第1章
PREFACE 前言
The definite object proposed in this work is an examination of the general history of Europe and America with particular reference to the effect of sea power upon the course of that history. Historians generally have been unfamiliar with the conditions of the sea, having as to it neither special interest nor special knowledge; and the profound determining influence of maritime strength upon great issues has consequently been overlooked. This is even more true of particular occasions than of the general tendency of sea power. It is easy to say in a general way, that the use and control of the sea is and has been a great factor in the history of the world; it is more troublesome to seek out and show its exact bearing at a particular juncture. Yet, unless this be done, the acknowledgment of general importance remains vague and unsubstantial; not resting, as it should, upon a collection of special instances in which the precise effect has been made clear, by an analysis of the conditions at the given moments.
A curious exemplification of this tendency to slight the bearing of maritime power upon events may be drawn from two writers of that English nation which more than any other has owed its greatness to the sea.“Twice,”says Arnold in his History of Rome,“Has there been witnessed the struggle of the highest individual genius against the resources and institutions of a great nation, and in both cases the nation was victorious. For seventeen years Hannibal strove against Rome, for sixteen years Napoleon strove against England; the efforts of the first ended in Zama, those of the second in Waterloo.”Sir Edward Creasy, quoting this, adds:“One point,however, of the similitude between the two wars has scarcely been adequately dwelt on; that is, the remarkable parallel between the Roman general who finally defeated the great Carthaginian, and the English general who gave the last deadly overthrow to the French emperor. Scipio and Wellington both held for many years commands of high importance, but distant from the main theatres of warfare. The same country was the scene of the principal military career of each. It was in Spain that Scipio, like Wellington, successively encountered and overthrew nearly all the subordinate generals of the enemy before being opposed to the chief champion and conqueror himself. Both Scipio and Wellington restored their countrymen's confidence in arms when shaken by a series of reverses, and each of them closed a long and perilous war by a complete and overwhelming defeat of the chosen leader and the chosen veterans of the foe.”
Neither of these Englishmen mentions the yet more striking coincidence, that in both cases the mastery of the sea rested with the victor. The Roman control of the water forced Hannibal to that long, perilous march through Gaul in which more than half his veteran troops wasted away;it enabled the elder Scipio, while sending his army from the Rhone on to Spain, to intercept Hannibal's communications, to return in person and face the invader at the Trebia. Throughout the war the legions passed by water, unmolested and unwearied, between Spain, which was Hannibal's base, and Italy, while the issue of the decisive battle of the Metaurus, hinging as it did upon the interior position of the Roman armies with reference to the forces of Hasdrubal and Hannibal, was ultimately due to the fact that the younger brother could not bring his succoring reinforcements by sea, but only by the land route through Gaul. Hence at the critical moment the two Carthaginian armies were separated by the length of Italy, and one was destroyed by the combined action of the Roman generals.
On the other hand, naval historians have troubled themselves little about the connection between general history and their own particular topic, limiting themselves generally to the duty of simple chroniclers of naval occurrences. This is less true of the French than of the English;the genius and training of the former people leading them to more careful inquiry into the causes of particular results and the mutual relation of events.
There is not, however, within the knowledge of the author any work that professes the particular object here sought; namely, an estimate of the effect of sea power upon the course of history and the prosperity of nations. As other histories deal with the wars, politics, social and economical conditions of countries, touching upon maritime matters only incidentally and generally unsympathetically, so the present work aims at putting maritime interests in the foreground, without divorcing them, however, from their surroundings of cause and effect in general history, but seeking to show how they modified the latter, and were modified by them.
The period embraced is from 1660, when the sailing-ship era, with its distinctive features, had fairly begun, to 1783, the end of the American Revolution. While the thread of general history upon which the successive maritime events is strung is intentionally slight, the effort has been to present a clear as well as accurate outline. Writing as a naval officer in full sympathy with his profession, the author has not hesitated to digress freely on questions of naval policy, strategy, and tactics; but as technical language has been avoided, it is hoped that these matters, simply presented, will be found of interest to the unprofessional reader.
A. T. MAHAN
December, 1889.
本书有着一个确切的目标，那就是具体地根据海权对历史进程的影响，来审视欧洲和美洲的概史。史学家们通常都不熟悉海洋的情况，他们对海洋既无特殊兴趣，也无专业知识；因此，海权对于一些重大问题所起的深刻而具有决定性的影响，往往就被他们忽略了。对于某些具体战例与海权总体的发展趋势而言，具体战例甚至更符合这种情况。泛泛而谈，说利用和控制海洋是而且一直是世界历史的一个重要因素，做到这一点并不难；但找出并说明它在某一具体时刻的准确影响，却要棘手得多。然而，不这样做的话，我们对海权整体重要性的认可，就是含糊而空洞的；因为我们本来应当是以一系列特定的、清晰地显示出海权准确影响的战例为基础，并且在分析了某一特定时刻的形势之后，才能进行此种认可的。
从英格兰民族的两位史家身上，即可以看出人们忽视海上力量影响历史事件的这种古怪倾向——英格兰民族之伟大，比其他任何民族都更可归因于海洋。阿诺德[1]在其《罗马史》中曾说：“历史已经见证过，有两位最重要的个人天才，曾经与两个伟大国家的资源和制度进行斗争；而在这两次斗争中，最终都是国家获胜。汉尼拔与罗马斗争了17年，拿破仑与英国斗争了16年；前者付出了努力，却在扎马[2]折戟，而后者则在滑铁卢败北。”爱德华·克里西勋爵在引用了这种说法之后，又进一步说：“然而，这两场战争相似性当中的一点，却并未得到充分的强调；那就是，最终击败了这位迦太基伟人的罗马将军，与最终给予法兰西皇帝以致命一击的那位英国将领之间，具有显著的相似性。西庇阿[3]与威灵顿[4]二人，虽说都曾身居高位数年，却都根本没有到过主战场。而二者主要的军事成就，也是在同一个国家取得的。西庇阿在西班牙时，跟威灵顿公爵一样，是在相继遭遇并且打败了敌人差不多所有的下级将领之后，才去面对敌军主帅或征服者本人的。西庇阿与威灵顿公爵二人，都在同胞遭遇了一系列挫折而产生动摇之后，重新让这些同胞恢复了对本国武装的信心，并且二者都是通过彻底而压倒性地击败了敌人的精兵强将，从而结束了一场旷日持久、危险可怕的战争。”
不过，这两位英国人都没有提及一种更为显著的一致性，那就是：获胜的一方控制了海洋。罗马人控制了水上，迫使汉尼拔不得不经由高卢进行遥远而危机四伏的行军，从而令其手下身经百战的部队损失过半；这也使得大西庇阿既能够让军队从罗纳河沿河而上前往西班牙，以切断汉尼拔的交通运输，同时还能亲自返回来，在特雷比亚面对入侵者。在整个战争期间，罗马军团都是经由水路，不受袭扰且毫不疲惫地往来于西班牙和意大利之间，可西班牙本来却是汉尼拔的大本营；而梅陶罗决战，则取决于罗马国内的军队对哈斯德鲁巴[5]与汉尼拔所率军队的态度，且最终原因还是在于汉尼拔的这位弟弟无法从海路带来援兵，只能经由高卢的陆路对其进行增援的事实。在如此关键的时刻，迦太基的两支军队却被长长的意大利分割开来，于是其中一支就被罗马将领们联合起来消灭了。
另一方面，研究海军的历史学家们，却又很少努力去了解普通历史与他们所研究专题之间的联系，通常都只让自己成为海军历史事件的简单记录者。对于这一点，法国史学家的情况并不像英国的史学家那样绝对；因为法兰西民族的天赋和法国史学家所受的训练，使得他们能够更加细心地去探究特定事件的前因后果，以及各个事件之间的相互关系。
然而，据笔者所知，还没有哪一部著作阐述了此处我们所要探究的这个特殊目标；也就是说，评估海权对历史进程和各国繁荣的影响。由于其他历史科目在研究战争、政治以及各国的社会与经济状况时，对海洋事件都只会顺带涉及，并且通常都是淡然置之，所以本书之目标，便是将海洋利益推向前台，但又不将它们与普通历史的因果环境割裂开来，而是力图表明它们如何改变了普通历史的因果环境，以及它们是如何被普通历史的因果环境所改变的。
本书所选的时间段，是从具有显著特征的帆船时代已然开始的1660年，到美国革命结束时的1783年。虽说维系接连发生的那些海洋事件的普通历史线索都被人们有意地忽略掉了，但本书还是想努力为它们呈现出一个清晰而不失准确的轮廓来。作为一名对自己的职业深有感触的海军军官，笔者在写作本书时，会毫不犹豫、自由自在地去探究那些与海洋军事政策、战略以及战术相关的问题；不过，本书略去了一些太过专业的术语，寄望这些简单平实地呈现出来的事情，能够引起非专业读者的兴趣。
阿尔弗雷德·塞耶·马汉
1889年12月
译者注：
[1] 阿诺德（Thomas Arnold,1795～1842）。英国近代教育家，著有《罗马史》和其他一些布道作品，其子马修·阿诺德（Matthew Arnold）为著名诗人和评论家。
[2] Zama：扎马。北非古城，位于迦太基西南部。公元前202年，古罗马将领西庇阿在此击败迦太基将领汉尼拔，使之成为了结束第二次布匿战争（Bella punica，指古罗马与古迦太基之间的战争，共进行了3次）的古战场。
[3] 西庇阿（Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus，公元前236～前184? ），古罗马统帅和政治家，生于贵族家庭，公元前205年开始担任执政官，后因罪引退并死于流放途中。他因在扎马战役中打败了汉尼拔而获称“征服非洲的西庇阿”，或称“大西庇阿（Scipio the Elder）”，以区别于家族中的其他人。
[4] Wellington：威灵顿公爵（原名Arthur Wellesley, 1769～1852，获封第一任威灵顿公爵）。英国政治家、军事家和外交家，拿破仑战争时期的英军将领，后为英国第21任首相，人称“铁公爵”。他也是历史上唯一一位获得7国（英国、法国、沙皇俄国、普鲁士、西班牙、葡萄牙、荷兰）元帅军衔的人。
[5] Hasdrubal：哈斯德鲁巴（公元前270～前221）。迦太基将领，汉尼拔的二弟。