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(1)王珏，中国人民大学经济学院经济史教研室教授。
(2)有论者也许会指出，在这一国际化金本位时代是否存在套利的可能？我们可以假设1法郎兑换0.01盎司黄金，这就意味着法国财政部随时准备以1盎司的黄金买卖100法郎。如果美国财政部随时准备以1盎司的黄金买卖50美元，则就意味着1美元必定交换2法郎。假设市场汇率是1美元兑换3法郎，在这一情况下，套利者可以用100美元兑换300法郎，利用这300法郎从法国中央银行购买3盎司黄金。将这3盎司黄金带到美国，并且可以以150美元的价格卖给美国财政部，获利50美元。其结果就是，减少法国货币供给（法国黄金储备减少）并且增加美国货币供给（美国黄金储备增加）。但是，把黄金从法国带到美国意味着套利者需要承担国家运输的成本。在这一时期，横穿大西洋运输黄金的成本是高昂的，国际金本位机制把汇率保持在运输成本所决定的范围之内。实际上，尽管存在套利的可能性以及局部范围内的汇率波动，国际金本位制度防止了大范围的且持久性的汇率波动。参见EICHENGREEN，BARRR（eds）．The Gold Standard in Theory and History［M］．New York：Methuen, 1985．