Introduction
Despite important differences in economic,political and cultural terms,and despite the lack of the degree of interdependence that characterizes more highly integrated regions such as Europe (Malamud and Gardini;2012),Latin American countries often seem to exhibit relatively homogenous,or at least parallel,political dynamics.This observation seems to be a common point in the literature.Thus,the dynamics of Latin American regional politics are often plausibly described in terms of decade-specific tendencies—the 1940s and 1950s were dominated by rapid modernization and urbanization,the 1960s and 1970s saw the emergence of military dictatorships in many countries,the 1980s and 1990s were characterized by the return to democracy and by neoliberal hegemony (Tickner,2008).The 2000s belonged to the “pink wave” or “left turn”,which fed on the failures of the previous tendency,but were also marked by a concurrent return to extractivism as the main source of growth in many countries of the region (Rosales,2013).
Nowadays,it appears to be obvious that the hour of another turn has arrived,even though it is not quite clear which conceptual tags future generations of scholars will attach to it.Economic practices,with some exceptions,still tend to align more or less with neoliberal doctrine and radical alternatives,such as those practiced in Venezuela,have largely disappointed populations’ hopes for a more equitable distribution of wealth (Grugel and Riggirozzi,2018).The appearance and electoral success of aggressive nationalist demagogues such as Brazil's Jair Bolsonaro are stunning and betray a high degree of disaffection with corruption and insecurity,but so far,none of them have revealed any concrete policy course to address those or other important issues (Hunter and Power,2019).In this sense,the prevailing “public mood”—in the sense of a collective attunement to an unfolding process which enables certain emotional and intellectual reactions (Ringmar,2018)—of the region is one of fundamental uncertainty.It might also be framed in Gramscian terms as a “crisis of authority”,an “interregnum” in which “the old is dying and the new cannot be born” (Gramsci,1971).
Such uncertainty is repeated in—as well as compounding,and compounded by—the international situation.While the previous phase of Latin American politics was clearly shaped by North American hegemony,the contemporary era might,for the first time since the Cuban Missile Crisis,see a drastic increase in the impact and,in some cases,physical presence of non-American powers in Latin America.One remarkable instance,though difficult to scrutinize empirically in its long-term effects,is the current military support of Russia for the allied regime of Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela (Mijares,2017),as well as the role of the former in the latter's extractive industries and in arms sales to some other countries in the region (Rouvinski,2015).Perhaps more relevant in the long term is the economic engagement of Chinese enterprises and institutions,both as buyers of raw materials and as potential investors,mainly in infrastructure projects (Gallagher,2016).Alternatively,these new relations might create more freedom of action for Latin American countries vis-à-vis the U.S.(Nolte,2013),or they might be undergoing a dramatization relying on “anecdotal evidence” as well as on “overstating U.S.omnipotence in the past” (Long,2016).In any case,Latin American countries are faced with considerable uncertainty as they navigate the global politics of the early 21st century.It is unlikely that Latin American states’ disposition towards—and participation in—the provision of global public goods will not be impacted by this situation.