或既存的倾向中而能退一步思考行动的选择与适当性，也使人不受限于自身的社会地位，给人空间思索既存社会规范（如具体礼文）。《论语》中孔子便指出其时代中某些礼不合时宜，而这类勇于反思、不随众的例子也可见于《孟子》与《荀子》。这类反思并非无所根据地质疑社会规范，也并非从自利观点出发，而是被理想的社会关系、社会知识所引导。信广来做了一个很好的注解：这些反思是“根基于一种仅在不断演变的社会秩序中才得以实现的合理性”[16]。

根据以上讨论，吾人可区分儒家自我的两个重要面向：一个是社会性的、与他人相依的面向，一个是笔者称为“行动者”的面向。然而，这两个面向之间似乎存有紧张的关系。一方面，社会性自我是由个人所扮演的社会角色来理解的。个人应遵循社会规范，并随之转化。在这层理解下，一个人的自我似乎无法在脱离社会关系脉络、不在社会规范定义下被理解。另一方面，“反思行动者”这个面向的自我是有反思能力、能不限于实际社会关系与情境去做超越性思考的。在这层理解下，很明显存在一个不必然受任何他人或是任何既存社会规范界定或约束的超越性自我。因此，似乎这两个面向之间存在着一种紧张的关系，一个整合成融贯自我的困难：自我似乎很难同时是必然与他人联结、必须在关系中理解，又是在反思下超越任何社会规范与关系的。

对以上说法的一种可能反驳是，这表面上的紧张关系是源自对“既存社会规范”与“其背后的根本理由”之间的混淆，一旦对两者做了区分，紧张关系就会消解。某些人可能会同意前面所提到信广来的说法，而认为人们得以检视（并有时偏离）既存社会规范是根据社会秩序背后的“根本合理性”，而宣称：真正构成并限制自我的不是既存的社会规范以及事实上的人际关系，而是社会秩序背后不变且独立于他人与既存规范的“根本合理性”。这个反驳值得深思。对于这个反驳，吾人可能提问：此“根本合理性”的本质与来源为何？它又是如何构成自我？另外，这个看法还可能面对一个隐忧：在这个看法中，自我与他人的关系似乎相当单薄。他人（与他我关系）对个人的重要性可能只是从这“根本合理性”衍生而来。果真如此，儒家的理想自我可能面对道德疏离的问题[17]。这真的是儒家（尤其是本文关心的荀子）对他我关系的看法吗？（笔者将于本文末阐释“仁”这个概念后回应这个问题。）

邓小虎提供了一个对《荀子》中自我与社群具启发性的说法[18]。本文检视这个说法，并进一步发展一套对《荀子》中理想自我的诠释，同时处理自我这两个面向之间的紧张关系问题。这个讨论，当有助吾人看出自我的两个面向如何能融贯地展现在荀子对道德转化以及理想自我的看法中。

邓小虎以及笔者的讨论都集中在儒礼的形成与功能上。因此，笔者先简介《荀子》中的礼。荀子认为，礼起源于人对生存与兴盛的追求。他指出人天生就有欲望并追求其满足，在这追求的过程中，若无规范，则内在欲望的冲突[19]与外在同他人之间的纷争便无可避免，而导致动乱。要解决这个问题，重点不是去除欲望或是减少欲望，而是要导正欲望（以及个人的判断与行动）[20]。导正后的欲望不会因为物质有限而无法满足，而物质也不会被导正后的欲望消耗殆尽，如《礼论》所言：“使欲必不穷于物，物必不屈于欲。两者相持而长，是礼之所起也。”可以看出，礼不只是在分配财物资源，更在养欲化性。的确，礼的设计就是要解决内在与外在的冲突与纷乱，并将人生导向较美好的境地。

二、邓小虎对《荀子》中自我与社群的说法

邓小虎于“Self and Community in the Xunzi”一文，重构《荀子》中对道德转化的说法，主要厘清礼和社群在道德转化中扮演的角色。人们经由道德转化而成为理想的行动者，以臻良好人生。据邓氏所言，在这个理想状态，人们的欲望获得满足，又享受到社群中的人际关系，最重要的是得以整合自己而成为“自主”的行动者——成为能控制并主导自己人生与行动，而不仅是被自身一时冲动的欲望驱动的存在。邓小虎表明，道德转化的终极目标之一可视为成就“现代自主理想”[21]。

这份良好人生与“自主”的成就，来自在社群中实践儒礼。邓小虎指出，儒礼具现了一套包含规范个人行为与人际关系的规范性框架，实践儒礼有助于养欲，并使得人们能在社群中和谐地生活。并且，社群本身也扮演了重要的角色。邓氏说明：“社群”对荀子而言不是随便一群人的组合，而是“由礼架构起的一群人”[22]。可以得知，社群在这个理解下是儒家规范性框架的具体成果。邓氏强调：“最好的养欲只有在人们受社群教化下才有可能。”[23]

除了规范关系与养欲外，邓小虎尤其强调礼和社群在人们自我实现为“整全”与“自主”行动者方面所扮演的关键角色。他指出：“是经由这样的规范性框架，一个人才能组织自己成为一个整全的自我，才能评价并控制他自己一时冲动的欲望。”[24]理由是经由采纳并内化此规范性框架，吾人理解到对自身整体来说善是什么，而能评价欲望，区别重要与不重要的欲望。由此，吾人对自身与自己的人生有了真切的了解，而不再被一时冲动或不重要的欲望“控制”或“奴役”[25]。

笔者认为邓氏的重构相当具启发性。在此重构中，可看到“他人”（以及他我关系）在个人转化中扮演的两个关键角色。首先，自我转化中必要的一步——儒家规范性框架的采纳与内化——很明显牵涉他人。这框架的采纳是来自践礼，而礼最大的作用便在于维持与他人的规范性关系。并且，此规范性框架的习得必须在社群脉络内进行，而社群（如之前已提）是由礼所架构起的，包括自我与他人的群体。在此条件下进行的道德转化，必然引领个人将自己认同为关系中的、社群中的一分子。

再者，根据邓氏所言，这套框架根植于“文化与群众对人性的诠释”[26]。由于自我转化需采纳并内化此框架，不仅仅是个人与他人的规范性关系会构成转化后的自我，他人对人性与人生的诠释也会是构成转化后自我的一部分。诚然，邓先生强调：“社群与其背后的传统对人类自我具有本质性与建构性的重要性。”[27]

本文后段会指出，这些“他人”在自我转化中扮演的角色，为自我的两个面向所带来的张力。笔者先进一步厘清这套框架是在何种意义下“根植于”文化与群众对人性的诠释：这里不应解释为群众对人性的诠释“决定了”这套框架，因为这样的解释忽略了荀子赋予圣贤在制礼上的创造性工作。荀子明确主张，为了解决冲突与纷乱，圣贤创制了礼。[28]吾人有理由认为这个过程历时长久，经过许多试误阶段，礼才渐趋稳定而形成长期运作的准则。这期间的试误过程，亦需在一个具体的文化脉络下与众人智慧中进行。因此可以推断，儒礼是在较弱、非决定性的意义下奠基于一个文化与群众对人性的诠释。此外值得一提的是，并非“任何”文化与群众对人性的诠释皆是适当的：在礼的创制与选择的过程中，某种智慧（如圣贤之智）以及实践上的成功亦为必要，如此跟随者才可能对礼原则上的正确性与可行性有基本的信心，而这也阻挡了部分关于相对主义的可能质疑。

笔者相当认同邓小虎对《荀子》中道德转化的基本重构：经由实践儒礼，个人采纳并内化其背后的规范性框架；经由这个过程，个人得以转化其自然欲望，做出更好的判断，感受与行动也都更加合宜，并活出与他人共享的和谐人生。笔者也认为邓氏对儒家规范性框架具个人整合功能的说法对理解《荀子》相当有帮助。诚如其言，这透过礼整合自身人性与社群和谐生活，是荀子对礼的说法的一个重点，也使礼更富有吸引力。[29]然而，邓先生在重构中强调“自主”或是“现代自主理想”——一种对自我的完全控制——作为道德转化的目标，是笔者认为值得斟酌的，以下详论。

三、对“自主”的强调：一些厘清

邓小虎主张，道德转化的一个终极目标在成就“现代自主理想”，使人们成为“自主的行动者”。针对这个主张，吾人可问三个问题：（一）“现代自主理想”的意义为何？（二）荀子式道德转化是否能算是“现代自主理想”的一个成就？（三）成就“现代自主理想”又是否真是荀子道德转化的终极目标？以下探讨这三个问题。

（一）现代自主理想

“自主”（autonomy）最一般的意义为“独立”“拥有或创造规范自身的律法”“自治”“依循自身意愿的自由”“个人自由”等。[30]而与自主高度相关的概念则包括“对自身完全掌握”“自由”“个人主义”“与他人区别”“权利”以及“理性”[31]。“自主”一词可使用于不同脉络，笔者的焦点则放在与本文最相关的“个人自主”这个概念上[32]。庄锦章为“个人自主”提供了一个基本的解释：“个人有能力与自由去实现对自身认同重要的计划。”[33]笔者以这个解释为起点进行探讨。以下先做一些初步的厘清工作[34]。

第一，这里讨论的自主理想关涉庄锦章所称之“积极自主”——是关于对自身行动与人生的控制“来源”的讨论，而非关涉“消极自主”（不受外在束缚的行动自由）[35]。

第二，这里讨论的“自主”是一种成就（而非基本能力）。它牵涉到转化过程中长期训练下所成就的高超技能（expertise）。换句话说，笔者的讨论聚焦在“一个人具有某些高超技能，能主导自己依对自我认同深切相关的计划或价值而行动”，这样的人具有“个人自主”。

第三，“自主”这个西方概念本身包含不同的意义；或者说，不同的西方“自主”理论，对这个词的说法与着重点都不同。然而，“自主”这个概念还是牵涉到一些核心特征或是相关现象。庄锦章和信广来的两篇相关论文，其重要工作便是在指出儒家伦理学重要特色中与西方“自主”概念的关键面向相关联之处[36]。庄锦章聚焦在儒家对“志”的发展、成就一个整全自我以及自我主导所需下的功夫等的说法，与“自主”概念的关联。信广来则讨论儒家所强调的人类做社会区分、反思及评价个人行动与人生等能力；并指出个人的社会背景与作为社群一分子的这个身份会影响其思考与评价，而这反思与判断的能力独立于外在控制，可视为“自主”的一种展现[37]。在本文中笔者跟随庄、信二氏的做法，讨论荀子理论中与“自主”概念相关联的部分，但也将同时指出荀子理论与“自主”概念中不完全相融贯的部分。

“自主”概念的核心特征为何？庄锦章着重于一个人主导自身，依对自我认同深切相关的计划或价值而行动的能力；信广来则强调不被外在因素决定的反思判断。可看出这两位学者注意到“自主”概念牵涉到一个人依自己判断而行的“胜任能力”（competency），以及此判断与计划应可归属于自身的“本真性”（authenticity）[38]。John Christman进一步为这两个自主概念核心条件提出简要说明：“胜任能力条件包括了有理性思考、自我控制所牵涉的各式能力，以及能够免于使人衰弱的病理原因、系统性自欺等不当影响。”“本真性条件则常包含反思自身欲望、价值等，并为其背书（或认同）的能力。”[39]

可以看出，自主概念强调的是个人自身的反思与独立于外在影响因素的重要性。并且，如同Christman所指出，“在判断一个人是否自主时，并不规定相关欲望或价值等的内容应该为何”。也就是说，自主概念的重点在于一个人的行动（或是计划、人生等）与自我认同之间的关系，它是价值中立的。另外，与接下来讨论相关而值得一提的是，如果我们仔细检视自主概念的这两个核心条件所牵涉的能力，会发现它们都是个人的内在资源，而且主要是与理性相关的能力。

以这些厘清为前提，下文接着探讨邓小虎重构理论中理想行动者在何种意义下是“自主”的行动者。笔者将论证：邓先生所主张的“自主”与以上笔者分析的当代自主理想两者间有重要的不同点。

（二）邓小虎主张的“自主”

邓氏所指的“自主”是否只是指“心”的基本反思抉择能力？如前所提，荀子认为一个人的行动必然先经过他的“心”评价与认可，而心的评价并不被“欲”或其他因素决定。值得注意的是，这“反思行动者”面向的自我并不是道德转化的成就，而是在转化前即已存在。在转化前，由于缺乏适当的规范性框架，心的判断会有“不中理”的情况，而欲望可能会对个人的决定与行动有很大的影响力[40]。但是，即使在这个情况下，仍是“心”做出评价与选择，而并非被“欲”控制或驱迫，个人的行动也不应被理解为被自身的欲望控制或决定——这是因为“做出评价”“发出认可”本身就包含采取一个反思立场、与欲望或外在因素保持形式上的距离而不必然被其决定等意涵。若“自主”指的就是这种根据反思而支持自身选择与行为的能力，荀子应该会认为，至少所有反思能力正常的成年人都是自主的。

邓小虎对自主的看法，很明显比心的基本反思决断能力强。自主是一种成就，而根据邓氏所言，一个自主的行动者，其“人生是由一个整全的自我来指挥与主导的”，而这个行动者“根据自己的计划积极地主导自己的人生”[41]。这里的自主概念符合笔者之前所提：“一个人具有某些高超技能，能主导自己去从事对其自我认同深切相关的计划。”

邓氏又做了进一步要求：“自我的整全（integrity）与人生的自主只有在自我与人生都被一个规范性框架所架构的情况下才有可能。”[42]这个要求使他主张的“自主”在意义上比“具基本反思性”或“根据自身的计划行动与生活”更强：人们必须采纳并内化一套规范性框架来整合自我，而其计划与目标也应符合这个规范性框架。

值得注意的是，虽然这个意义下的“自主”比“具反思性”或“根据自身的计划行动与生活”更强，但目前为止这还仅是一种形式上的要求，并没有对规范性框架的内容做特定约束。很明显，满足了“具反思性”和“依规范性框架整合自身计划、行动与生活”这些形式条件，并不保证一个人就会依据儒家观点进行“正确的”思考与行动。因此，吾人很自然会问：一个满足这些形式条件，但是依循一个不同于儒家思想的规范性框架（比如采取了道家框架或是自利框架）的人，是否也算邓小虎主张中的“自主”的人？换句话说，人们是否有可能采纳不同规范而达成邓氏所谓的“自主”，而儒家只是提供其中一种规范？[43]

邓小虎未在文章中直接处理这个问题，但有理由认为他会持否定态度[44]。对他来说，接受儒家规范性框架（或非常类似的框架）对于达成“自主”而必要的，原因是“自主”要求人对自己有“扎实的掌控”，而这只有在我们真的知道自己是谁、自己真的想要什么的情况下才能达成[45]。他认为，儒礼提供了对人性最好的诠释，因此只有经由实践儒礼，吾人方可得到这类知识与掌控。他指出，儒家规范性框架并非发现于外在世界，也并非由人性直接导出，而是“由吾人的行动与人性互动中建构而成，其作用在于掌握最佳展现人性的行为模式”[46]。从这些说法可以推论，邓小虎不会认为儒家规范性框架只是一种对人性可能的诠释，而会认为它是将人性紧密地纳入考量而为人类整体的善提供最佳说法的诠释。儒家规范性框架，是以人性作为框架发展起点与约束来源，采纳它所达成的“自主”不只是一个形式上的整合，而是由人性与其潜力作为内容，以和谐、满足的社群生活为方向的实质整合。

从此可看出，邓氏所考虑的“自主”是一种有力而实质性的（而非形式性的）自身控制，因此比之前介绍的“现代自主理想”在意义上丰富许多。这种“自主”除了要求一个人要形成整全的自我，更要求对自我有“真确知识”以便对自身能有扎实的掌控，而且其中经历不断反思的规范性框架，所根据的是一个特定的、文化上与群体间对人性、自我、人际关系的诠释。这个诠释具有实质的价值内容：要求人们将自身“作为人”“作为关系与社群的一部分”这些身份视为核心身份，并以养欲、共善以及和而不同的社群生活为目标。

从某些特定观点来看，儒家这套诠释的确可被视为至今对人性的最佳诠释。然而，一个值得思考的问题是，是否所有合理的、考虑到人类处境的规范性框架，都应接受儒家诠释中对人性、自我与人际关系的预设？简要来说，我们可以观察到以下几点预设，而每一点都颇具争议性：

1. 人们应将自身“作为人”视为其核心身份，而所谓“人”包含了儒家对人性的特定看法[47]。

2. “自我”应作为社群中的一分子，在关系中被理解。

3. 人们应以共善为目标，而共善构成了个人的善[48]。

4. 善并非来自于人性，而是来自于圣贤根据文化与众人对人性的诠释所做出的创造性活动（如制礼）。即使人们有成善成圣的潜能与条件，但努力并不保证必然成就，道德转化需依赖圣贤的智慧。（此点尤其是荀子思想的特色。）

5. 善德如仁、义等应在合于礼的意义下来理解。也就是说，这些价值与规范被理解为深植于文化与体制之中，在概念上与文化和群体对人性的诠释相联结[49]。（此点尤其是荀子思想的特色。）

邓小虎所主张的这种“自主”值得考虑。这个主张中有两个明显的特色：“实质价值预设”与“自我控制”。笔者用了一些篇幅讨论前者，现在简短厘清后者。邓氏如何理解“自我控制”？前面已经讨论过的反思决断能力、对自身行动与计划的主导能力、根据规范性框架形成整全的自我，以及对自我有所谓“真确知识”（儒家诠释）以便对自身能有扎实的掌控等，都明显包含在内。但吾人应如何理解“对自我的主导”与“扎实的掌控”的内涵？由于邓氏未有进一步说明，笔者认为这部分便留下了诠释的空间。

第一个可能的诠释是，邓小虎所主张的“荀子式自主”中的“控制”概念，援引了“现代自主理想”中所使用“强意义下的自我控制”概念：强调控制来自“本真的自我”而非他人，并多半以个人的“内在理性资源”达成。笔者称这类“自主”为“实质自我控制式”自主，以反映出这个主张中强调“自我控制”与“实质价值预设”两个特色。如之前的讨论中显示，邓氏不但认为满足“荀子式自主”的理想行动者会满足现代自主理想的基本形式要求——具有某些高超技能，能主导自己去从事对其自我认同深切相关的计划——而因此也许能成为现代自主理想的一个例子。（以下笔者会提出这方面的疑虑。）也许他甚至有更高的期望：认为满足“实质自我控制”的行动者就算不成为现代自主理想的唯一典型，也会成为一个模范[50]。由于邓氏将“荀子式自主”与“现代自主理想”如此紧密联结，行文中讨论到自我控制时也常使用“现代自主理想”的相关概念，笔者认为这个诠释有其可能。

第二个可能的诠释则是，虽然邓氏将“荀子式自主”与“现代自主理想”紧密联结，但他使用“控制”概念时其实并未援引“现代自主理想”中所使用那么强的“自我控制”概念，只是指某种较弱意义下的“自我主导”。笔者并不排除此一可能性[51]。在这个情形下，邓氏的看法与笔者之后将说明的荀子式道德转化中所牵涉的自我丧失，也有可能相容；而吾人可将“实质自我控制式”的自主，视为一个可从邓小虎既有说法而开展出来的立场[52]。

以下笔者对以上第一个诠释（视“实质自我控制”的自主为“现代自主理想”的范例）提出两点疑虑。这两点疑虑主要都是关于其“实质价值预设”的主张。（关于这类自主中强意义的“自我控制”这个主张，笔者将在之后提出质疑，指出荀子式道德转化与这类“自我控制”并不相容。）

第一，儒家规范性框架是否能作为对人的“真知”，本身即有争议。如前所论（这也是邓小虎的立场），儒家规范性框架并不由人性决定，也不由某种宇宙规律或是人作为理性存有而决定，而是根植于一套对人性具创造性、累积性的诠释。根据荀子的立场，世界的状态并不事先决定道德，这由他强调“天人之分”与“礼成于伪”便可看出[53]。在这个立场中，儒家的框架只是根植于一个文化中众人对人性的诠释（虽然它可能根据某些预设、从某个观点来说是最佳诠释），这个诠释做了一些具争议性的预设而不见得会被广泛认为是最佳诠释；另外，吾人亦无法确知这个诠释是否“真确”的知识；而且，原则上这个框架（至少在礼的设计上乃如此，而仁义又在概念上与礼相联结）很可能会因为人的处境与文化的改变而有所调整[54]。

第二，这种强调“实质自我控制”的自主，与西方现代自主理想的基本概念，事实上难以协调。西方“自主”的基本概念，如前所提，是关于自我主导、独立，以及免于外在限制的自由。这个基本概念蕴含着一个想法，就是个人具有基本的能力（或充足资源）来反思个人处境并理性选择自己的目标，因此对个人目标内容基本上是采取价值中立的态度。基于这个原因，强调“实质自我控制”的自主与此基本概念有两个不协调之处：首先，“实质自我控制”的自主预设一个很特定的理论观点为真（儒家对人的诠释），而这个预设与“自主”的基本价值中立观点有冲突。举Bernard Williams所用的著名例子[55]来说，虽然一个为了完成自身对艺术的追求而抛弃家庭的画家也许会被认为是不道德的，但他的自主性一般来说却不会受质疑——毕竟他就是依循定义他自身认同的“根本计划”（ground project）而行！但是根据“实质自我控制”的看法，这个画家却不是自主的。针对这个例子，邓小虎可能的回应是，这个画家其实对自己没有“真知”，因此他所依循的计划并不是根据他“真正的自我认同”，也因此不具本真性（此计划并非真是“他的”）。但这个回应彰显了这部分讨论的一个隐忧：计划的本真性（或行动的自主性）难道不是由行动者对自身的反思理解来决定，而是根据文化以及群体对人性的诠释来决定的？若是如此，在自我认同上对他人的依赖与现代自主理想中对独立的强调，两者会产生冲突。

再者，在这个立场中，人们自身并未拥有所有达成“自主”的必需资源或能力，而必须向外（文化、社群）学习儒家规范性框架。由此可见，这个道德转化理论在自主、个人独立性、个人自由等面向其实有其限制：儒家框架作为一个文化与群体对人性的诠释，虽不是完全不能修改的，却也无法为个人差异性量身定做。一个采纳这个规范性框架的人，在某种意义上要准备好放弃自己定义自我、表现自我的独创性[56]。

至此吾人应可看出，荀子理论中的理想行动者虽然在某些意义上是自主的，但这种强调“实质价值预设”的自主与西方意义下的自主还是不完全一致的，有不协调之处。因此，荀子式道德转化很难算是“现代自主理想”的一个成就。两者的比较，不仅展现出《荀子》与西方自由主义中对行动者看法的不同，同时也提供了一个机会，深入探索儒家自我观的两个面向之间的关系与张力。

在讨论这点之前，笔者先回答本节一开始提到的第三个问题：“自主”对于荀子来说是否是道德转化最重要的目标？笔者将论证不必然如此。从前面的讨论我们可以看出，“实质自我控制”这种自主十分强调“自主”作为对自身扎实的、全面性的控制，而即使对现代自主理想，“独立”与“自我控制”也是很核心的特征。但是对儒家而言，转化的目标是使人成为一个美好的自我，过着仁与义的道德生活。自主可能可以有助达成这样的生活，或是这样的生活包含某种意义下的自主，但是“独立”或强意义下的“自我掌控”本身在荀子理论中并不明显有内在的价值或作为终极目标[57]。以下笔者将在讨论荀子理论中的理想自我后，指出在道德转化以及理想存在中，其实有三种意义下的自我丧失——这将削弱行动者厚实意义下的“现代自主理想”，以及邓小虎所强调的“全面自我掌控”。基于这个原因，与其说荀子认为转化在于实现现代自主理想，或是“实质自我控制”，不如说是在实现“实质自我导正”以美化自我。

四、比“自主”更重要的目标：美化自我

邓小虎“采纳儒家规范框架以助于自我整合”这个说法相当具启发性，也使儒礼更具说服力。然而，《荀子》中道德转化并不仅是关乎在社群内调养并满足个人的自然欲望，或是让吾人自我整合成为自主的行动者[58]。道德转化有更进一步的目的：美化自我。荀子在《劝学》中有言：“古之学者为己，今之学者为人。”[59]此“为己”的学习目标是什么？在什么意义下是“为己”“为人”？荀子接着说明：“君子之学也，以美其身；小人之学也，以为禽犊。”荀子认为学习重点并非为了被人所知、得到他人赞美，从他人获取名利或是自我满足，而是为了提升自己，“美其身”。换句话说，道德转化在于将个人的存在境界往美善的方向提升。以下笔者将做进一步说明。

在儒家论述中，“美”的概念常伴随“德”与“善”，而与恶相对[60]。荀子除了主张君子之学在于美其身，也明确指出“性不能自美”[61]，这种学习必涉及有意识的、长久累积的努力（“伪”）。他进一步说明，这种学习牵涉到整个人的转变，包括心、身，并展现在人的言行中[62]。诚然，荀子在《正论》中对圣人的形容就是“圣人备道全美者也”。

这种须经由此类学习才可能达成的存在样态是何种面貌？在何种意义下它是美的？我们已知，在《荀子》中道德转化必须经由学习并实践儒礼。荀子认为，人有自然的情感与欲望，而正确的教化不在于去除这些自然的倾向，而是在精炼、修饰它们。礼的实践不仅在于使人每日的活动（如吃喝）有节制且和谐，使人的意志与行为合乎理，使人的态度与情感适当，且将文化带入一个人的容貌、举止与气度，使人不至于“夷固僻违，庸众而野”[63]。这种教化牵涉到一个人原初能力的发展，以及自然情感与欲望表现的优化：不仅适时予以引发或停止，也适时调节强度，同时赋予其适当的意义[64]。经由这样的教化与学习，一个人不只行为受到调节，心的判断合于理，他的自然倾向也经转化而变得优雅合宜，他所成就的德与善也展现在他美好与喜乐的存在中[65]。

礼的本质，在于顺人情以调节人际关系。荀子认为，在礼中情感和态度的改变应足以表明关系的亲疏贵贱[66]。这对人际关系的引导调节以解决潜在或实际上的（包括内在或外在的）冲突相当关键，对道德转化来说也是不可或缺的。的确，对荀子（或普遍儒家）而言，道德转化主要经由调节导正个人与他人的关系而实践，而理想的自我状态——圣——便是在人际关系中臻于完美的状态[67]。对儒家来说，最基本也最被强调的德行与善——仁——便关涉人对他人的态度与人际关系。一个人转化后的美，在重要的意义上来说，便展现在他与他人的关系中。笔者稍后会根据儒家“仁”的概念进一步说明这种美好的存在状态。

现在先简短总结：到目前为止，笔者承袭邓小虎的基本立场而发展出来的荀子理想自我的主张，笔者称之为“实质自我导正”：《荀子》中的理想自我，是经由学习与实践儒礼，对有导致恶的倾向之本始材质不断有意识地加工形塑所达成的美好成果。这加工形塑根据一套文化与群体对人性的诠释，目的在转化人的自然状态并为所有人带来和谐的生活。人心本有反思能力，能对自身欲望与行动做出评价与选择。经由对自身的加工形塑，人心逐渐采纳儒礼背后的规范性框架，而能做出合乎理的评价与选择。此外，人的其他原初能力（如做社会区分、形成社会关系）与基本情感倾向等也获得培养与引导。这些能力与倾向的表现受到文化调养，整个人的存在状态获得提升，变得美好而喜乐。

之前提到儒家自我的两个面向，都在这个主张中扮演重要角色。人心具有反思与判断能力，扮演着反思行动自我的角色。这个角色对自我转化极其重要：心会对自身欲望、倾向与行动做出评价与选择，但是这个判断并非没有依据。转化前，可想见人已经置身在某种文化之中而得以汲取某些判断依据[68]；更重要的是，经由学习，心得以采纳儒家规范性框架，能对自身选择、自身社会关系，甚至个别社会规范进行进一步反思，判断其是否符合儒家规范性框架，而做出自我导正。并且，儒家规范性框架根据的是一种对人性的诠释。这个诠释本身也可能依据反思（尤其是圣贤的反思）而进行调整修正、自我导正。这些都是自我“反思行动者”面向的展现，对自我道德转化是不可或缺的。

另一方面，荀子认为人必群居，人必须发展并妥善运用其做社会区分与形成社会关系、社会规范的原初能力，最终学习儒礼以转化自我，才能达成和谐与共善。经过这个评价、采纳与实践规范性框架的过程，人们才能一起建构最符合身处环境以及既存文化的对人性的诠释：儒礼。诚然，儒家对人性的诠释，根源于群体在文化中的互动，而人必须透过实践儒礼，以采纳这个由自己与他人共同建构、涉及社会关系的儒家规范性框架。经过这个过程所产生的理想自我，必然将自己视为社群的一分子、社会关系与社会秩序中的一部分，并据此规范自己。在这个意义下，一个人在社会关系与社会秩序中的地位，构成了人的核心身份，而这就是社会性自我的形成；也就是说，经由道德转化，反思行动面向的自我逐渐接受甚至支持自身慢慢由社会性自我所形塑。在这个理解下，自我的两个面向之间可以合理并存，并没有不良的紧张关系。[69]（以上是笔者“实质自我导正”说的第一步说明。这个看法与前述“实质自我控制”说法的差别，在下一段对自我丧失的讨论中会更清楚。）

至此可见，理想自我与他人之间的关系是规范性的，这个关系是经由众人接纳与实践礼而建立起的。这个说法中自我与他人之间联结的重要性看来像是衍生自个人所接纳的规范性框架。也许有人会担忧：他人，对于自我而言，是否只是这个规范性框架的化身？然而，以上并不是笔者对儒家他我关系的完整看法。笔者认为，道德转化改变一个人的意识状态，使转化后的自我与他人有更亲密而直接的联结。笔者在讨论“仁”之后会对这个转化有进一步的说明。

五、实质自我导正：经由自我丧失来形塑自我

根据笔者对《荀子》中理想自我的说法，很明显可看出其中的“自我”并非一种恒定不变的存在——在自我形塑的过程中，自我是不断变动的。笔者接下来论证：荀子式的自我转化是经由自我丧失以及与他人相连所达成的。在这个自我形塑的过程中，人在三个意义下会丧失自我：1. 人会丧失部分其天生的倾向（也就是荀子所理解的人性）与世界互动中所自然形成（或至少未被导正）的表象，虽然这些表象有可能被这个人认同为（过去）自我的一部分。2. 人在历经礼的训练与实践过程中，会失去对自身“扎实、全面的掌控”。这是因为在这段过程中，人其实无法具体而全面地了解礼的教化是如何在自己身上产生作用的，他也无法预测转化后的自我有何确实的存在样态。3. 转化后，人会失去原本在意识中以自我为中心的倾向，他的自我会与他人实质相连。笔者“实质自我导正”这个主张因为观察到上述三个面向的自我丧失，故此应与前述“实质自我控制”式自主以及“现代自主理想”区别开来。这部分的论文以文本辅助，初步探索这些意义上的自我丧失。

（一）自我之“状”的改变

荀子强调礼在化性中的重要角色。他对“化”的说法是：“状变而实无别而为异者，谓之化。”[70]“状”可以理解为“表现出的状态”，如“老幼”或是“蚕蛾”皆是一物不同之状；“实”则为“本体”，如幼变为老，蚕变为蛾，但其实对其物来说同一无别。[71]那在化性之中，何者为“状”，何者为“实”？可以注意：荀子在《正名》中对“性”其实有不同的说法，第一为“生之所以然者谓之性”，第二为“性之和所生，精合感应，不事而自然谓之性”。对此二句的解释，常见的说法是，“生之所以然者”是指天生的“生理之性”；“性之和”为人之“心理能力”，有生长之力、知能之具；“精合感应”则是耳目等与所闻见之外物相结合而产生感应所自然形成的倾向或状态。[72]笔者在另一篇文章提供了文本分析来讨论礼乐化性的问题，并论证第一用法中的性应理解为天生的官能、不具体的生理与心理趋力、倾向等，也就是性之“实”，笔者称之为“狭义性”，是不能改变的天性。第二用法中的性应理解为包括“狭义性”与其作用于日常生活经验“自然”产生，由耳目感官、心理能力与外物“精合感应”而培养出的较具体倾向与表现，也就是性之“状”，笔者称之为“广义性”。“状”则是可能经由“伪”（人心的思虑学习与长久努力的累积）而改变。对荀子来说，那些自然形成、尚未被导正的“状”是人性在其所处环境的自然表现，而它多半导致争夺与混乱，因此有礼乐化性的必要。“化性”便是由于礼乐等对“（狭义）性”“加工”，导致源于“（狭义）性”并经过一般生活经验所自然形成的心理结构与行为（也就是广义性、“状”）的改变，成为理想自我。

可以看出，在自我形塑的过程中，一个人逐渐失去自身基于天性（狭义性）在与世界互动中自然形成、尚未被导正的自我，而转变成理想的“伪”、理想自我。形塑出来的理想自我，便是转化后的“状”，部分由狭义性构成，部分由伪（包括礼的实践以及对儒家规范性框架的采纳）所构成。也因此，道德转化会令人失去某一部分的自我，不只是某种自我表述或是跟自我有关的内容，而可能是自我的一部分——可以想见，虽然只是表象，一个人在转化前仍可能将此表象视为自我认同的一部分，而依据这部分的自我理解世界，透过行动与世界互动。

另外，这种状的改变也牵涉到一种自我控制的丧失：如前所述，荀子理论的一个特色，在于这个构成理想自我的规范性框架主要是由他人（圣贤、社群）所提供。将自我托付在这个主要由他人提供的规范性框架中而成就新的自我，便是放弃了自我作为自我控制与自我诠释的充分来源。这种自我丧失与之前所提及的本真性与原创性的问题相关，也因此，从强调自主（或自我控制）的观点来看，在一些例子中（如Williams的艺术家例子）这类自我丧失可能会被视为是需要斟酌的[73]。但这类自我丧失，对荀子来说，是一件好事。

（二）朝向未知的旅程

上一段谈到的自我丧失相信是相当符合常识、容易理解的。接下来笔者论证：由于道德转化牵涉到对礼的学习与实践，这种转化可被理解为一趟朝向未知的旅程。将自己委身于这样一趟旅程，也是一种意义下的自我丧失。在这个状况下，一个人同样无法宣称自己对自我拥有厚实意义下的完全控制。

不同于其他形式的道德教育（如跟随老师研习经典、学习思辨），礼的实践（以及乐的陶冶——另一种荀子强调的教育形式）直接牵涉到人类情感、动机与身体倾向。如前所述，礼的实践作用在调节、优化整个人的各个层面。荀子认为礼可以调养人认知、情感与感官等能力。实践礼的经验帮助人培养品味，改变人的信念与判断，澄清一个人的志向，并调节人的情感、欲望及其表达。[74]

值得指出的是，即使礼的设置是根据一种对人性的诠释，不过在转化之前人们对礼的作用及个中原因并没有清楚的认识。荀子在《礼论》中解释了许多重要礼仪的缘由，但是要完全掌握礼，人们还是必须跟着老师亲身学习并实践礼。荀子多次指出跟随老师与礼的实践对道德教育的重要性，比如《劝学》中这一段便非常清楚：“学之经，莫速乎好其人，隆礼次之。上不能好其人，下不能隆礼，安特将学杂识志，顺《诗》《书》而已耳。则末世穷年，不免为陋儒而已……不道礼宪，以识《诗》《书》为之，譬之犹以指测河也，以戈舂黍也，以锥餐壶也，不可以得之矣。故隆礼，虽未明，法士也；不隆礼，虽察辩，散儒也。”如果一个人在学习中不跟随老师指导而想依赖自身的想法来做，根据荀子的说法，就是如同“以盲辨色，以聋辨声”，是完全行不通的[75]。诚然，荀子认为虽然大部分的人试着遵守礼，其实并不了解礼。[76]

因此，对礼的实践虽然会改变一个人的认知、情感和身体倾向，人们却不知道这个改变如何发生。事实上，除了一些经典（如《论语》《荀子》）中对圣人与德的笼统描述外，人们也无法确定这个改变具体来说意味着什么。从这里可以清楚看出，不但一个人的理性与感性能力不足以为自己提供自我诠释或创造自身的规范（如前所述，这造成转化中第一个意义下的自我丧失），这些能力甚至不足以在一个人的转化中引导自我。一个人立志跟随老师学礼、实践礼，可谓将自我委身于自己的老师以及儒家规范性框架下，开放自己身心灵让整个人随之改变，踏上未知的旅程。[77]此时，虽然道德转化也许是自愿的，也是反思下的决定，但他可谓对儒家规范性框架与他人（包括制礼的圣贤、文化背后的群体，以及所跟随的老师）让出了对自身的掌控。这是转化中第二意义下的自我丧失[78]。

（三）意识的扩张：在关系中丧失自我

在转化的过程中，一个人开放自身的身心灵，让礼乐来调节甚至重塑自己的各种倾向。可以合理推测，在这个过程中，人的意识状态也随之改变。[79]有鉴于上一段对未知旅程的讨论，笔者并不打算宣称自己真确知道圣人的心理状态。然而，儒家经典仍提供了许多材料，让吾人思考探究。笔者在此集中讨论儒家的核心德性：仁。之前提过，“仁”关涉到人对他人的态度行为以及人际关系，是儒家最基本也是最被尊崇的德行善性。理想自我的美的一个核心表现就在其仁德。采纳儒家规范性框架并将其内化，如何能转变一个人的意识状态从而成就仁的表现？笔者的论证是，道德转化改变一个人的意识状态，使其焦点得以扩张——在个人的意识中，他人会结构性地与自我联结，成为自我关注的对象，而一个人对自身的关注也会被重塑，当中包含对他人的觉知与关怀。笔者主张这便是理想转化中第三意义下的自我丧失。

孔子认为“仁”不只是可能的，也是对每个人易于接近的德性。他说：“仁远乎哉？我欲仁，斯仁至矣。”（《论语·述而》）然而，如曾子与颜渊的感慨所示，易于接近并不表示能轻易达成。[80]仁人的境界为何？为什么“夫仁者，己欲立而立人，己欲达而达人”？

“仁”调节个人对他人的态度和人际关系，在《荀子》中被视为核心价值与品德。仁的基本概念是对人关怀、爱人。[81]然而这种爱与关怀并非一视同仁没有分别，而是有亲疏差等，并有其适当的表达方式。仁展现于一个人的想法、言语、行为与情感中，其表现应由礼、义来引导与节制。荀子在《大略》中明言：“亲亲、故故、庸庸、劳劳，仁之杀也；贵贵、尊尊、贤贤、老老、长长，义之伦也；行之得其节，礼之序也。仁，爱也，故亲；义，理也，故行；礼，节也，故成。仁有里，义有门。仁非其里而处之，非仁也；义非其门而由之，非义也。推恩而不理，不成仁；遂理而不敢，不成义；审节而不和，不成礼；和而不发，不成乐。故曰：仁、义、礼、乐，其致一也。君子处仁以义，然后仁也；行义以礼，然后义也；制礼反本成末，然后礼也。三者皆通，然后道也。”[82]

荀子视仁义为最重要的德，认为两者皆应由礼义引导并展现于礼。然而，仁与义的作用并不完全相同。荀子在《不苟》中言：“君子养心莫善于诚，致诚则无它事矣。惟仁之为守，惟义之为行。诚心守仁则形，形则神，神则能化矣；诚心行义则理，理则明，明则能变矣。”这段话不容易理解，有许多不同的诠释。[83]比较没有争议的部分是，“诚”一般解为诚其意、不自欺，是养心的首要工作；诚心后，还应守仁行义才能转化。注意到这里心对于仁在于“守”，而行为应该“合于义”。吾人可推测，“仁”在这里比较类似动机，而“义”比较类似行为应符合的规范。那么，仁作为关怀、爱、动机，具体来说表现为何？

由于“仁”是关爱众人，虽然君子自然便会关怀自己的家人，但他会在这个自然的基础上，依循礼义的引导，将他的关怀扩展至他人——这是他的价值选择的结果，是志于道的表现。对于一个转化后的人，对他人合宜的关怀便是他的基本态度。他不再仅专注于自身或是个人利益，因为这些不是他最重要的考量。荀子常使用“恭”“敬”来形容仁人的态度[84]，这可以理解成仁人对道的恭敬之心，也可看出他不再以自己为中心而将他人放在自身之前的态度。荀子在《性恶》中，将这种经由“伪”的转化而改变个人的注意焦点说得很清楚：“今人之性，饥而欲饱，寒而欲暖，劳而欲休，此人之情性也。今人见长而不敢先食者，将有所让也；劳而不敢求息者，将有所代也。夫子之让乎父，弟之让乎兄，子之代乎父，弟之代乎兄，此二行者皆反于性而悖于情也。然而孝子之道，礼义之文理也。故顺情性则不辞让矣，辞让则悖于情性矣。用此观之，人之性恶明矣，其善者伪也。”[85]

在转化后，这种注意焦点不同的意识状态是自然发生而非有意而为的——这会成为个人意识结构性的一部分：当我进入一个情境时，会知觉到情境中的他人；当我考虑不同的行动可能性时，会想到情境中的他人会如何受影响；某些在逻辑上是可能的选择（如将自身放在首位而忽略他人），可能不会出现在我的意识中成为选项；而一些其他可能的选择（如虽然对自己无利但是对他人有利的行动），则可能开始出现。我的关怀及于他人，而我的意识的焦点扩张了：在我的意识中，他人会结构性地与自我联结，成为我的焦点。

这里笔者借讨论孔子“夫仁者，己欲立而立人，己欲达而达人”这句话的意涵，进一步阐明此意识结构性的改变。对这句话一个常见的诠释是仁人以自身为例，将一己所欲施予人。这个诠释相当合理，也令我们认为孔子也许不只是专注于一般被视作较为被动的“己所不欲，勿施于人”的教导，只求不带给别人困扰磨难，而也积极追求他人的利益福祉。然而，这句话还有一个面向也值得注意：仁人在想成就自身的福祉时，会先为他人而行。为什么？一个值得考虑的理由是，这时，在他心中，他人的福祉其实构成了自身的福祉。此时仁人并不是因为希望追求自身福祉，而视达成他人福祉为此目标的手段或工具，进而先勉力成就他人；也不是在心中对他人和自身的福祉做一个衡量与比较，而决定他人的福祉可以优先。对仁人而言，他人的福祉“构成”或“就是”自身的福祉的一部分。在这个意义上，他人在意识中结构性地与仁人自我联结，成为注意的焦点。

另外，在转化的过程中，一个人不只注意焦点扩张、转移了，他对自己的想法和对情境的理解也会因为加入关系的结构而产生改变。转化前，人将自我与他人区别，只关怀自己，满足自身的欲望。然而，由于礼特别强调人际关系与个人在关系中的角色[86]，礼的实践让一个人渐渐将自己视为关系中的一部分，例如儿子、晚辈、朋友或者社群中的一员。他此时不仅觉知到他人，也觉知到自己与他人的关系。他对自身的意识及关注被重塑而包括对他人的觉察，以及和他人相连的自己。他不再是一个独立于他人的存在。在他接受了儒家规范性框架而转化后，他整个人接受了新的世界观而与他人紧密联结起来。此时，他失去了他过去的自我，那个独立的、与他人分离的、被他视为优先的一种存在。杜维明把这种转变说得很清楚：“儒家礼仪的一个明显特征，在于在一个人的自我养成中不断地深化与扩大对他人存在的知觉。”[87]这便是第三个意义下的自我丧失。

值得注意的是，前两种意义下的自我丧失主要关于自我认同和自我控制，而这个意义下的自我丧失关于意识中自我的改变。这个意义下的自我丧失，是强调自我应是独立的、与他人区隔开的那类思想（如现代自主理想）所不乐见的。

厘清这部分的转化的意涵后，我们可以回头讨论一个之前提出的问题：对于仁人来说，他人对自我的重要性是否仅由儒家规范性框架衍生而出？如笔者之前所论，仁人对于他人的关怀是有差等的，这份关怀也必以合礼义的方式表达。对于仁人而言，他人是否仅是其所遵循的规范性框架的化身，只是刚好扮演了关系中另一方的角色，而仁人的关怀仅在于好好扮演自己的角色？如果真是这样，仁人与他人之间的关系似乎相当薄弱：他对他人的感受、与他人之间的关系，都有其道德信念作为中介，而与他人没有真正厚实而亲密的关系。这种情况下，仁人其实可能面对道德疏离的问题。

若本文的重构正确，《荀子》中的理想自我并不会有道德疏离的问题。这是因为对仁人而言，他对每一个人的关怀都是真实而具体的。这份关怀的表达的确会受到礼义的引导与约束，但是关怀的背后是对对方真实的情感，真心地视人如己。如笔者所指出，仁人对他人和自己的看法都在转化中改变了，这份变化在于仁人意识状态的结构已然不同。他人与自我之间的关系这时表现在何为他的注意焦点，他如何思考和感受自身行动，以及如何看待他人与自己。一个转化后的人，与他人的关联是实质紧密的。这份联结并非成圣的手段，而是圣人存在状态本身。

六、结论

本文探讨了他人与他我关系在《荀子》自我转化与理想自我中扮演的角色。笔者介绍了儒家自我的两个面向：反思行动者面向与社会面向，并指出两者之间似乎存在的紧张关系；接着检视邓小虎对礼与社群在自我转化中扮演角色的说法，并以其基本立场为基础，发展出对《荀子》自我转化与理想自我的诠释。笔者意图借由对这个诠释所牵涉到“自主”问题的探讨，探究在这个诠释中自我的两个面向之间可能的紧张关系。笔者先厘清“自主”的不同意义，讨论《荀子》中理想自我在何种意义下可称为“自主”，以及此种自主的特殊性。荀子式自主有别于“现代自主理想”与“实质自我控制”，应被理解为一种“实质自我导正”。笔者进一步论证，“自主”中常被强调的“独立”与“自我控制”等特征，其实并非《荀子》中自我转化的终极或重要目标：虽然荀子强调“心”的反省与主宰能力，但他对道德转化主要的关心并非在于达成独立的、完全的自我控制，而是在于对自我加工，形塑出一个美好的、与他人实质上紧密相连的自我。在这个转化过程中，个人在三个意义下失去自我。

根据笔者的诠释，在自我转化中，一个人将自己托付给儒家规范性框架，而此框架根植于文化与群体对人性的诠释。在这个过程中，人将失去其人性与世界互动自然形成的表象以及自我诠释，失去对自身完全的掌控而踏上朝向未知的旅程；也失去以自我为焦点的意识结构，而建立与他人的紧密联结。这些意义下的自我丧失，制造了自我与他人之间，以及自我的两个面向之间的紧张关系。然而，这份紧张关系不必被视为一个问题，反而是理想自我动态式的、辩证式的形成中必要的张力：它让我们保持开放与灵活。荀子强调：在礼中仍应思索[88]，礼者顺人情也[89]，而文理情用应相为内外表里[90]。这份自我与他者之间的张力，让我们与世界有真实的联结，也让我们有机会接触到更理想的感受与更适当的想法，而不会陷于抽象的规范、纯粹的意识形态，以及孤独的自我。对于荀子而言，这是成为人的必经之道。

（作者单位：台湾政治大学哲学系）

Crafting the Self through Losing the Self: Exploring Xunzi's Ideal Self and the Role of Others

Wang Hua

One may think that the best strategy to survive and to flourish, especially during hardship, is to focus on oneself and to strive for one's own benefit. Indeed, this is one piece of advice Elie Wiesel got on his arrival at Auschwitz: "Listen to me, boy. Don't forget that you are in a concentration camp. Here every man has to fight for himself and not think of anyone else. Even of his father. Here there are no fathers, no brothers, no friends. Everyone lives and dies for himself alone."[91] However, this is not the only advice he got. He also got a contrary warning: "We are all brothers, and we are all suffering the same fate. The same smoke floats over all our heads. Help one another. It is the only way to survive."[92] The person holding this latter view is not alone. In fact, a survivor of the camp at Treblinka recalls, "In our group we shared everything; and the moment one of the group ate something without sharing it, we knew that it was the beginning of the end for him."[93]

These contrary comments may stem from two conflicting views, egoism and altruism. However, they also express different views about the self and its survival:the first isolates one's self from others and focuses on one's own benefit; the other view implies a strong other-relatedness of the self. In this latter view, helping others is not just being altruistic, but it is only when one connects with others so tightly — as fathers and sons, as brothers, as fellow sufferers—that in one's considerations one does not isolate oneself from others and prioritize oneself, that one can survive and maybe even flourish.

Many have pointed out that the Confucian concept of the ideal self and self-transformation significantly involve others, starting with the connection with one's family, extending to community and ultimately to people in general.[94] In an important sense, for the Confucians, the ideal self is not independent, but interdependent on others. This emphasis on the connectedness and interdependence between the self and others can be clearly seen in Confucius' well-known comment: "the person of ren仁 (the ideal person in Confucianism), wishing himself to be established, sees that others are established, and wishing himself to be successful, sees that others are successful."[95] Wei-ming Tu puts this view nicely: Confucianism emphasizes "self-cultivation through communication with and sharing in an ever-expanding circle of human-relatedness."[96]

To this view, one naturally asks: What is the role of others and one's relation with others, in the Confucian account of self-transformation and the ideal self? Also, is there any tension between the self and others in this view of self-transformation? For example, is this relation between the self and others compatible with the view that the self is (or should be) reflective and autonomous?[97]

Valuable work has been done based on Confucius' and Mencius' views to address these questions.[98] However, I know of less work in this vein regarding Xunzi's account. In contrast with Mencius, who puts strong emphasis on the heavenly endowment in human nature and cultivation, Xunzi takes the ideal state of the self, i.e., sagehood, to be an artifice resulting from doing inventive and accumulative work on the originally crude (if not bad) [99] human nature. The crucial part of this work involves learning and practicing Confucian li (礼) (rituals). It is through such intentional effort that one gradually crafts oneself into an ideal self. In this transformation process, one's heartmind (xin心), human nature (xing性) and others all play significant roles. Given Xunzi's strong emphasis on rituals and human creative activities, even though there are important similarities among Confucian philosophers' views on the idea of self, his view on the ideal self is worthy of further attention. The aim of this paper is thus to explore Xunzi's account of the ideal self, self-transformation and the roles others play in this account.

Tang (2012) argues convincingly that Confucian rituals instantiate a normative framework containing norms for interpersonal relationships and personal behavior. This normative framework is based on a cultural and collective interpretation of our nature. Through adopting this normative framework, one achieves an understanding of one's overall good, and a unified and other-related self. Tang further argues that the agent, through learning and practicing rituals, gains "control" over himself and his life, which Tang considers to be an ultimate expression of the modern ideal of "autonomy".

I am sympathetic to Tang's basic position, and I find his emphasis on the moral transformation as an achievement of the modern ideal of autonomy worthy of further investigation. I argue that, even though the ideal agent is autonomous in some sense, the ultimate goal of the Xunzi an self-transformation is in some ways in tension with the modern ideal of autonomy. Even though, as I argue, this does not render the two aspects of the Confucian self, the social aspect and what I call the "reflective agent" aspect, incompatible — in fact, this tension is part of what keeps one improving and flourishing as human.

In the following I will first introduce the two aspects of the Confucian self I just mentioned and the apparent tension between them. I then examine Tang's account of the role rituals and community play in self-transformation, and develop an account of the ideal self and self-transformation following Tang's basic position. Then I explore the possible tension between these two aspects of the self in this developed account. I do this by addressing the issue of autonomy. I explore the sense of autonomy that is attributable to Xunzi's ideal self (and the senses that are not) and the particularities of such autonomy. I then argue that autonomy is not an ultimate goal of self-transformation. As we will see, even though Xunzi emphasizes that the heartmind has the reflective capacity and is the master, his concern for moral transformation is not so much for the complete control of the self (or the heartmind) or one's life; rather, it is to craft the self into a beautiful and substantially (instead of merely normatively) other-related existence. I argue that in this self-crafting process, one unavoidably loses oneself in three senses. Indeed, Xunzi's self-transformation is through self-loss and the connectedness to others.

Ⅰ. Two Aspects of the Confucian Self and the Apparent Tension

Many have pointed out that, according to the Confucians, human beings are primarily social beings, and that the Confucian notion of self primarily involves others and the social roles one occupies. Some go as far as claiming that, for the Confucians, given that their conception of one is always in relations with others, "there can be no me in isolation".[100]

For Xunzi, social relations and social norms are also crucial to the self and self-transformation. Human beings not only have natural affection for family and friends, natural desires for food, comfort, honor, security and profit, but we have a unique capacity to draw social distinctions, and to follow social norms developed from such distinctions.[101] Given that humans necessarily live with others in a world with limited resources, Xunzi urges that this capacity to draw social distinctions is important, and it needs to be developed and applied well; otherwise there will be chaos.[102] One is to participate in social relations and follow social norms, to learn and practice rituals, and to satisfy one's basic desires accordingly. Furthermore, one should cultivate abilities and states of character in social contexts through ritual practices[103], so that one can be transformed and beautified, and ultimately fully instantiate an ideal human.

One, however, does not follow social norms blindly in this process. Many have noted the Confucian emphasis on the capacity of reflection of one's heartmind, as well as its capacity to issue decisions and actions according to its reflection.[104] In the Confucian account, the heartmind is capable of reflecting on one's choices and one's life, making evaluations, and directing one's life based on such reflection without being determined by external influences.[105] Xunzi may be understood to hold an even somewhat stronger view of the heartmind. Xunzi is very clear on the idea that the heartmind is the "lord" of the body[106] and the "spirit"[107]. It issues commands but does not receive commands.[108] Moreover, in Xunzi's account, one's heartmind does not just have a capacity to be reflective and to evaluate actions; rather, it plays a crucial role in any judgment or action:the heartmind necessarily evaluates desires and decides whether to approve of the relevant action, and "actions must be mediated by the heartmind's approval".[109] Xunzi contends, "order and disorder lie in what the heartmind permits and not with the desires", and thus moral education lies not in reducing desires, but in getting what the heartmind permits to coincide with correct principles (li理).[110]

Such reflective capacity not only allows one to step back from one's existing inclinations and actions, and reconsider their propriety; it also allows one to step back from one's place in the social order, and reconsider the propriety of the existing social norms such as the rites. In the Analects Confucius argues that certain rites are not appropriate for the time, and this readiness to reevaluate and deviate from traditional norms can also be seen in the Mencius and the Xunzi. It is worth noting that, in these cases, one need not examine social norms from a view from nowhere or from a purely egoistic perspective; rather, such deviations (and adaptations) can be socially informed and guided. As Kwong-loi Shun nicely puts it, they are "based on a certain rationale underlying the social order that can only be realized in this evolving order".[111]

We may thus distinguish two important aspects of the Confucian self:one is the social or other-related aspect, and the other is what I call the "reflective agent" aspect. However, an apparent tension between these two aspects may arise upon closer consideration:on the one hand, the self in the first aspect is to be understood by the social roles it occupies. One is to follow social norms, and to transform oneself accordingly. In this picture, it is not clear how one may see oneself as a 'me' that is not embedded in any social relations or defined by the social norms. On the other hand, the self in the second aspect is understood to be reflective, being able to step back from one's actual social relations and to rise above one's current situation. In this "reflective agent" picture, there is clearly a 'me' that is not necessarily bound by others or by the existing social norms. It thus seems that it is difficult to have a coherent account of the self with both aspects, where the self is at the same time other-related and can only be understood in relations, as well as reflective and transcending all existing norms and relations.[112]

Some may argue that this apparent tension only stems from a lack of distinction between existing social norms and the underlying rationale. Following Kwong-loi Shun's comment that one's examination of and deviation from the existing social norms is based on the rationale underlying the social order, some may conclude that what really constitutes and binds the self is not the existing social norms and actual people/relations, but the underlying rationale that is unchanging and independent from others and the existing norms. This reply is worth considering. One may wonder:what is the nature and the source of such a rationale, and how does it constitute the self? Moreover, one worry may arise:in this view, the self-other relation seems quite thin — others (and one's relation with others) seem crucial to the self only as a derivative of such a rationale. If this were the case, one might be argued to suffer from a form of moral alienation from others.[113] Is this how the Confucians, Xunzi in particular, conceive of the self-other relation? (I address this problem at the end of the paper after I elaborate the Confucian ideal of ren.)

Tang (2012) provides an insightful account of Xunzi's ideas on self and community. In this paper, I examine this account and further develop a view of Xunzi's ideal self to address this apparent tension. It helps us see how the two aspects of the self may coherently figure in Xunzi's account of moral transformation and Xunzi's conception of the ideal self. Tang's discussion focuses on the formation and the function of Confucian rituals. So, before turning to Tang, I first briefly introduce rituals in Xunzi's account.

Xunzi understands rituals to arise from the human need to survive and flourish. Xunzi's view is that humans are born with desires they seek to satisfy. In this process of seeking, internal conflict among desires[114] and external struggles with others unavoidably arise if no regulations are imposed, and this causes chaos and impoverishment. To address this problem, Xunzi argues that it is not to rid oneself of desires or reduce the number of desires; rather, desires (as well as judgments and actions) need be guided.[115] Rituals are devised to resolve (internal and external) conflict and chaos, and bring human lives to a better and more beautiful state. Indeed, rituals are not only to divide things among people, but to nurture one's desires by transforming them. The effect is that the transformed desires are never dissatisfied due to the limitation of the material goods, and material goods are never to be depleted by the transformed desires: "In this way the two of them, desires and goods, sustained each other over the course of time. This is the origin of ritual principles."[116]

Ⅱ. Tang's view of the self and community in the Xunzi

Tang provides an account of the roles rituals and community play in Xunzi's view of moral transformation as he reconstructs it. Through moral transformation, people become ideal agents and attain the good life. According to Tang, in this ideal state people's desires are satisfied, they enjoy human relationships within the community, and most importantly, they become integrated and autonomous agents — people who can control and direct their lives, and are not just driven by their momentary desires. One ultimate goal of this moral transformation is the achievement of the modern ideal of autonomy.[117]

This attainment of the good life and autonomy is achieved through practicing Confucian rituals in the community. Confucian rituals, Tang points out, instantiate a normative framework containing norms for interpersonal relationships and personal behavior. Practicing Confucian rituals helps to nurture our desires and allows people to live harmoniously in a community. Moreover, community also plays an important role here. A community for Xunzi, notes Tang, is not just any group of people, but is "an assembly of people structured by rituals"[118]. A community is thus the embodiment of the normative framework aforementioned. Tang argues, "the best nourishment of desire...is only possible when the person is cultivated by the community".[119]

Besides regulating relationships and nourishing desires, Tang especially emphasizes the crucial roles rituals and community play in people's "self-realization" as integrated and "autonomous" agents. Tang argues, "community and its embodied tradition are essential to and constitutive of human selfhood"[120], and "it is through such a normative framework that a person organizes himself into a unified self that can evaluate and control his own momentary and spontaneous desires."[121] Tang's reason is that, through adopting this normative framework, one achieves an understanding of one's overall good, and one can thus evaluate desires and distinguish important desires from insignificant ones. The person adopting this framework thus achieves an understanding of himself and his life, and he is no longer "controlled" or "enslaved" by momentary and insignificant desires.[122]

We can already see two ways in which others (and one's relations with others) are crucial to one's ideal transformation in Tang's account. (As we will see later in this paper, this presence of others in the self-transformation process gives rise to an interesting tension between the two aspects of self.) First, a necessary step of this self-transformation, i.e., the adoption of the normative framework, significantly involves others:this adoption is through learning and practicing rituals, which is to maintain normative relationships with others; moreover, it needs to take place in a community, which, as noted, is an assembly of self and others structured by rituals. This transformation clearly leads one to identify oneself as relational to others and as part of the community.

Secondly, according to Tang, this normative framework is based on "a cultural and collective interpretation of our nature".[123] Given that one's ideal transformation requires adopting this normative framework, it is not just one's normative relations with others that form the transformed self, but others' interpretation of life and human nature which also constitutes the transformed self (through one's adoption of the normative framework). Indeed, Tang holds that "community and its embodied tradition are essential to and constitutive of human selfhood"[124]. I find this point inspiring, and later I will argue that the fact that others play significant roles in self-transformation brings tension between the two aforementioned aspects of the self. Here I will only clarify the sense in which the normative framework is "based on" a cultural and collective interpretation of our nature.

It should not mean that a collective interpretation "determines" the normative framework, since this omits the important role sages play in the invention of the rituals. Xunzi explicitly claims that rituals are established by the sages to resolve the problem of conflict and disorder.[125] It is reasonable to think that this process took a long period of time, through much trial and error, for rituals to stabilize as a long-standing practice. This trial and error process also needs to be embedded in a specific cultural context and collective wisdom. It is thus reasonable to think that the Confucian rituals result from the cultural and collective interpretation of our nature in a weaker, non-determinant sense. Moreover, it should be noted that it cannot just be any cultural and collective interpretation, but some kind of wisdom (e.g., sagehood) and success in practice also need to be involved in the invention and the selection process for the followers to have confidence in the general correctness of the rituals, and to an important extent, to avoid falling prey to relativism.

I am sympathetic with Tang's basic position:one achieves the ideal self by learning and practicing Confucian rituals and taking up the underlying normative framework; through this process, one transforms one's natural desires, makes better judgments, feels and acts more in line with what is appropriate, and can live harmoniously with others. Moreover, I find Tang's emphasis on the person unifying function of the Confucian normative framework helpful. Indeed, this unification — of one's nature and one's harmonious existence with others achieved through following Confucian rituals — is a significant attraction of Xunzi's account of rituals.[126] However, Tang's emphasis on autonomy as a form of complete control of the self and the goal of moral transformation requires further investigation.

Ⅲ. The Emphasis on Autonomy: A Clarification

Tang argues that one ultimate goal of moral transformation is the achievement of the modern ideal of autonomy:for people to realize themselves as autonomous agents. To this position, two questions may arise: (1) What is the modern ideal of autonomy? Is the Xunzian moral transformation indeed the achievement of this ideal? (2) Is "autonomy" indeed the goal of moral transformation in Xunzi's account?I address these two questions in the following sections.

1. The Modern Ideal of Autonomy

In the most general terms, "autonomy" means "independence", "having or making one's own laws", "self-government", "liberty to follow one's own will" and "personal freedom".[127] Related concepts clustered around it include "self-mastery", "freedom", "individualism", "separateness", "rights" and "rationality".[128] This term is used in various contexts, and here I focus on the most relevant concept:personal autonomy (or individual autonomy, instead of political autonomy, for example).[129] Chong (2003) provided a basic account of personal autonomy: "The individual's ability and freedom to realize projects that are important to his or her own identity."[130] I take this as my starting point. Some preliminary clarifications are in order.

First, the ideal discussed here is concerned with what Chong calls the "positive conception" of autonomy[131]— the kind of self-directedness that is concerned with the source of control over one's actions and one's life, rather than with the "negative conception" of autonomy, which is concerned with the freedom from external constraints on actions.[132]

Secondly, the sense of "autonomy" in question is an achievement concept.[133] It involves expertise that results from long-term training during the transformation process. So, my focus is on one's expertise at directing oneself to act on projects (including desires, values, etc.) that can count as "hers", or as Chong puts it, on projects that are important to her own identity.

Thirdly, it should be noted that the western notion of autonomy admits different senses; or to put it differently, different theories of autonomy depict this notion differently and have their respective emphases. However, this is not to say that there are not some core features or a range of phenomena that are associated with the notion of autonomy. Indeed, the valuable work Chong (2003) and Shun (2004) did was to focus on features of Confucian ethics that connect with essential aspects of autonomy. Chong focused on the Confucian emphasis on the development of aspirations (志), achieving the integral self, and the effort required for self-directedness and how these features connect with the notion of autonomy. Shun addresses the Confucian emphasis on human capacities to make social distinctions, to reflect and assess one's action and one's life, and how one's reflection is informed by one's social background and one's identity as a member of the community. Shun suggests that this capacity to make reflective decisions is independent of external control, and thus counts as a form of autonomy.[134] Here I follow Chong and Shun's work in pointing out features of Xunzi's account as Tang reconstructed it that connect with essential aspects of autonomy, but later I also address the aspects of Xunzi's account that may be in tension with the thick notion of autonomy.

What are the essential features of autonomy? Chong's and Shun's respective views provide insights. Chong addresses one's ability to direct oneself to act on projects (including desires, values, etc.) that can count as "hers". Shun addresses the importance of reflective decisions that are not determined by external influence. Their shared emphasis is on one's competence to act on one's project and the authenticity of one's projects.[135] John Christman provides a brief summary of the competency conditions and authenticity conditions involved in the conception of autonomy: "Competency includes various capacities for rational thought, self-control and freedom from debilitating pathologies, systematic self-deception and so on ... Authenticity conditions often include the capacity to reflect upon and endorse (or identify with) one's desires, values and so on."[136]

It is important to note that this conception of autonomy emphasizes one's own reflection and independence from external influence. Moreover, as Christman points out, there is "no stipulations about the content of the desires, values and so on, in virtue of which one is considered autonomous ..."[137] In other words, this conception of autonomy focuses on the internal relation between one's action/project/life and one's identity, and is thus in a strong sense value-neutral. For my purposes (which will become clear soon), it is also worth noting that, if we look carefully at the capacities that are involved in both of these conditions, we can see that they are mainly concerned with one's rational capacities, which are one's internal resources.

With these clarifications of the modern ideal of autonomy, I explore the sense in which the ideal agents in Xunzi's account as Tang reconstructed it may be autonomous agents. I will point out that Tang's view of autonomy is in fact much stronger than and in tension with the modern ideal of autonomy as I just put forward.

2. Tang's View of Autonomy:Substantive Self-Control

Tang recognizes that for Xunzi, one's heartmind necessarily evaluates one's actions and issues approvals, and its evaluation is not determined by desire or other influences. This reflective aspect of the self exists before moral transformation. Even though due to the lack of a proper normative framework, one (or one's heartmind) may approve of certain actions without following the correct principles, one is not driven or "controlled" by these desires (even though these desires may have strong influences on the heartmind's decision[138] ) — since to evaluate and to approve by definition is to adopt a reflective stance and to endorse the result of reflection, and is thus not determined by desire or external influences. If "autonomy" refers to the capacity to reflectively endorse one's actions (or that one in fact does), we can safely assume that (at least) any normal adult is "autonomous" in this basic sense in Xunzi's account.

Clearly Tang's view of autonomy is stronger than this. An autonomous agent, according to Tang, has "a life commended and directed by a unified self"[139], where the agent "actively directs her life and lives it according to her plans and projects".[140] This notion of autonomy matches what I formulated earlier: one's expertise to direct oneself to act on projects (including desires, values, etc.) that can count as "hers".[141]

However, Tang makes a further requirement of autonomy: "The integrity of the self and the autonomy of one's life are only possible when the self and the life are structured by a normative framework."[142] Understood in this way, Tang's "autonomy" is stronger than being reflective or acting and living according to a plan that renders her recognizable as a unified agent:one needs to adopt and to be unified according to a normative framework, with plans and projects in accordance with this normative framework.

Notice that, even though the conception of autonomy depicted so far is stronger than the agent simply being reflective or living in accordance with her plan, it is still a formal depiction, without special constraint on the content of the normative framework. Clearly, being structurally "reflective" (where evaluation and approval is necessary in the process) and being unified with a plan and normative framework does not mean one will be able to reflect and act "properly" according to the Confucian perspective. One naturally asks, can someone, matching the criteria so far presented, adopt a different normative framework from the one instantiated in Confucian rituals, say, an egoistic framework or a Daoist framework, and still be an "autonomous agent" in Tang's account? That is, is it possible that the Confucian teaching just provides one possible way to achieve Tang's idea of autonomy?[143]

Tang views the adoption of the Confucian normative framework (or something very similar to it) provides a very plausible answer (if not necessary) for achieving autonomy— not just any normative framework will do.[144] Tang views autonomy as "a firm command of the self", and we can only have that if we "know who we truly are and what we truly want"[145]. According to Tang, we gain such knowledge and command through Confucian rituals, since it plausibly provides the best interpretation of human nature. He argues that the Confucian normative framework is not "discovered externally in the world", and not "derived directly from our nature".[146] It is, rather, "constructed through the interplay between our actions and our nature; they are meant to capture those patterns of behavior that best express and actualize our nature".[147] He argues, "[the]Confucian interpretation of human nature is represented in the Way of humans as understood by Xunzi". The Way of humans allows two things:to "live harmoniously with one another in a unified community", and "[enabling]the best nourishment of our desires".[148] From these comments, we can gather that Tang would likely say that the Confucian normative framework is not just one possible interpretation, but it is the interpretation that takes our nature into account closely and provides the best account of the overall good of humans. With human nature as its starting point and its constraint, the adoption of the Confucian normative framework is more than a formal unification, but has human nature and potential as its content, and has the harmonious and content community life as its direction.

From this, we can see that the kind of "control" Tang proposes is strong and substantive (instead of merely formal), and thus the form of autonomy is much stronger than the modern notion of autonomy I discussed earlier. It requires "true knowledge" of oneself and the normative framework that is being adopted and acted from as "true knowledge" is based on a specific, cultural and collective interpretation of human nature, the self and interpersonal relations, and treats the nourishment of desires, the common good and a harmonious communal life structured by distinctions as the aim. It clearly has substantive value content.

This Confucian interpretation is endorsed by some, and from a certain perspective, to be the best interpretation available. However, it is unclear all reasonable normative frameworks with accounts of human conditions need to accept its assumptions, and certainly reflective minds may disagree with one or more of them. Specifically, this interpretation presumes the following:

(1) One treats humanity as one's core identity, and humanity here refers to a specific view of human nature.[149]

(2) The self should be understood in relations and as part of a community.

(3) One's aim should be at the communal good, which constitutes individual good.[150]

(4) (Particular to Xunzi's view) Goodness does not come from human nature, but from the sage's creative invention based on a cultural and collective interpretation of human nature. Even though people have the relevant resources to become good, there is no guarantee that people will achieve goodness even if they try, and they need to rely on the sage's inventions in the transformation process.

(5) (Particular to Xunzi's view) Goodness such as ren (仁) and rightness (义) are understood in terms of ritual propriety (礼). That is, these values and norms are conceptually tied to a cultural and collective interpretation of humanity, and thus deeply embedded in culture and institution.[151]

This is a form of autonomy worth considering. Given the strong emphasis on self-control and the substantive value presumptions involved in this account, I call Tang's view of autonomy "substantive self-control". Presumably the ideal agent in this account will fit the formal depiction that she has the expertise to direct herself to act on projects (including desires, values, etc.) that can count as "hers", she serves as an example of the modern ideal of autonomy. However, Tang's view seems stronger than that. He may think that the ideal agent serves as the paragon of autonomy, if not the only example of autonomy.[152]

Here I address two concerns I have with this substantive self-control as an example (or the paragon) of the modern ideal of autonomy. First, we may question whether the Confucian normative framework indeed counts as "true knowledge" of oneself. As we know, in Xunzi's view the Confucian normative framework is not determined by (or the direct derivative of) human nature, by cosmic order or by one's capacity as a rational human being; rather, it is an interpretation through creative and cumulative effort. Indeed, according to Xunzi's position, there are no predetermined moral facts given how the world is (or woven into the fabric of the universe, so to speak) — thus his emphasis on wei为，the creative and cumulative effort, for the invention of the Confucian rituals.[153] The Confucian framework, given this position, is just a cultural interpretation of human nature (even though it may be the best, given the assumptions mentioned earlier). Epistemologically we cannot know whether it is the "true" answer, and in principle it may change if the situation we face or the culture changes.[154]

Second, as I pointed out, this form of autonomy that Tang describes clearly involves substantive value content: the Confucian (in this case, the Xunzian) interpretation of human nature and the ultimate good. However, there is tension between this form of autonomy and the basic western notion of autonomy. The basic idea of autonomy, as I discussed earlier, is about self-directedness, independence from others, and freedom from external constraints. It implies that individuals have the capacities (or at least all the resources) to reflect on their situation and rationally choose their own ends, and it carries the idea of value neutrality toward that end. However, Tang's view of autonomy is not only stronger, but is in tension with this basic idea in two ways. To start with, it is only attributed to a particular theoretical perspective (the Xunzian idea of the Way of humans), and this conflicts with the common claim to value neutrality in the attribution of autonomy. For example, the artist Gauguin depicted by Bernard Williams[155] may usually be counted as immoral for abandoning his family for his artistic pursuits, he may still be counted as an autonomous agent, given that he is acting from his ground project (which, by definition, is tied up with his identity as he conceives it). But in Tang's stronger view of autonomy, he is not. Tang might argue that, in this case, Gauguin does not have true knowledge of himself (since his belief about himself obviously does not match the Confucian interpretation), thus his project is not authentically his, given that it is not based on his "true identity". This reply raises my worry exactly:should the authenticity of a project not be determined by a person's reflective understanding of himself, but instead by the cultural and collective interpretation of presumed human nature? This dependence on others in connecting with our own identity seems to clash directly with the modern ideal of autonomy.

Moreover, in this account one does not already have all the capacities or resources guaranteeing one to be "autonomous", but has to learn from the culture and the community to adopt the Confucian normative framework. Indeed, this account of moral transformation has its limitations regarding autonomy and individual independence and freedom:as a cultural and collective interpretation of human nature, though not completely closed to revision, the Confucian framework is not something best tailored to individual differences. A person taking up the normative framework needs to in some ways be prepared to lose her complete originality in expressing her individuality.[156]

It should thus be clear that the ideal agents in Xunzi's account are "autonomous" in certain ways; however, this autonomy is in tension with the modern ideal of autonomy. The comparison between the modern ideal of autonomy and substantive self-control shows the difference between the liberal (as well as the Kantian) idea of agency and that of Xunzi. It also provides us a way to see the relation (and the tension) between the two aspects of the self in Xunzi's account. Before I move to address that issue, an elaboration of the goal of Xunzi's moral transformation is crucial.

Now I turn to the second question I raised in the beginning of this section: is "autonomy" (including the modern ideal of autonomy and substantive self-control as Tang suggests) the ultimate goal (or at least one ultimate goal) for moral transformation in Xunzi's account? I argue that it is not. For Confucians, autonomy is good because the ethical life of ren (仁) and rightness (义) is the aim, and autonomy helps one transform and live such an ethical life. This life also involves some form of autonomy. It is not clear, however, that autonomy itself is intrinsically valuable in Xunzi's account, or is one ultimate goal.[157] In fact, I argue that there are ways in which one loses oneself during moral transformation and in the ideal life. This undermines the agent's autonomy in the thick sense, as well as the complete "control" of the self that Tang emphasized. In the following I first address the nature of the ideal existence and the role of others in this account. I then move to address three ways of self-loss in this account.

Ⅳ. More than Autonomy: a Beautiful Self

I find Tang's emphasis on the self-unifying function of the adoption of the Confucian normative framework inspiring. Indeed, the substantive self-direction Tang argues for is a significant attraction of Xunzi's account of rituals. However, moral transformation is not just about nurturing and satisfying our desires in the community, or unifying us as autonomous agents.[158] It serves a further aim:it aims at beautifying the self.[159] Xunzi says, "In antiquity men undertook learning for the sake of self-improvement (or "for theirselves", which is a more direct translation for "为己"); today people undertake learning for the sake of others." What is involved in self-improvement? (Or we can ask, following the direct translation, in what sense is it for one's self?) What does "for the sake of others" mean? Xunzi immediately answers these questions: "The learning of the gentleman is used to beautify his whole person (美其身). The learning of the petty man is used like ceremonial offerings of birds and calves."[160] So according to Xunzi, learning is not used for gaining fame or profit from others.[161] Rather, the most crucial aspect of moral transformation is to beautify the self, or to what I call "raise up one's whole state of existence" (at least from the Confucian perspective).[162] Here I elaborate on this point.

In Confucian discourses (and in Chinese culture in general), the concept of beauty is often linked with the concept of virtue and goodness, and is contrasted with the concept of moral badness.[163] We saw that Xunzi's view of the learning of the gentleman is to beautify himself. Also, he clearly states that without such accumulative effort, wei (伪), human nature cannot beautify itself.[164] He further describes such learning as involving the change of one's whole person, including one's heartmind as well as one's body, and it will manifest itself in one's activity and words.[165] Indeed, Xunzi describes a sage as someone who thoroughly perfects himself in the Dao and is a person of complete beauty.[166]

What kind of existence can one achieve through such learning?In what sense is it beautiful? As Tang has pointed out, the learning and the practice of rituals play a crucial role in Xunzi's moral transformation. Xunzi thinks that we have natural affections and desires, and a proper guidance is not to rid ourselves of such natural dispositions, but to refine them. The point of the ritual practice is not only to render one's daily activities (such as eating and drinking) harmonious and measured, to bring order to one's aspirations and ambitions and render one's actions reasonable, as well as one's attitudes and emotions befitting the situations, but it is also to bring culture to one's manner and appearance, so one does not seem "arrogant and obstinate, depraved and perverted, utterly commonplace and savage".[167] This guidance involves the transformation of one's raw capacities and the refinement of the expression of natural emotions and desires — regulating when to enhance them and when to stop them, and also induce them and provide them with meaning when appropriate.[168] Through such learning, not only is one's behavior regulated, but one's heartmind and one's natural dispositions are refined and transformed, and the achieved virtue and consummate goodness is manifested in an existence that is regarded as joyful and beautiful.[169]

The essence of ritual is about guiding human relations. Xunzi says, the changes of emotion and manner should be sufficient to make clear that the rank is high or low and that the relation is near or distant, and rituals are to provide guidance. The use of rituals "ornaments social relations. They provide distinctions between the obligations due near and far relations and the eminent and humble."[170] The guidance for human relations is crucial for resolving potential or actual (internal as well as external) conflicts as well as bringing about the transformation of the self. Indeed, for Xunzi (and Confucians in general), transformation is largely through regulating and changing one's relation with others, and the ideal selves — the sages — are people who are perfect in human relations.[171] Moreover, the fundamental as well as the most exhorted virtue and consummate goodness in Confuciansim is ren (仁), a virtue regarding one's attitude toward others and personal relations. In an important sense, the beauty of the transformed self is manifested in one's relation with others. Later I will elaborate on the nature of such a beautiful existence based on the Confucian idea of ren (仁).

Before that, I briefly summarize my proposal of Xunzi's ideal self so far, a view I have developed from Tang's account. I call it the "substantive self-correction" view: an ideal self, in Xunzi's account, is an achievement by learning and practicing the Confucian rituals and adopting the underlying normative framework. This self-crafting process requires intentional and accumulative effort. The Confucian rituals are also creative designs from accumulative effort. They are based on a cultural and collective interpretation of human nature and aim at nurturing human's natural state and bringing harmonious living for all. One's heartmind is reflective by nature, and through this self-crafting process, one's heartmind adopts a proper normative framework and is able to evaluate and decide according to correct principles. in this process one's raw capacities to make social distinctions and form social relations also develops, and one's natural affections and desires are guided and nurtured, their expressions refined, and one's whole existence is thus cultured and beautified.

The aforementioned two aspects of the Confucian selves both play crucial roles in this account: it should be clear that the heartmind plays the role of the reflective agential self, and this role is crucial for the transformation of the self. It necessarily adopts a reflective stance toward one's existing desires and inclinations, however, this reflective agential self does not reflect from a perspective of nowhere. Even before transformation, conceivably one is already immersed in the surrounding culture and absorbs certain kind of basis for judgment.[172] More importantly, through learning, the heartmind can adopt the Confucian normative framework, correct oneself, and also evaluate this framework piecemeal.[173]

Moreover, Xunzi thinks that humans are bound to live with others, and the only way humans can satisfy their desires and prosper is by developing and making good use of their capacity to make social distinctions and form social norms and relations, and ultimately adopt Confucian rituals and transform themselves. Indeed, through this process of adopting and evaluating normative frameworks, collectively people establish an interpretation of our human nature that best fits our environment and our existing culture: the Confucian rituals. The ideal self, achieved through learning and practicing rituals, identifies oneself as part of this community life and social order, and regulates oneself accordingly. In this case, one's place in social relations and social order deeply constitutes one's conception of oneself, and that is the formation of the social aspect of the self. In this case, there is no problematic tension between the two aspects of the self I mentioned earlier. Rather, through moral transformation, the reflective agential self becomes constituted by the social self, and the former accepts or even endorses this.[174]

This is my initial account of Xunzi's view of the ideal self, the substantive self-correction view. Next I will show how this view may be different from the substantive self-control account (and the modern ideal of autonomy) I mentioned earlier. Before that, I would like to flag a potential worry for my view:clearly the ideal self in this view is related to others in a normative sense — through one's adopting and practicing rituals. One's connection with others may, however, seem derivative from one's normative framework. Others, to the self, seem to be merely the embodiment of the normative framework. This may be a cause for concern. It is worth noting that this initial account I just provided is not a complete depiction of the self-other relation in Confucianism. My view is that the transformed self also connects with others in a much more intimate way. I argue for this view after I elaborate on the nature of the ideal self based on the Confucian idea of ren仁.

Ⅴ. Substantive Self-Correction: Self-Crafting Through Self-loss

It should be clear that in the substantive self-correction view, the self is not a static existence. Rather, it goes through changes in the self-crafting process. I argue that, in the self-crafting process there are three senses in which one loses one's self: 1. One loses one's naturally formed (or at least before-corrected) expressions of one's nature, which one may identify as part of one's (old) self. 2. One loses one's firm control of oneself by going through the training of rituals, with no clear prediction of how it works or what the transformed self will be. 3. The unified ideal self is also substantially other-related:one loses the focus on oneself in one's consciousness, and structurally connects with others. These three senses of self-loss mark the distinction between my view and the other two views of self-directedness aforementioned: "the modern ideal of autonomy" and "substantive self-control".[175] This part of the paper is mainly exploratory and preliminary, but I try to provide textual support for the discussion.

1. The change of one's appearance

Xunzi emphasizes the importance of rituals in the transformation of human nature. He characterizes 'transformation' as follows, "where the appearance undergoes metamorphosis, but there is no distinction in the reality, yet they are deemed different, it is called 'transformation'."[176] In the transformation of human nature, what is the "appearance", and what is the "reality"? Xunzi points out two uses of "human nature"[177]: let's call "what characterizes a man from birth" his "nature1" ; and call "what is produced out of the harmony of inborn nature, out of the sensibilities of the organ tallying as the senses respond to stimuli, and what from birth is effortless and spontaneous" his "nature2". I discussed this passage (and some other issues concerning moral transformation) elsewhere based on a close textual analysis.[178] Here I will just rehash the main points to facilitate discussion: "nature1" is something that cannot be changed, and the "nature2" is what is formed without cumulative and good effort — this is the part that can be transformed (huazing化性) and should be contrasted with the idea of "wei" (伪). (cumulative and good effort or what is formed by it, e.g., rituals. See fn.63 for further explanation.) According to Xunzi, when people follow their natural state, then (internal as well as external) conflict and disorder arise, and rituals are designed to resolve this problem through a transformation of people; the difference between sages and others is not in their nature, but in wei.[179] Following these ideas, we may understand "reality" to be referred to "nature1" or the entity with "nature1", the appearance before transformation (that may lead to chaos) to "nature2" (maybe with the help of some human artifice), which is not formed or corrected by rituals (or the Confucian normative framework) and the appearance after transformation to "wei", or the virtuous existence, the crafted self.

It should be clear that, in the self-crafting process, one loses one's naturally formed states (nature2, states prior to "correction" ) in the sense that such states are transformed into "wei". For Xunzi, such natural states are just appearances or expressions of human reality (nature1). This natural expression leads to bad consequences, so rituals are designed to guide and correct it. Conceivably, even though it is just an appearance, one may still identify it as part of oneself, and before transformation, act accordingly. One (or more specifically, one's reflective self or one's heartmind) is urged to see the bad consequence of such expression of oneself (self as nature1), and transform oneself (self as nature2).[180] One's new and crafted self, one's appearance after transformation, is partly constituted by one's nature (nature1), and partly constituted by the effortful, constitutive activity — ritual practices and the adoption of the Confucian normative framework.

Thus, in this transformation one loses one's naturally formed expression of one's nature, which one may identify as part of one's (old) self. It is worth noting that this form of self-loss involves a loss of self-identity, it is thus not just the loss in the expression of the self (or content of the self), but it also involves the loss of one's own (previous) way of interaction with the world (including one's understanding of and reaction to the world). Moreover, it involves the loss of one's control over oneself: recall that what is particular to Xunzi's account is that this transformation is through adopting a normative framework that is essentially provided by others (the sages or the community). Entrusting oneself to this normative framework and form such new existence is, in a way, to give up the self being the source of control and self-interpretation. This form of self-loss can thus be connected with the issue of originality and authenticity I discussed earlier, and in some cases (e.g., Williams' Gauguin case) such self-loss may be considered problematic from a concern for autonomy — especially from the modern ideal of autonomy, but also from the general idea that emphasizes strong self-control.[181] This self-loss according to Xunzi, however, is a good thing.

2. The journey to the unknown

Next I argue that, given that the transformation process involves ritual practices, such transformation is in a way a journey to the unknown. Entrusting oneself to such a journey is also, in a sense, a loss of self. In this case, one cannot really claim to have complete control of oneself in a different sense.

Different from other forms of moral education, such as following teachers to study classics and to deliberate, ritual practices (and music, another form of education strongly emphasized in the Xunzi) engages one's emotions, motivations and body directly. As mentioned earlier, ritual practices work to tune and refine one's whole person. Xunzi thinks that rituals can nurture one's cognitive, affective and sensory faculties. Through the experience of ritual practices, one can develop taste, change one's beliefs, clear one's aspiration,[182] and regulate one's emotions and desires, and their expressions.

It is worth noting that, even though rituals are designed as an interpretation of human nature, before transformation one does not really have a clear understanding of why and how exactly they may work. Xunzi does explain in the chapter Discourse on Ritual Principles (《礼论》) the rationale for some important rituals, but one needs to learn and practice rituals with a teacher to truly master them. Xunzi clearly states the necessity of teachers and ritual practices in moral education: "If you can neither be devoted to a man of learning nor exalt ritual principles, how can you do more than learn unordered facts or merely mechanically follow the Odes and Documents? In this case you will never, even to the end of your days, escape being nothing more than an untutored Ru ...one who exalts ritual principles, though he may never gain a clear understanding of them, will be a model scholar, whereas one who does not exalt them, though he undertakes investigations and makes discriminations, will remain only an undisciplined Ru."[183] If one does not follow the teacher in ritual practices but tries to rely on one's own notion, according to Xunzi, it is like "to employ a blind man to differentiate colors".[184] Indeed, according to Xunzi, most people (except for sages) do not understand rituals even though they form the normative framework for them.[185]

Therefore, even though the practice of rituals change one's cognitive, affective and bodily inclinations, one does not know how exactly this change works, or what exactly this change entails, except for the more general remarks of the state and virtues of the sages that can be found in the classics (such as the Analects). It should be clear now that not only one's original capacities are not sufficient to provide an interpretation of oneself and create one's norms (which causes the first sense of self-loss), but these capacities are not even sufficient to guide oneself in one's transformation. By adopting the Confucian rituals and transform, one basically entrusts oneself to one's teacher and to this framework, and allows one's own psyche to be open to changes.[186] In this way, even though one may voluntarily and reflectively decide to transform morally[187], one can also be said to yield one's firm control of oneself to the Confucian framework and to others (the sages, the collective and the teachers) by going through the training of rituals with teachers and adopting the Confucian framework, with no clear prediction of how it works and what the transformed self will be. This is the second sense of the loss of self.[188]

3. The expansion of consciousness: self-loss in relation

Opening up one's psyche allows ritual practices and music to refine and to some extent even reshape one's affective and sensory dispositions. Understandably it also changes one's states of consciousness.[189] Given my argument for the journey to the unknown, I do not claim that I have a full knowledge of the sages' mental states. However, the Confucian texts provide plenty of material for thought. I focus, in particular, on the Confucian ideal of ren. I mentioned earlier that the fundamental as well as the most exhorted virtue and consummate goodness in Confucianism is ren仁，which is a virtue regarding one's attitudes toward others and personal relations. In an important sense, the beauty of the transformed self is manifested in the virtue of ren. How does the adoption of the Confucian normative framework change one's states of consciousness to be a manifestation of ren? I argue that, through transformation, one's consciousness is changed in the sense that its focus is expanded: others structurally relate to the self in one's consciousness as one's focus, and one's focus on oneself is reshaped to include an awareness of others. This is, I argue, the third sense in which the process of crafting the self is losing the self.

Ren, for Confucius, is not only possible, but is easily accessible for everyone. He says that, "Is ren indeed so far away? As soon as we want it, we should find that it is at our very side." (Analects 7.29) However, we should not mistake "by our side" for "easily attainable". Indeed, ren can be difficult to attain, as Confucius' disciples Zengzi and Yan Yuan both proclaimed.[190] What is the state of a person of ren? Why is it that "the person of ren, wishing himself to be established, sees that others are established, and wishing himself to be successful, sees that others are successful"?

Ren regulates human relations and one's attitudes toward others, and is regarded as a fundamental virtue in the Xunzi. The basic idea of ren is care and love for all[191], however, it is not love for all without distinction or regulation. Rather, it is care with gradation and regulated with proper expression. Ren is manifested in one's ideas, words, behavior and emotions, and it is guided by rituals and expressed in behavior in accordance with rightness (yi义，the other fundamental virtue in the Xunzi). For example, Xunzi said, "to treat relatives as is appropriate for relatives, to treat old friends as is appropriate for old friends, to treat servants as is appropriate for servants, to treat laborers as is appropriate for laborers — these are the gradations in ren", and "to extend kindness without correct principles (li理) does not constitute ren. To follow correct principles without proper regulation does not constitute rightness ... The gentleman dwells in ren by means of rightness, and only then is it ren."[192]

Xunzi takes ren and rightness to be the two most fundamental virtues, and both are guided by and manifested in ritual propriety. However, ren and rightness do not work in the same way. Xunzi says, "For the gentleman to nurture his mind, nothing is more excellent than truthfulness. If a man has attained perfection of truthfulness, he will have no other concern than to cling to ren and to carry out rightness in conduct. If you cling to ren with a heartmind of truthfulness, then you will come to embody it. If you embody it, then you enter a unified state called shen. Being in this state, you can then transform. If you carry out rightness with a heartmind of truthfulness, then you will become well-ordered. If you are well-ordered, then you will become enlightened, and then you can adapt to things."[193] This passage is not easy to understand, and there are different translations and interpretations.[194] The Chinese word Knoblock translated as "truthfulness" is cheng (诚). Cheng means sincerity and truthfulness in Chinese, but it can also mean achieving a clear awareness of oneself and integrity. Notice that the elements of autonomy we find in Xunzi's account earlier, such as reflective awareness and acting in accordance with one's own value, fit the idea of cheng well. For Xunzi, being truthful and having integrity is just the starting point of nurturing the heartmind. One still needs to cling to ren and to carry out rightness in one's conduct, then one may transform. Notice that ren is something the heartmind should cling to and embody, it works more as a form of motivation and emotion, rather than a constraint.[195]

Given that ren is care, a kind of affection for all, we can see why even though the gentleman naturally loves his family[196], he aims at extending his care and affection to others (though with distinction) from the basis of his natural emotion, with rightness and ritual propriety regulating his conduct. This is a devotion based on a conscious choice of value. For a transformed person, the care for others with propriety is thus her basic concern. She no longer puts herself or her own benefit at the center of consideration, given that for her, it is not the most driving motivation. Xunzi often uses the term "humble" or "respectful" to describe a person of ren.[197] We may understand this to mean that a person of ren respects Dao, but we may also see that she puts others before herself — she no longer focuses on herself. Xunzi makes this change from the original self-prioritized view to the other-prioritized view clear: "Now, it is the inborn nature of man that when hungry he desires something to eat, that when cold he wants warm clothing, and that when weary he desires rest — such are essential qualities inherent in his nature. But when in fact a man is hungry, if he sees one of his elders, he will not eat before his elder does; rather, he will defer to him ... It is the Way of the filial son and the proper form and correct principles contained in ritual principles and moral duty. Thus, to follow inborn nature and feelings is not to show courtesy or defer to others. To show courtesy and to defer to others contradicts the feelings inherent in his inborn nature."[198] And, after transformation, this change of priority may not be an intentional decision any more, but becomes the structure of her consciousness: when she encounters a situation, she sees the people present in the situation. When she considers different options, she thinks of how people may be affected. Some options (e.g., the ones that prioritize oneself and neglect others) may automatically be silenced, and some other options (e.g., the ones that do not benefit oneself or even harm oneself, but benefit others) start to appear. Her care is extended to others, and her focus is expanded: structurally, others relate to her in the sense that they become the focus of her consciousness.[199]

I elaborate on this structural change further by considering Confucius' remark that I mentioned in the beginning of this paper: "The person of ren (仁), wishing himself to be established, sees that others are established, and wishing himself to be successful, sees that others are successful." One common interpretation of this sentence is that one should resort to oneself as example, and try to do unto others what one wants oneself. This is a helpful interpretation, and it provides reasons to think that Confucius is not just focusing on the Confucian Golden Rule (which might be considered less active), do not do unto others what you do not want others do unto you, but also recommend the Christian Golden Rule.[200] However, there is another aspect of this remark worth pointing out:in this case, upon thinking of one's welfare, one acts for others before one acts for oneself. Why is this? My interpretation for this idea is this: for a person of ren, other's welfare becomes one's own, not just derivatively, and not just instrumentally. That is, when she helps others attain their welfare, it is not simply because she takes their welfare into consideration, and assigns them equal (or more) weight to her own. It is, more importantly, because she identifies their welfare as hers. In the person of ren's view, others' welfare is not an instrumental good (attaining it is good for me) or derivative good (I care about you so I care about your welfare), but it constitutes her welfare. This is the sense in which others structurally relate to her and become the focus of her attention.

Moreover, notice that after transformation, it is not just that one's consciousness is expanded, but one's understanding of the situation becomes structured by relations. Before transformation, one separates oneself from others, and one's concern is focused on oneself and on satisfying one's own desires. However, due to rituals' emphasis on relations and roles[201], through ritual practices one starts to see oneself more and more as a part of a relation — a junior of the group, a daughter to the family, a friend to her friends, a person to her fellow people. One does not just become aware of others, but one becomes aware of others in relation to oneself. Indeed, her consciousness of herself and her focus on herself, is reshaped to include an awareness of others and an awareness of the self as related to others. A person of ren is no longer a separate existence from others. After she adopts the Confucian normative framework and transforms, she is tightly related to others in the new worldview she adopts with her whole person. In this way, she loses her (older) self, the independent, separate, prioritized existence she once took herself to be. Tu puts it well: "A distinctive feature of Confucian ritualization is an ever deepening and broadening awareness of the presence of the other in one's self-cultivation."[202] It is worth noting that the previous two senses of self-loss are more about the loss of self-identity and more importantly, that of self-control, while this sense of self-loss is about the change in one's consciousness regarding the self. Allowing or even encouraging this sense of self-loss is against the idea that the self is independent and separate from others, which is (as I pointed out earlier) an ideal of the self highly related (if not presumed in) the modern ideal of autonomy.[203]

It is time to address a question I raised earlier:in Xunzi's account, is the importance of others to one only derivative from one's normative framework? As I mentioned, a person of ren's care for others is with distinction, and its expression is constituted and guided by rightness and ritual propriety. Could it be that others, for the person of ren, are just people who happen to be occupying the roles they play in the relation with her, and her aim is just to play her role well? If this is the case, the relation between the person of ren and others seems pretty thin: one's feelings for and relation with others is mediated by one's moral beliefs; one does not have a robust and intimate connection with others. In this case, one may be argued to suffer from a form of moral alienation from others.

Xunzi's account of the ideal self, as I have developed it here, does not suffer from this problem. This is because, for the person of ren, her care for each and every one is real and particular. Such care is indeed regulated and manifested through conduct in accordance with ritual propriety, but this does not change the fact that care is real affection. Moreover, as I pointed out, her conception of others and herself is changed through transformation, and such change lies in the structural changes of her consciousness I mentioned earlier. The relation between the ideal self and others is manifested in how she thinks and feels about her actions, about others and about herself. We may thus say, she substantially relates with others. This other-relatedness is not instrumental to her sagehood: it constitutes her sagehood.

Ⅵ. Conclusion

In this paper I explore the role of others and one's relation with others, in Xunzi's account of self-transformation and the ideal self. I introduced two aspects of the Confucian self, the reflective agential self and the social self, and point to the apparent tension between them. I then examine Tang's account of the role rituals and community play in self-transformation, clarify the role of the heartmind, and develop an account of the ideal self and self-transformation following Tang's basic position. Then I explore the possible tension between these two aspects of the self in this developed account. I do this by addressing the issue of autonomy and self-loss in the transformation process. I showed that autonomy is not an ultimate goal of self-transformation. In fact, the ultimate goal of the Xunzian self-transformation is in some ways in tension with (some senses of) autonomy. I argue that, even though Xunzi emphasizes the reflective capacity of the heartmind, his concern is not so much with the complete control of the self (or the heartmind) or one's life; rather, it is to craft the self into a beautiful and substantially (instead of merely normatively) other-related existence with the virtue of ren. I argue that in this self-crafting process, one unavoidably loses oneself in various senses, and address three such losses in the paper.

According to my account, during self-transformation one entrusts oneself to the adoption of the Confucian normative framework, which is based on a cultural and collective interpretation of human nature. One loses one's naturally formed expression of oneself, loses complete control of oneself (and the desire to do so) by taking the journey to the unknown, and loses the focus on oneself in one's consciousness in the substantial relation with others. Such losses of self create tension between the self and others, and between the two aspects of the self. However, this tension should not be considered a problem. In fact, this tension between the self and others (and the two aspects of the self) is necessary in the dynamic and dialectic formation of the ideal self:it is what keeps us open and flexible. Xunzi emphasized that one needs to be able to reflect on rituals[204], that rituals should be in accordance with facts about human beings[205], that the form of rituals and the emotions experienced and expressed need to match[206]. This tension between the self and others gives us a true connection with the world, allows us to be in touch with more ideal feelings and better ideas, and not be locked in abstract norms, pure ideology and an isolated self. This is how, at least according to Xunzi, we may flourish as human.

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[1]本文之英文版已于《东吴哲学学报》第36期第59—102页发表，现附于中文版之后以作参照。本中文版已于《中国哲学与文化》第15辑第31—62页发表（中文版内容略有更改）。

[2]Tu Wei-ming, Confucian Thought: Selfhood as Creative Transformation, New York: SUNY Press, 1985, p.128.

[3]这里讨论的“自主”（autonomy）不限于康德式的“自律”，以下的讨论将会厘清这个概念牵涉的不同意涵。

[4]重要的论文与专书包括Chung-Ying Cheng（成中英）2004, Roger T. Ames 2010, Kim-chong Chong（庄锦章）2003 and Wei-ming Tu（杜维明）1985. Kwong-loi Shun（信广来）,“Conception of the Person in Early Confucian Thought”, in Confucian Ethics, A Comparative Study of Self, Autonomy and Community, edited by Kwong-loi Shun and David B. Wong, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp.183-202; Joel J. Kupperman,“Tradition and Community in the Formation of Character and Self”, in Confucian Ethics, pp.103-123; Chung-ying Cheng（成中英）,“A Theory of Confucian Selfhood: Self-Cultivation and Free Will in Confucian Philosophy”, in Confucian Ethics, pp.124-147; Roger T. Ames,“Achieving Personal Identity in Confucian Role Ethics:Tang Junyi on Human Nature as Conduct”, Oriens Extremus 49（2010）:143-166; Kim-chong Chong（庄锦章）,“Autonomy in the Analects”, in The Moral Circle and the Self: Chinese and Western Approaches, edited by Kim-chong Chong, Sor-hoon Tan and C. L. Ten, Chicago:Open Court, 2003, pp.269-282; Tu Wei-ming, Confucian Thought.

[5]越来越多当代学者同意荀子并不主张“性本恶”这个较强的看法，而是顺性则乱起恶生。可参考Kim-chong Chong, Early Confucian Ethics: Concepts and Arguments, Chicago: Open Court, 2007; Donald Munro,“A Villain in the Xunzi”, in Chinese Language, Thought and Culture: Nivison and His Critics, edited by Philip J. Ivanhoe, Chicago: Open Court, 1996, pp.193-201; David Wong,“Xunzi on Moral Motivation”, in Virtue, Nature and Moral Agency in the Xunzi, edited by T. C. Kline III and Philip J. Ivanhoe, Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000, pp.135-154。

[6]Tang Siufu（邓小虎）,“Self and Community in the Xunzi”, Frontiers of Philosophy in China 7.3（2012）:455-470.

[7]邓的原文是autonomy，本文翻成“自主”而非另一常见的翻译“自律”，以免读者将“自主”的意义限缩为康德伦理学中的“自律”概念。

[8]Henry Rosemont持此说法，见Rosemont,“Why Take Rights Seriously? A Confucian Critique”, Human Rights and the World's Religions, Boston University Studies in Philosophy and Religion 9（1994）:177。Herbert Fingarette在“The Problem of the Self in the Analects”（Philosophy East and West 29[1979]:129-140）一文中主张，根据儒家说法，人们不应强加个人意志，而应屈从于“道”——而在这个意义上人们“没有自我”。在他1991年对Roger T. Ames的回应中，他采取了一个相近的立场，主张西方自我概念牵涉“个人主义式、自利主义式以及特殊主义式的行动基础”，并不适用于儒家（Herbert Fingarette,“Comment and Response”, in Rules, Rituals and Responsibilities, edited by Mary I. Bockover[La Salle, IL:Open Court, 1991], pp.169-220）。值得特别注明的是，本文讨论的“自我”概念并不预设此西方概念，而是前理论的、接近中文用法的日常概念。如“吾”“自”“己”“吾身”（或“其身”）等概念已经在先秦儒家文献如《论语》《荀子》中都可以看到，本文谈到的“自我”概念并不超出这些基本用法。

[9]见《王制》K 9.19.（为节省篇幅，本论文引《荀子》中较长段落时，采Knoblock, John与张觉《大中华文库汉英对照——荀子》中的章节编号。《大中华文库汉英对照——荀子》，Knoblock, John与张觉译，湖南人民出版社，2003年）。

[10]例子可见《王制》K 9.20与《富国》10.5。

[11]荀子也提及其他学习的方式，比如跟随老师学习经典。然而，他特别强调跟随老师学习与实践礼对化性的重要性（如《修身》：“凡治气养心之术，莫径由礼，莫要得师，莫神一好。”），因此这也是本文的重点。

[12]如Shun,“Conception of the Person in Early Confucian Thought”; Cheng,“A Theory of Confucian Selfhood”。

[13]如Shun,“Conception of the Person in Early Confucian Thought”; Cheng,“A Theory of Confucian Selfhood”。亦见Chong,“Autonomy in the Analects”; Joseph Chan,“Moral Autonomy, Civil Liberties and Confucianism”, Philosophy East And West 52.3（2002）:281-310。

[14]《解蔽》：“心者，形之君也，而神明之主也，出令而无所受令。自禁也，自使也，自夺也，自取也，自行也，自止也。”依梁启超解释，“神明”指的是人之智慧。（见《荀子今注今译》，北京：商务印书馆，2010年）可见“心”是智慧的主宰。若智慧包括情，或统御情，则可看出心主宰情的关系。

[15]邓小虎也采取这个看法（Tang,“Self and Community in the Xunzi”, p.461），其他学者则有不同意见。比如Eric Hutton与Bryan Van Norden两位学者都主张“欲”本身足以造成行为，不需心的认可，心的评价也非必要。但是Hutton同时也承认，一般来说心在行动前会先评价、做出认可（虽不是总如此）（详见Eric L. Hutton,“Xunzi on Moral Psychology”, in Dao Companion to the Philosophy of Xunzi, edited by Eric L. Hutton [Dordrecht:Springer, 2016], pp.201-227; Bryan van Norden,“Mengzi and Xunzi:Two Views of Human Agency”, in Virtue, Nature and Moral Agency in the Xunzi, pp.103-134）。由于邓小虎与笔者都接受心的判断在行动中扮演必要的角色，故本文不深入讨论这个问题。

[16]Shun,“Conception of the Person in Early Confucian Thought”, p.191.

[17]这是当代对公正无差等的道德理论（如康德伦理学、结果主义等）相当有名的一个批评，称为“疏离问题”（the alienation problem）。Peter Railton为这个问题提出清楚的说明，并论证这对结果主义不必然是一个挑战（Peter Railton,“Alienation, Consequentialism and the Demands of Morality”, Philosophy and Public Affairs 13.2[Spring 1984]:134-171）。这个问题颇为复杂，在当代伦理学也有相当多的讨论。由于本文篇幅限制，笔者无法更详细解释这个问题或为儒家伦理学提出一套完整的回应，但在本文后段将根据对儒家核心美德“仁”的讨论而提出简要的回应。

[18]Tang,“Self and Community in the Xunzi”.

[19]如见《礼论》K 19.3。

[20]如见《正名》K 22.11, 22.12。

[21]邓氏认为，成就自主是道德转化的一个终极目标（Tang,“Self and Community in the Xunzi,”p.455）；在更近期的著作中也表明类似的主张（邓小虎，《荀子的为己之学：从性恶到养心以诚》，北京：北京大学出版社，2015年）。另外，他也认为（至少对于今天的人们来说）儒家礼的价值确实就在于它在成就“现代自主理想”中所扮演的必要且关键的角色（Tang,“Self and Community in the Xunzi,”p.468）。

[22]Tang,“Self and Community in the Xunzi”, p.459.

[23]Tang,“Self and Community in the Xunzi”，第467页。

[24]Tang,“Self and Community in the Xunzi”，第456页。

[25]转化前一个人被自己的欲望所“控制”和“奴役”这个主张值得斟酌，本文稍后检视邓氏所主张的“自主”时会讨论。

[26]Tang,“Self and Community in the Xunzi”, p.455.

[27]Tang,“Self and Community in the Xunzi”, p.466.

[28]如见《王制》K 9.3, 9.18,《礼论》19.1，与《乐论》20.1。

[29]荀子在《礼论》中对这个看法也多有提及。

[30]这些解释都可以在《牛津英语词典》中找到。

[31]这些相关概念可见于John Christman,“Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy”, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy（https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/autonomy-moral/）, 2015; Rosemont,“Why Take Rights Seriously? A Confucian Critique”; Chan,“Moral Autonomy, Civil Liberties and Confucianism”。

[32]邓小虎关心的也是个人自主（如见“Self and Community in the Xunzi”第466页的讨论）。由于对儒家来说，理想的转化就是道德转化，而成为有德之人（或“成人”）被视为个人自我认同的关键，因此在这个讨论中谈到的“个人自主”和道德自主（对个人道德生活具主导性）不但不应互为敌对，而且其外延应该是一致的；也就是，一个“个人自主”的人也会是“道德自主”的，反之亦然。

[33]Chong,“Autonomy in the Analects”, p.269.

[34]这里的讨论可先排除两种“自主”形态的可能。陈祖为做了四种道德自主元素的区分：对道德的自愿支持、对道德人生的反思参与、道德来自自己立法的自律，以及道德作为个人意志的极端自由展现。其论证是，前两种元素可在儒家伦理中找到，而后两种不但找不到，也与儒家思想不相容。第三种元素，即道德自我立法，指的是康德伦理学中道德律来自自我立法这个说法：康德认为道德律源自一个人的普遍理性（非一个人的天性、情感或文化），也因此是有效的。第四种元素，即极端自我展现，指的是“道德与道德的选择是由个人自我做成——这个自我是存在意义上的，而非理性意义上的自我，后者并不真的代表个人”。这种“自主”的意义在于个人为自我立道德律，但根据的不是普遍理性，而是个人“根据自身欲望、期许以及个人状况所做出的反思”。陈氏指出，儒家伦理并不接受这两个元素，因为对儒家而言，伦理并非由普遍理性或是自由选择立法，道德是“根植于人性或是天，而这两者其实同为一体”。（详见Chan,“Moral Autonomy, Civil Liberties and Confucianism”）笔者基本上同意陈氏排除第三、第四种自主，不过想进一步指出，根据本文重构的荀子理论，规范性框架根植于一套文化与群体对人性的诠释。这套框架来自他人（以及自己）的功夫与努力。这提供了另一个排除这两种“自主”形式的理由：两者都强调由“自我”“立法”，但这与荀子理论不合。

[35]Chong,“Autonomy in the Analects”, p.277.庄氏这个区分是比照Isaiah Berlin对积极自由与消极自由的区分。庄氏的论文集中讨论积极自主，意图探讨吾人“想主导自己人生的内在深层欲望”。

[36]Chong,“Autonomy in the Analects”; Shun,“Conception of the Person in Early Confucian Thought”.

[37]Shun,“Conception of the Person in Early Confucian Thought”, p.193.

[38]庄、信两位对“自主”的说法，与John Christman在Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy中“Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy”一文对“个人自主”这个概念的看法不谋而合。Christman也认为“胜任能力”与“本真性”这两个能力在这个概念中扮演核心的地位：“最简单来说，自主就是自己做主，能够由可被视为本真自我（one's authentic self）的一部分的（而非由外加诸的）考量、欲望、情况与特质所主导。”（第2—3页）文中Christman也介绍了“理想自主”概念，内容与本文提到的“成就”概念类同：“一种可以立志作为目标的、一个人最大程度展现本真性而免于操控或使自我扭曲的影响的成就。”（第4页）

[39]Christman,“Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy”, p.6.

[40]如见《荣辱》K 4.12。

[41]Tang,“Self and Community in the Xunzi”, p.460.

[42]Tang,“Self and Community in the Xunzi”, p.466.

[43]感谢王荣麟教授提出这个问题，促使笔者做此讨论。

[44]值得一提的是，邓氏在论文中并未打算完整论证对儒家规范性框架的采纳是成就自主的必要条件，但他确实主张儒家规范性框架提供一个相当合理的说法。

[45]Tang,“Self and Community in the Xunzi”, p.468.

[46]Tang,“Self and Community in the Xunzi”，第465页；亦参考第466页。

[47]邓小虎在《荀子的为己之学》所提出的诠释比这个预设似乎更强一些：在为成就自主所做的人性诠释中，人性不仅应被列入考量，甚至不应被部分忽略或否定（见邓小虎：《荀子的为己之学》，第十章）。

[48]这点许多学者都有论述，比如Shun,“Conception of the Person in Early Confucian Thought”, p.195。

[49]这个看法在《荀子》中出现多次，比如《大略》K 27.22。

[50]这是一个设想性的问题，但邓小虎可能的确有比较高的期望，认为接纳儒家规范性框架是成就自主的唯一典型，或至少是模范。毕竟，假若他所持的是较弱的看法，认为儒家的理想行动者只是自主的“一个例子”，行动者可以采纳许多其他规范性框架而成就自主，此时“儒礼”对于成就自主的重要性就大幅减低，而他以下的主张就较难理解：“假若有一现代人问荀子，为何他要依随儒礼。荀子大抵会这样回答：儒礼构成了一个规范性框架，借着这个框架，吾人得以成就一整全之自我，并成为一自主的行动者。荀子大抵也会指出，作为一个当代的理想，‘自主’只有在吾人牢牢掌控自我之后方能实现。只有吾人在明白我之为何、我所欲为何之后，方可自主地行动。”（Tang,“Self and Community in the Xunzi”, p.468；笔者中译。）

[51]但是应注意：这第二个诠释会让邓小虎所诠释的“荀子式自主”与“现代自主理想”的差别，变得比第一个诠释更大。如笔者接下来所述，“现代自主理想”与“实质价值预设”已经难以相容，如果在“自我控制”上，“荀子式自主”与“现代自主理想”也使用不同概念，那两者很难说有重要的关联性，前者很难成为后者的范例。

[52]非常感谢匿名审查人敦促笔者厘清这一点。

[53]在《荀子》中，“伪”这个概念常用来与“性”相对，而至少有两义：一指心的选择与行动（如《正名》：“心虑而能为之动谓之伪。”），一指经由累积的工夫所达成的能力与成就（如《正名》：“虑积焉，能习焉，而后成谓之伪。”）。本文只谈第二义。圣与常人之性同，差别在于他们累积的工夫（伪），而荀子认为，儒礼便来自圣累积的工夫而非天生，因此礼并非来自性。冯耀明在《荀子人性论新诠——附《荣辱》篇23字衍之纠谬》中（《台湾政治大学哲学学报》，2005年7月第14期，第169—230页）对“伪”这个概念提出非常清楚的分析。

[54]值得一提的是，邓小虎也认为我们并不知道人性最佳的表现为何，只能对它做出诠释。他并未要提供一个对儒礼作为最佳诠释的证明，仅想展示：对人来说什么是善？儒礼是一个相当可信的看法。（见Tang,“Self and Community in the Xunzi”, p.468。）

[55]见Bernard Williams, Moral Luck, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981。

[56]Herr对这一点做了深入的讨论，他强调由于仁必须透过礼来表达，而礼本质上是根据群体共识所建立的主体间规范，这并未为个体自发性留下足够空间（Ranjoo Seodu Herr,“Is Confucianism Compatible with Care Ethics? A Critique”, Philosophy East & West 53.4[2003]:471-489）。笔者在另一篇文章较深入地讨论这个议题，请见Ellie Hua Wang, 2016.04,“Moral Reasoning:the Female Way and the Xunzian Way”, The Bloomsbury research handbook of Chinese philosophy and gender, Bloomsbury academic, pp.141-156。

[57]陈祖为也提出类似的看法（Chan,“Moral Autonomy, Civil Liberties and Confucianism”, p.299）。

[58]邓小虎强调，制礼的原因与好处在于养欲并整合自我。这部分笔者十分同意，但认为荀子的理想并不仅如此，而更在于提升存在境界。另外，若考虑圣贤的存在面貌，我们会发现他们并不再把注意力放在满足自身欲望，或攸关自我的考量（如是否自我整合）。他们关怀的是他人的福祉、全体和谐美好的生活。这让我们思考：即使荀子有时会为道德转化提供攸关自我的理由（如满足欲望等），这些很可能也只是为未转化的心灵所提供的理由，让人们受到吸引，却不是道德转化的终极目标。

[59]此言亦可见于《论语·宪问》，意义相近。

[60]如见《解蔽》《性恶》。

[61]如见《礼论》K 19.15。

[62]如见《劝学》K 1.9。

[63]如见《修身》K 2.2。

[64]如见《礼论》K 19.13, 19.14。其意亦与孔子“文质彬彬”之说契合。

[65]许多重要著作，如A. S. Cua的“Dimensions of Li（Propriety）:Reflections on an Aspect of Hsün Tzu's Ethics”（Philosophy East and West 29.4[1979]:373-394）和庄锦章的Early Confucian Ethics，都为这部分讨论提供许多宝贵资源。笔者也在本期刊另一篇文章谈论礼乐化性如何可能，以及一些相关问题，请见王华，2016.07，《礼乐化性：从〈荀子〉谈情感在道德认知与判断中扮演的角色》，《中国哲学与文化》第13辑，第39—67页。

[66]如见《礼论》K 19.14, 19.18，以及《儒效》8.24。

[67]如见《解蔽》K 21.15。

[68]如前所述，儒礼根植于文化，因此在转化前人们已处于文化之中。信广来对这点提出有启发性的说明：“中国思想家将其听众视为具体的个人，并拥有由其成长中深植的社会秩序所形塑而因此与他们一定程度上相同的关怀与观点。”（Shun,“Conception of the Person in Early Confucian Thought,”p.194笔者中译）

[69]此一支持本身也可能是反思的产物，但不应是无中生有，或是从一个更高、更超然的立场而来，而应该经由一个接近反思平衡的方式得出。

[70]《正名》K 22.6。

[71]此解可见于《荀子今注今译》，第519页。

[72]此解可见于《荀子今注今译》，第512页。王先谦，《荀子集解》，台北：艺文印书馆，1973年。

[73]除了Williams的艺术家例子，Peter Railton提到“好论断的艾德”（judgmental Ed）的例子也与此十分相关。在这个例子中，艾德决定采纳一个规范性框架，依其判断并行动。但是从此衍生出的论断与态度其实与他原初的情感倾向（关怀他人）有冲突。此时问题是，哪一些倾向与态度对艾德来说才是“他的”、更称得上是“本真”的？（Peter Railton,“Normative Guidance”, in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol.1, edited by Russ Shafer-Landa [Oxford:Oxford University Press, 2006], pp.3-34）

[74]如见《礼论》K 19.2与《乐论》20.9。

[75]请见《修身》K 1.12, K 2.11。

[76]《法行》：“礼者，众人法而不知，圣人法而知之。”

[77]杨儒宾在《恍惚的伦理——儒家观想工夫论之源》（《中国文化》2016年第1期，第1—19页）一文中，指出祭礼之前的斋戒礼仪是影响一个人的意识状态，使人有机会放松维持日常人格同一性的心理机能，而进入恍惚之境，得到新的经验。本文这里讨论的情感与身体的开放性（vulnerability）也许可以以此方法理解。

[78]先前提到，对荀子来说，不是任何文化与群体对人性的诠释都可能成为儒家规范框架，而必须是圣贤所生的设计。这里的讨论也进一步提供这个坚持的理由。

[79]值得注意的是，社会心理学与脑神经科学目前有越来越多研究表明，东西方不同文化塑造了不同的自我建构方式（例见：S. Han and G. Northoff,“Understanding the Self: A Cultural Neuroscience Approach”, Progress in Brain Research 178. C [2009]:203-212）；也有研究发现，东西方不同的生活方式（西方较强调独立，东方较强调互相依存）形成脑部活动的差异（例见：M.de Greck et al.,“Culture Modulates Brain Activity during Empathy with Anger”, Neuroimage 59.3[2012]:2871-2882）。这些都是相关的有趣发现，但由于篇幅考量，本文不多加讨论。

[80]请见《论语·泰伯》。

[81]《大略》：“仁，爱也，故亲。”

[82]荀子多次表明，“仁”以及其表达必须以礼义为规范。另一例为《臣道》K 13.8—9。

[83]西方学者如Knoblock和Hutton也提出非常不同的翻译。参见张觉，《大中华文库汉英对照——荀子》（John Knoblock and Zhang Jue, Library of Great Chinese Classics Bi-lingual Version in Both Chinese and English: Xunzi），长沙：湖南人民出版社，2003年；Eric L. Hutton, Xunzi: The Complete Text by Xunzi, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014。

[84]《荀子》中多次提到这点，如《不苟》《臣道》《正名》等。

[85]荀子在《荣辱》与《性恶》其他段落中也有类似说法。

[86]荀子在《礼论》与《大略》章对此有许多说明。

[87]Tu, Confucian Thought, p.114.

[88]例见《礼论》《大略》。

[89]例见《大略》。

[90]例见《礼论》《大略》。

[91]Night（1969:122）by Elie Wiesel.

[92]Ibid, p.52.

[93]The Survivor: An Anatomy of Life in the Death Camps（1976:96）by Terrence Des Pres.

[94]For example, Wei-ming Tu, 1985.

[95]The Analects 6.30, with my own translation. All references to the Analects in this paper follow standard section numbers as in, for example, Lau 1992.

[96]Tu 1985:128

[97]The term“autonomous”here is not limited to the Kantian notion. Later in this paper I discuss different senses of this term.

[98]Just to name a few:Kwong-Loi Shun（信广来）2004, Joel J. Kupperman 2004, Chung-Ying Cheng（成中英）2004, Roger T. Ames 2010, Kim-chong Chong（庄锦章）2003 and Wei-ming Tu（杜维明）1985.

[99]The traditional interpretation of Xunzi is that he thinks human nature is originally bad. However, more and more contemporary scholars argue that by saying human nature is bad（性恶）, Xunzi does not mean that it is originally bad; rather, he meant that disorder results from unregulated human interaction in an environment with limited resources. See, for example, Kim-Chong Chong 2007; Donald Munro 1996; David Wong 2000.

[100]Henry Rosemont,“Why Take Rights Seriously? A Confucian Critique”, 1994:177. Herbert Fingarette, in his“The Problem of the Self in the Analects”（1979）, argues that according to the Confucian teaching,“we must have no self”in the sense that we do“not impose our personal will”, and just yield our will to the Way. In his response to Roger. T. Ames（Fingarette, 1991）, he takes a similar position and argues that the western notion of self, which involves“individualistic, egoistic, particularistic grounds for action”, is not applicable to Confucianism. It is also worth noting that the idea of“self”discussed in this paper is not tied up with this aforementioned“western notion of self”; rather, it is a pre-theoretical, commonsensical idea, and it is based on the understanding of self in Chinese. Chinese expressions of such commonsensical“self”such as“吾”“自”“己”, already appear in pre-Qing Confucian texts such as the Analects, the Xunzi, etc. The idea of the“self”at work in this paper does not exceed this basic understanding of self.

[101]K 9.19. The translations of the Xunzi used in this paper are from Knoblock 2003 and Hutton 2014. I use“K”to refer to translation from Knoblock, and also provide the chapter and section numbers for the reference. I use“H”to refer to translation from Hutton, and also provide the chapter and line numbers for the reference.

[102]K 9.20 and 10.5 for example.

[103]Xunzi also mentions other forms of learning, such as studying classics with a teacher. However, Xunzi puts special emphasis on ritual practices and learning（K 2.4 for example）, so this is what I focus on in this paper.

[104]For example, Kwong-Loi Shun 2004 and Chung-Ying Cheng 2004.

[105]E.g., Cheng 2004, Shun 2004, Chong 2003, Chan 2002.

[106]K 17.4

[107]K 21.9

[108]K 21.9

[109]Tang also accepts this view（2012:461）; however, some argue otherwise. For example, Hutton（forthcoming）and B. Van Norden（2000）both argue that a desire itself is sufficient to cause an action without the approval of the heartmind, the mediation of the heartmind's evaluation is not necessary.（Hutton did, however, concede that generally [instead of universally]the heartmind evaluates and issues approval prior to actions.）Since Tang and I agree that the heartmind necessarily evaluates desires and its approval is necessary for action, I do not address this controversy here, but I will discuss it in another paper.

[110]Li（理）can be known and acted according to by human. It is often understood as the objective order/pattern of the world, and it is also translated as the“rational principles”by Knoblock. Xunzi thinks that li（理）is something one can guide one's xin with（e.g., K 21.11）.

[111]Shun 2004:191.

[112]An anonymous reviewer suggests the possibility of framing this tension that I see between the two aspects of the self in terms of“perspectives”. I appreciate this suggestion as I think this is indeed a good way to see the tension:these two aspects involve two apparently contrasting perspectives the agent may adopt in seeing herself, and also involve two different ways she engages the world（through deliberations, etc.）The latter also constitutes who she is, that is, her self.

[113]This is a criticism against impartial moral theories such as Kantian ethics and consequentialism, often called“the alienation problem”. Peter Railton（1984）gave a clear account of this problem and argued that consequentialism does not suffer from this problem. This problem is quite complicated and generated a lot of discussion in ethics. Given the limitation of space and the topic, I do not aim to give a full account of the problem or the Confucian solution here, but I will address the problem based on my discussion of ren.

[114]K 19.3 for example.

[115]K 22.11, 22.12 for example.

[116]K 19.1 for example.

[117]Sometimes Tang seems to suggest that the achievement of autonomy is the most important goal of moral transformation. For example, Tang（2012:455）（with my emphasis）:“If human beings are controlled by momentary desires, they live like beasts and cannot act as autonomous agents ... Through Confucian rituals a person can not only satisfy desires properly, but can also enjoy human relationships within the community. Most importantly, it is through these Confucian rituals that a person realizes himself as an agent who can control and direct his own life.”The view that the achievement of an integral self（整全自我）（which he identifies as autonomy in Tang[2012]）is an ultimate goal of moral transformation is also clearly expressed in Tang（2015）. Moreover, Tang also suggests that the value of Confucian rituals（at least for people in the modern world）indeed lies in its crucial role in achieving autonomy.“If a person in the modern world were to ask Xunzi why he should follow Confucian rituals, Xunzi would probably answer that Confucian rituals constitute the normative framework through which we gain an integral self and become an autonomous agent. He would point out that autonomy as a modern ideal is possible only when we have a firm command of the self. Only when we know who we truly are and what we truly want can we act autonomously.”（2012:468）

[118]Tang 2012:459.

[119]Tang 2012:467.

[120]Tang 2012:466.

[121]Tang 2012:456.

[122]The idea that one is controlled by one's desires before transformation is worth further discussion, which I will address later in this paper.

[123]Tang 2012:455.

[124]Tang 2012:466.

[125]For example, K 9.3, 9.18, 19.1 and 20.1. Clearly, this claim gives rise to questions such as how did the sages become sages before the rituals, and whether it was the work of one sage or many sages. The solution that more and more scholars adopt is that the ancient kings, in trying to resolve the conflicts among people, started instituting rituals, and by following the rituals themselves, the kings develop love for the rituals in themselves and transform into sage kings. The rituals then are past down in culture. See, for example, Nivison 2000:186.

[126]K 19.3.

[127]We can find these meanings in the Oxford English Dictionary.

[128]For example, Christman（2015）, Rosemont（2004）and Chan（2002）talk about these concepts.

[129]Tang is concerned with personal autonomy as well. For example, Tang（2012:466）. It should be noted that given that, for the Confucians, the ideal transformation is moral transformation, and becoming an ethical human being should be crucial to one's own identity, personal autonomy and moral autonomy（i.e., self-directedness of one's moral life）are not only not in antagonism in this discussion, but they have the same extension. Notice that in Chong's discussion of autonomy in the Analects, he does not distinguish between“personal”and“moral autonomy”for the same reason:for doing so“unnecessarily assumes an antagonism from the outset, which is alien to...the Analects.”（Chong 2003:269）Chan（2002）, on the other hand, distinguishes moral autonomy from personal autonomy due to his interest in discussing what Chong calls“the negative conception of autonomy”, and he finds personal autonomy provides better support“for civil and personal liberties”, since“personal autonomy requires the availability of options that the agent regards as valuable...including options of career, marriage, education, association and religion — options that are normally protected in international human-rights charters.”（Chan 2002:299）Given that my concern is with what Chong calls the positive conception of autonomy, I do not address this distinction Chan makes.

[130]Chong 2003:269.

[131]Chong 2003:277.

[132]Ibid. Chong follows Isaiah Berlin's distinction between the negative and the positive conceptions of liberty and makes this distinction. His focus on the positive conception of autonomy aims to explore our“deep-seated desire for directing our own lives”.（Chong 2003:277）

[133]Chong（2003:277）makes this point clear:“For self-directedness to obtain, strength of character and effort are required to maintain an integral sense of self together with the ideals which form an important part of this self. In this sense, autonomy is an achievement concept.”

[134]Shun 2004:193.

[135]This matches John Christman's introduction to the idea of individual autonomy:“In the western tradition, the view that individual autonomy is a basic moral and political value is very much a modern development. Putting moral weight on an individual's ability to govern herself, independent of her place in a metaphysical order or her role in social structures and political institutions is very much the product of the modernist humanism of which much contemporary moral and political philosophy is an offshoot... Put most simply, to be autonomous is to be one's own person, to be directed by considerations, desires, conditions and characteristics that are not simply imposed externally upon one, but are part of what can somehow be considered one's authentic self.”See John Christman,“Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy”, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy（https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/autonomy-moral/, p.2-3）Christman also introduces the“ideal autonomy”that fits the achievement concept of autonomy I just mentioned:“an achievement that serves as a goal to which we might aspire and according to which a person is maximally authentic and free of manipulative, self-distorting influences”.（ibid, p.4）

[136]ibid, p.6.

[137]ibid, p.7.

[138]In K 4.12, Xunzi states that without teachers and proper models, one's heartmind is like one's mouth and stomach, just aiming at feasting oneself to satisfaction and not know ritual principles.

[139]Tang 2012:460.

[140]Ibid.

[141]This also matches Christman's depiction of ideal autonomy mentioned in the earlier footnote. It is worth noting that the influential account of authenticity by Frankfurt also requires similar elements:that the freedom of the will should involve second-order volition and wholeheartedness.

[142]Tang 2012:466.

[143]I would like to thank王荣麟for his questions that inspired this discussion.

[144]It should be noted that Tang does not try to give a full proof that the adoption of Confucian normative framework is necessary for autonomy, but he does think it provides a very plausible answer. In his book（Tang 2015, ch.5）, he further argues that the adoption of the Confucian normative framework（or something similar to it in emphasizing norms for interpersonal relations）is necessary for the achievement of autonomy, since the necessary condition for an autonomous individual involves the ethical abilities to understand and express emotions and desires, and such framework provides cultivations for such abilities. Due to the limitation of space, I will not address this further argument here.

[145]Tang 2012:468.

[146]Tang 2012:465.

[147]Ibid.

[148]Tang 2012:465-466.

[149]Based on Tang's interpretation of Xunzi in his book（《荀子的为己之学》）we can add that based on this interpretation, human nature should not be partially neglected or rejected in achieving autonomy.（Tang 2015, ch.10）

[150]Shun makes this point clearly:“While some Confucian thinkers, such as Xunzi, do regard the social setup as in part serving the purpose of preempting potential conflict among people in the pursuit of their basic needs, they also emphasize its other functions such as beautifying the emotions. More importantly, even in relation to the function of the social setup in enabling people to satisfy their basic needs, the focus of Confucian thinkers when viewing the legitimate claims that an individual has on others is less on how the claims serve to protect that individual, but more on how they are part of a social setup that is to the communal good ... The important point, which both Ihara and Wong highlight in their respective chapters in this volume, is that Confucian thinkers regard such claims as based on an understanding of the social dimensions of human life rather than on a conception of human beings as individuals who need protection in the pursuit of their individual ends.”（2004:195）

[151]This idea is especially clearly expressed in K 27.22.

[152]After all, if Tang holds the weaker view that the ideal agent in this case is just one example of autonomy, that there are many other normative frameworks that can be adopted to be autonomous, there seems much less point for him to claim that“If a person in the modern world were to ask Xunzi why he should follow Confucian rituals, Xunzi would probably answer that Confucian rituals constitute the normative framework through which we gain an integral self and become an autonomous agent. He would point out that autonomy as a modern ideal is possible only when we have a firm command of the self. Only when we know who we truly are and what we truly want can we act autonomously.”（468）

[153]The concept of“wei”in Xunzi's text is contrasted with human nature, and is explained in two different ways:one refers to the choices and action of the heartmind, and the other refers to the activity and achievement achieved through cumulated effort and practice. Wei in this second sense carries a positive connotation.（K 22.1 Yiu-Ming Fung[冯耀明]provides a close analysis of the idea of“wei”in his seminal paper.[《荀子人性论新诠——附〈荣辱〉篇23字衍之纠谬》，2005年]）My use in this paper of“wei”is limited to this second sense. The sages are different from others not because they have different natures, but because of“wei”. According to Xunzi, rituals come from the accumulated effort of the sages, and are not inherent in human nature.（K 23.7）

[154]For example, consider how the world may drastically change when political structures and technology advance, and how this may affect the changes in conditions of human relationships and in culture. We can see these thought experiments in many scientific novels.

[155]Bernard Williams, Moral Luck, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.

[156]Herr, for example, emphasizes that ren must be expressed through li, which is essentially“a body of intersubjective prescriptions based on communal consensus”, and thus there is not much room for individual spontaneity. See Herr, Ranjoo Seodu, 2003. I address this issue further in another paper.

[157]Chan（2002:299）makes the same point about Confucianism.

[158]As Tang argues convincingly, Xunzi does see nurturing human desires and forming integral agents as important reasons and benefits for the design of the rituals. However, I do not see that Xunzi works very hard at stressing the unique problem with the lack of autonomy, but his emphasis is on gaining perspective, thinking carefully and in the long term, and having proper values. Moreover, if we consider the ideal state of existence in Confucianism（sagehood）, we notice that the sages do not focus on trying to satisfy their own self-concerned desires or trying to be a unified person so much anymore. They think about the welfare of others instead. This observation gives me reason to think that a lot of self-concerned reasons Xunzi provides for achieving sagehood are more for the untransformed minds:they are to convince the untransformed people there are good reasons for doing it, but they need not convey the whole or the most important goal for moral transformation.

[159]Xunzi uses the word mei“美”in his characterization. This word has the aesthetic connotation that means more than moral goodness. Some translate it to be“refined”（e.g., Knoblock）, which does capture the“cultured”,“elegant”and“fine”aspect of the term“美”. However,“refined”also has a“purified”connotation that I do not think is fit for an interpretation of Xunzi. As I argued earlier, there is no“pure”self before transformation in Xunzi's account. Some translate it to be“fine”（Hutton）, which does capture the“excellent”aspect of the term“美”, but it does not seem to express the aesthetic aspect as well. While the term“beautiful”not only captures the aesthetic aspect of the term, but captures the“fine”,“excellent”and the“pleasing”aspect of“美”. Indeed, Xunzi（and Confucius）connects the state of the sage to pleasure or happiness.（K 21.12 for example）

[160]K 1.10 with some of my own translation. Knoblock translates“美其身”to be refine his character. I change“refine”to“beautify”for consistency, and change“his character”to“his whole person”to match what Xunzi says in K 1.9.

[161]We can also see here that Xunzi is not（at least not directly）concerned with self-control. Moreover, from his comparison with the cases where people learn to gain fame or profit, it is clear that he does not think learning should be for self-satisfaction. I appreciate an anonymous reviewer's suggestion to clarify this point.

[162]It is worth noting that, the expression“raise up one's whole state of existence”is from the ethical and aesthetic perspective, not the metaphysical perspective. Thanks for an anonymous reviewer's suggestion for clarification.

[163]This use can also be found in Xunzi's text. For example, K 21 and K 23.

[164]K 19.15.

[165]K 1.9.

[166]K 18.2.

[167]K 2.2.

[168]K 19.13 and 19.14. We can also see that this idea corresponds with Confucius's idea of“文质彬彬”.

[169]A. S. Cua's seminal paper“Dimensions of Li（Propriety）: Reflections on an Aspect of Hsün Tzu's Ethics”（1979）and Kim Chong Chong's insightful book Early Confucian Ethics both provided important discussion of this topic. I also developed a more detailed view of the transformation process in Xunzi's account in another paper.

[170]K 19.14, 19.18 and 8.24.

[171]K 21.15.

[172]Shun makes this point clearly:“The hypothetical figure of the egoist does not play a role in Chinese ethical thought and Chinese thinkers see their audience as concrete individuals who already share to some extent the concerns and perspectives shaped by the social order within which they have been brought up.”（Shun 2004:194）

[173]I discuss the details of how transformation may work through ritual practices in another paper.

[174]This endorsement may even be reflective, but presumably not from a higher perspective or from the vacuum, but through a method similar to reflective equilibrium.

[175]A cautionary note is in order: as I pointed out earlier, Tang puts a lot of emphasis on the idea of“control”in his discussion of autonomy. However, it is unclear from his discussion whether he uses expressions such as“control and direct his own life”,“firm command of the self”, a good life is a life“actively directed by that person”, and“live according to one's plans and projects”, etc., to associate with the modern ideal of autonomy（which, as I pointed out earlier, has a strong emphasis on control by oneself and not by others, especially through one's rational capacities）, or he simply means to talk about some sort of self-directedness, and may implicitly accept the three sense of self-loss I talked about in Xunzi's ideal self. I do not wish to decide on this issue in this paper. I accept the possibility of the latter, and in that case, my project here should be understood as pointing out the difference between my substantive self-correction view from a view one may develop from Tang's expressions, the substantive self-control view. I appreciate an anonymous reviewer's suggestion for this clarification.

[176]K 22.6.

[177]K 22.1.

[178]One anonymous reviewer suggested some interesting issues regarding how moral transformation occurs for further investigation, including“what self-interpretation involves, what it is about the normative structure that can transform an agent from passive to active, how the normative structure works with patterns of human nature”, etc. I appreciate the suggestion. I address some of these issues in another paper, but more needs to be done for us to understand the Xunzian moral transformation more fully.

[179]K 23.7.

[180]One's evaluation of options and one's attitudes will change after the adoption of the Confucian normative framework. This is noted in many places in the Xunzi.

[181]Besides Williams' Gauguin case mentioned earlier, also consider Peter Railton's judgmental Ed in Railton 2006. In that story, Ed decides to take on a normative framework and issues judgments and acts accordingly, but such judgments（criticizing and treating others harshly）are in conflict with his original emotional inclinations（caring about others）. The question arises:what is more authentic to Ed?

[182]K 19.2 and 20.9.

[183]K 1.12.

[184]K 2.11.

[185]K 30.1.

[186]The openness and vulnerability of one's emotional and bodily condition may be what allows ritual practices to change one's consciousness and induce new experiences and meaning. I discuss relevant changes through ritual practices in another paper. Yang（2016）also addressed this issue.

[187]For Xunzi, agents may（and probably need to）have voluntary and reflective endorsement in（pursuing the path of）moral transformation. This idea can be seen in, e.g., K 2.10. Chan（2002）also offers a more thorough discussion on this issue. He discusses what he calls“four elements”of moral autonomy: the voluntary endorsement of morality, a reflective engagement in moral life, morality as self-legislation and morality as the radical free expression of the individual's will. Chan argues that the first two elements can be found in Confucian ethics, while the last two cannot, and they are in fact incompatible with Confucian ethics. The third element, self-legislation, refers to the Kantian idea that the moral laws are self-legislated: it is one's Reason（inherent in humanity）alone — not human nature, emotions or culture — that originates and validates the moral law. The fourth element, radical self-expression, refers to the idea that“[morality]and moral choices are made by one's self—the existentialist, not the rationalist self — for the latter does not truly represent the individual”. In this case, one“legislates”the moral law for oneself, not by universal reason, but by“one's own reflection based on one's desires, ambition and personal circumstances”.（Chan 2002:285-6）Chan points out that Confucian ethics does not accept these two elements given that, according to the Confucians, morality is not legislated by reason or one's free choices, but is“groundedin human nature or heaven, which are two parts of the same whole”.（Chan 2002:290）I agree with Chan's view.

[188]This is an important reason why, for the Confucians, the Confucian normative framework cannot just be any cultural and collective interpretation of human nature, but must be a design of the sages.

[189]In fact, studies in social psychology and neuroscience show differences in self-construal styles between western and east Asian cultures. E.g., S. Han & G. Northoff 2009. Studies also find differences in brain activities due to different life styles（e.g., the eastern interdependent style and the western independent style）. E.g., M.de Greck et al.2012. However, due to the limitation of space, I do not address empirical studies in this paper.

[190]See the Analects 8.7 and 9.11.

[191]H 27:115,“Ren is care and so it makes for affection.”

[192]K 27.22. The idea that ren and its expression must be constituted by ritual propriety and rightness is also shown in K 13.8-9. Here for discussion I just focus on the relation among ren, rightness and ritual. Xunzi's view of ren is even more complicated than this. For Xunzi, ren connects with not just ritual and rightness, but also musicality（乐）.

[193]K 3.9.

[194]Knoblock and Hutton, for example, give very different translations. My translation is based on my idea of the ultimate condition of transformation — a unified state of the whole person, which is also suitable for translating the other appearance of cheng in K 1.2, 2.4 and 8.13.

[195]On the other hand, rightness is something the heartmind should carry out in one's conduct, which may serve more as a form of constraint or regulation. This idea matches Xunzi's idea in K 27.22.

[196]K 19.18.

[197]K 3.4, 3.10 and 21.12.

[198]K 23.6, also see K 23.7.

[199]For example, Xunzi often talks about how one does not have courtesy or defer to others by nature, but only learns these attitudes and develops concerns for others through ritual practices.（E.g., K 4.12, 23.2, 23.6）

[200]JeeLoo Liu provides a nice summary of the discussion as to whether there is a difference between these two rules in her book, An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy: from Ancient Philosophy to Chinese Buddhism, ch2.

[201]For example, K 27.22 and 19.12.

[202]Tu 114.

[203]I appreciate an anonymous reviewer's suggestion to clarify this point. My view is also that the independence of the self is also presumed in the general idea of autonomy that emphasizes on strong self-control, but I will not argue for it here.

[204]For example, K 19.8 and 27.50.

[205]For example, K 27.20.

[206]For example, K 19.9 and 27.49.