四、结语
FMI的危机破产规则的确立，说明了在金融市场发挥基础性重要作用的FMI也应当受到一定的激励约束，以避免发展停滞、缺乏治理动力、过于垄断、道德风险等情况。同时也说明了金融机构的生生死死，也是符合市场经济规律的。FMI具有不同的类型，恢复与处置失效或无力时破产过程中可能适用不同危机应对方式。但作为大多数为SIFI的FMI，维持关键服务的持续性，实现有序破产处置尤为重要。
我国金融监管理论和实践作为对FMI危机破产规则的认识存在一个逐步深入的过程，换言之，随着认识的加深，也会对危机破产规则产生重要影响，例如针对支付系统、中央证券存管机构、证券结算系统、中央对手方和交易数据库等不同类型采取更为针对性的破产规则。“欲立先破”，只有形成良好的金融机构（包括FMI）危机破产规则才能建立更为符合现代金融发展的规则体系，从而促进整个金融市场的发展。
[1]上海财经大学法学院博士生。
[2]See Committee on Paymentand Settlement System&Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions，Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures，April2012，p.7.
[3]See Ruben Lee，Running the World's Markets：The Governance of Financial Infrastructure，Princeton University Press，2011，p.26.
[4]See Ruben Lee，Running the World's Markets：The Governance of Financial Infrastructure，Princeton University Press，2011，pp.13-21.
[5]See Ruben Lee，Running the World's Markets：The Governance of Financial Infrastructure，Princeton University Press，2011，p.26.
[6]See Committee on Paymentand Settlement System&Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions，Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures，April2012，pp.7-9.
[7]See Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures&Board of the International Organization of Securities Commissions，Recovery of Financial Market Infrastructures，July 2017，p.5.
[8]See The Clearing House，TCH Thought Leadership“the Value of Large Banks”，at https：//www.theclearinghouse.org/issues/the-value-of-large-banks.（Last visited on April 15，2018）.
[9]See The Clearing House，TCH Thought Leadership“the Value of Large Banks”，at https：//www.theclearinghouse.org/issues/the-value-of-large-banks.（Last visited on April15，2018）.
[10]参见朱少平：《关于金融机构破产的几个问题》，载《中国金融》2007年第9期。
[11]参见美国《多德—弗兰克法案》第804条。
[12]参见许可：《美英金融机构破产模式比较及启示》，载《知识经济》2009年第1期。
[13]See The Clearing House，Comment Letter：The Clearing House Calls on FSOC to Address CCP Systemic Risk，9 January 2015，at https：//www.theclearinghouse.org/advocacy/articles/2015/01/20150109-tch-comments-on-ccp-systemic-risk-v2，Last visited on April 15，2018.
[14]See Committee on Paymentand Settlement System&Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions，Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures，April2012，pp.128-129.
[15]FSB对2011《金融机构有效处置方案的关键点》进行了升级，并于2014年10月15日发布了新版。新版规则，采取了对特定“关键点”的有关处置目的的信息分享和具体部门指导等额外指导，解决了“关键点”如何具体应用在保险公司、金融基础设施和具体部门指导中的问题。
[16]See Committee on Paymentand Settlement System&Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions，Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures，April2012，p.32.
[17]See Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures&Board of the International Organization of Securities Commissions，Recovery of Financial Market Infrastructures，July 2017，pp.8-11.
[18]See Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures&Board of the International Organization of Securities Commissions，Recovery of Financial Market Infrastructures，July 2017，p.13.
[19]See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System，Resolution Plans，15 January 2016，at http：//www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/resolution-plans.htm，Last visited on April15，2018.
[20]See Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures&Board of the International Organization of Securities Commissions，Recovery of Financial Market Infrastructures，July 2017，p.6.
[21]参见李曙光：《新〈企业破产法〉与金融机构破产的制度设计》，载《中国金融》2007年第3期。