Chapter IV Other Considerations concerning Innate Principles, both Speculative and Practical

§1. Principles not innate, unless their ideas be innate. Had those,who would persuade us, that there are innate principles, not taken them together in gross; but considered, separately, the parts, out of which those propositions are made, they would not, perhaps, have been so forward to believe they were innate. Since, if the ideas,which made up those truths were not, it was impossible, that the propositions, made up of them, should be innate, or our knowledge of them be born with us. For if the ideas be not innate, there was a time when the mind was without those principles; and then, they will not be innate, but be derived from some other original. For,where the ideas themselves are not, there can be no knowledge, no assent, no mental, or verbal propositions about them.

§2. Ideas, especially those belonging to principles, not born with children. If we will attentively consider new-born children, we shall have little reason to think, that they bring many ideas into the world with them. For, bating, perhaps, some faint ideas, of hunger,and thirst, and warmth, and some pains, which they may have felt in the womb, there is not the least appearance of any settled ideas at all in them; especially of ideas, answering the terms, which make up those universal propositions, that are esteemed innate principles. One may perceive how, by degrees, afterwards, ideas come into their minds;and that they get no more, nor no other, than what experience,and the observation of things, that come in their way, furnish them with; which might be enough to satisfy us, that they are not original characters, stamped on the mind.

§3. ‘Impossibility’ and ‘identity’ not innate ideas. ‘’Tis impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be’, is certainly (if there be any such) an innate principle. But can anyone think, or will anyone say, that impossibility and identity are two innate ideas‘ Are they such as all mankind have, and bring into the world with them‘And are they those, that are the first in children, and antecedent to all acquired ones‘ If they are innate, they must needs be so. Hath a child an idea of impossibility and identity, before it has of white or black; sweet or bitter‘ And is it from the knowledge of this principle,that it concludes, that wormwood rubbed on the nipple hath not the same taste, that it used to receive from thence‘ Is it the actual knowledge of ‘impossible est idem esse, et non esse’, that makes a child distinguish between its mother and a stranger; or, that makes it fond of the one, and fly the other‘ Or does the mind regulate itself,and its assent by ideas, that it never yet had‘ Or the understanding draw conclusions from principles, which it never yet knew or understood‘ The names impossibility and identity, stand for two ideas,so far from being innate, or born with us, that I think it requires great care and attention, to form them right in our understandings. They are so far from being brought into the world with us; so remote from the thoughts of infancy and childhood, that, I believe, upon examination, it will be found, that many grown men want them.

§4. Identity, an idea not innate. If identity (to instance in that alone) be a native impression; and consequently so clear and obvious to us, that we must needs know it even from our cradles; I would gladly be resolved, by one of seven, or seventy years old, whether a man, being a creature, consisting of soul and body, be the same man,when his body is changed‘ Whether Euphorbus and Pythagoras,having had the same soul, were the same men, though they lived several ages asunder‘ Nay, whether the cock too, which had the Other Considerations concerning Innate Principles,both Speculative and Practical same soul, were not the same with both of them‘ Whereby, perhaps,it will appear, that our idea of sameness, is not so settled and clear, as to deserve to be thought innate in us. For if those innate ideas, are not clear and distinct, so as to be universally known, and naturally agreed on, they cannot be subjects of universal, and undoubted truths; but will be the unavoidable occasion of perpetual uncertainty.For, I suppose everyone’s idea of identity, will not be the same, that Pythagoras, and thousands others of his followers, have: and which then shall be the true‘ Which innate‘ Or are there two different ideas of identity, both innate‘

§5. What makes the same man‘ Nor let any one think, that the questions, I have here proposed, about the identity of man, are bare,empty speculations; which if they were, would be enough to show,that there was in the understandings of men no innate idea of identity.He, that shall, with a little attention, reflect on the resurrection,and consider, that divine justice will bring to judgment, at the last day, the very same persons, to be happy or miserable in the other,who did well or ill in this life, will find it perhaps, not easy to resolve with himself, what makes the same man, or wherein identity consists:and will not be forward to think he, and everyone, even children themselves, have naturally a clear idea of it.

§6. Whole and part, not innate ideas. Let us examine that principle of mathematics, viz. ‘that the whole is bigger than a part’.This, I take it, is reckoned amongst innate principles. I am sure it has as good a title, as any, to be thought so; which yet, nobody can think it to be, when he considers the ideas it comprehends in it,whole and part, are perfectly relative; but the positive ideas, to which they properly and immediately belong, are extension and number,of which alone, whole and part, are relations. So that if whole and part are innate ideas, extension and number must be so too; it being impossible to have an idea of a relation, without having any at all of the thing to which it belongs, and in which ’tis founded. Now,whether the minds of men have naturally imprinted on them the ideas of extension and number, I leave to be considered by those,who are the patrons of innate principles.

§7. Idea of worship not innate. That ‘God is to be worshipped’, is,without doubt, as great a truth as any that can enter into the mind of man, and deserves the first place amongst all practical principles.But yet, it can by no means be thought innate, unless the ideas of God, and worship, are innate. That the idea, the term worship stands for, is not in the understanding of children, and a character stamped on the mind in its first original, I think, will be easily granted, by anyone, that considers how few there be, amongst grown men, who have a clear and distinct notion of it. And, I suppose, there cannot be anything more ridiculous, than to say, that children have this practical principle innate, ‘that God is to be worshipped’; and yet,that they know not what that worship of God is, which is their duty.But to pass by this.

§8. Idea of God not innate. If any idea can be imagined innate, the idea of God may, of all others, for many reasons, be thought so; since ’tis hard to conceive, how there should be innate moral principles,without an innate idea of a Deity: Without a notion of a lawmaker, ’tis impossible to have a notion of a law, and an obligation to observe it. Besides the atheists, taken notice of amongst the ancients,and left branded upon the records of history, hath not navigation discovered, in these later ages, whole nations, at the bay of Soldania in Brasil, in Boranday, and the Caribee Islands, etc. amongst whom there was to be found no notion of a God, no religion. Nicholaus del Techo in literis, ex Paraquaria de Caaiguarum conversione, has these words: ‘Reperi eam gentem nullum nomen habere, quod Deum, et Hominis animam significet, nulla sacra habet, nulla idola.’ These are instances of nations where uncultivated nature has been left to itself,without the help of letters, and discipline, and the improvements of arts and sciences. But there are others to be found, who have enjoyed Other Considerations concerning Innate Principles,both Speculative and Practical these in a very great measure, who yet, for want of a due application of their thoughts this way, want the idea, and knowledge of God. ’Twill, I doubt, not be a surprise to others, as it was to me, to find the Siamites of this number. But for this, let them consult the King of France’s late envoy thither, who gives no better account of the Chinese themselves. And if we will not believe La Loubere,the missionaries of China, even the Jesuits themselves, the great encomiasts of the Chinese, do all to a man agree and will convince us that the sect of the litterari, or learned, keeping to the old religion of China, and the ruling party there, are all of them atheist. Vid.Navarette in the Collection of Voyages, vol. and Historia cultus Sinensium. And, perhaps, if we should, with attention, mind the lives, and discourses of people not so far off, we should have too much reason to fear, that many, in more civilized countries, have no very strong, and clear impressions of a deity upon their minds;and that the complaints of atheism, made from the pulpit, are not without reason. And though only some profligate wretches own it too barefacedly now; yet, perhaps, we should hear, more than we do, of it, from others, did not the fear of the magistrate’s sword, or their neighbour’s censure, tie up people’s tongues; which, were the apprehensions of punishment, or shame taken away, would as openly proclaim their atheism, as their lives do.

§9. The name of God not universal or obscure in meaning. But had all mankind, everywhere, a notion of a God, (whereof yet history tells us the contrary) it would not from thence follow, that the idea of him was innate. For, though no nation were to be found without a name,and some few dark notions of him; yet that would not prove them to be natural impressions on the mind, no more than the names of fire,or the sun, heat, or number, do prove the ideas they stand for, to be innate, because the names of those things, and the ideas of them, are so universally received, and known amongst mankind. Nor on the contrary, is the want of such a name, or the absence of such a notion out of men’s minds, any argument against the being of a God, any more, than it would be a proof, that there was no loadstone in the world, because a great part of mankind, had neither a notion of any such thing, nor a name for it; or be any show of argument to prove,that there are no distinct and various species of angels, or intelligent beings above us, because we have no ideas of such distinct species, or names for them: for men being furnished with words, by the common language of their own countries, can scarce avoid having some kind of ideas of those things, whose names, those they converse with,have occasion frequently to mention to them; and if it carries with it the notion of excellency, greatness, or something extraordinary; if apprehension and concernment accompany it; if the fear of absolute and irresistible power set it upon the mind, the idea is likely to sink the deeper, and spread the further; especially if it be such an idea, as is agreeable to the common light of reason, and naturally deducible from every part of our knowledge, as that of a God is. For the visible marks of extraordinary wisdom and power, appear so plainly in all the works of the creation, that a rational creature, who will but seriously reflect on them, cannot miss the discovery of a Deity: and the influence, that the discovery of such a being must necessarily have on the minds of all, that have but once heard of ’tis so great,and carries such a weight of thought and communication with it,that it seems stranger to me, that a whole nation of men should be anywhere found so brutish, as to want the notion of a God; than that they should be without any notion of numbers, or fire.

§10. Ideas of God and idea of fire. The name of God being once mentioned in any part of the world, to express a superior, powerful,wise, invisible Being, the suitableness of such a notion to the principles of common reason, and the interest men will always have to mention it often, must necessarily spread it far and wide; and continue it down to all generations: though yet the general reception of this name, and some imperfect and unsteady notions conveyed thereby,Other Considerations concerning Innate Principles,both Speculative and Practical to the unthinking part of mankind, prove not the idea to be innate;but only that they, who made the discovery, had made a right use of their reason, thought maturely of the causes of things, and traced them to their original; from whom other less considering people,having once received so important a notion, it could not easily be lost again.

§11. Idea of God not innate. This is all could be inferred from the notion of a God, were it to be found universally in all the tribes of mankind, and generally acknowledged, by men grown to maturity in all countries. For the generality of the acknowledging of a God, as I imagine, is extended no further than that; which if it be sufficient to prove the idea of God, innate, will as well prove the idea of fire,innate; since, I think, it may truly be said, that there is not a person in the world, who has a notion of a God, who has not also the idea of fire. I doubt not, but if a colony of young children should be placed in an island, where no fire was, they would certainly neither have any notion of such a thing, nor name for it, how generally soever it were received, and known in all the world besides; and perhaps too, their apprehensions would be as far removed from any name, or notion of a God, till some one amongst them had employed his thoughts,to inquire into the constitution and causes of things, which would easily lead him to the notion of a God; which having once taught to others, reason, and the natural propensity of their own thoughts,would afterwards propagate, and continue amongst them.

§12. Suitable to God’s goodness, that all men should have an idea of Him, therefore naturally imprinted by Him; answered. Indeed ’tis urged, that ’tis suitable to the goodness of God, to imprint, upon the minds of men, characters and notions of himself, and not to leave them in the dark, and doubt, in so grand a concernment; and also by that means, to secure to himself the homage and veneration, due from so intelligent a creature as man; and therefore he has done it.This argument, if it be of any force, will prove much more than those, who use it in this case, expect from it. For if we may conclude,that God hath done for men, all that men shall judge is best for them, because ’tis suitable to his goodness so to do, it will prove,not only, that God has imprinted on the minds of men an idea of himself; but that he hath plainly stamped there, in fair characters,all that men ought to know, or believe of him; all that they ought to do in obedience to his will; and that he hath given them a will and affections conformable to it. This, no doubt, everyone will think it better for men, than that they should, in the dark, grope after knowledge, as St Paul tells us all nations did after God, Acts XVII. 27, than that their wills should clash with their understandings, and their appetites cross their duty. The Romanists say, ’tis best for men, and so suitable to the goodness of God, that there should be an infallible judge of controversies on earth; and therefore there is one: and I, by the same reason, say ’tis better for men that every man himself should be infallible. I leave them to consider, whether by the force of this argument they shall think, that every man is so. I think it a very good argument, to say, the infinitely wise God hath made it so: and therefore ’tis best. But it seems to me a little too much confidence of our own wisdom,to say, I think it best, and therefore God hath made it so. and in the matter in hand, it will be in vain to argue from such a topic, that God hath done so, when certain experience shows us, that he hath not. But the goodness of God hath not been wanting to men without such original impressions of knowledge, or ideas stamped on the mind:since he hath furnished man with those faculties, which will serve for the sufficient discovery of all things requisite to the end of such a being; and I doubt not but to show that a man by the right use of his natural abilities, may, without any innate principles, attain a knowledge of a God, and other things that concern him. God having endued man with those faculties of knowing which he hath, was no more obliged by his goodness, to implant those innate notions in his mind, than that having given him reason, hands, and materials, he Other Considerations concerning Innate Principles,both Speculative and Practical should build him bridge or houses, which some people in the world,however of good parts, do either totally want, or are but ill provided of, as well as others are wholly without ideas of God, and principles of morality; or at least have but very ill ones. The reason in both cases being, that they never employed their parts, faculties, and powers,industriously that way, but contented themselves with the opinions,fashions, and things, of their country, as they found them, without looking any further. Had you or I been born at the Bay of Soldania,possibly our thoughts, and notions, had not exceeded those brutish ones of the Hottentots that inhabit there: and had the Virginia king Apochancana, been educated in England, he had, perhaps been as knowing a divine, and as good a mathematician, as any in it. The difference between him, and a more improved Englishman, lying barely in this, that exercise of his faculties was bounded within the ways, modes, and notions of his own country, and never directed to any other, or further inquiries: and if he had not any idea of a God,it was only because he pursued not those thoughts, that would have led him to it.

§13. Ideas of God various in different men. I grant, that if there were any ideas to be found imprinted on the minds of men, we have reason to expect, it should be the notion of his Maker, as a mark God set on his own workmanship, to mind man of his dependence and duty; and that herein should appear the first instances of human knowledge. But how late is it before any such notion is discoverable in children‘ And when we find it there, how much more does it resemble the opinion, and notion of the teacher, than represent the true God‘ He that shall observe in children, the progress whereby their minds attain the knowledge they have, will think, that the objects they do first, and most familiarly converse with, are those that make the first impressions on their understandings: nor will he find the least footsteps of any other. ’Tis easy to take notice, how their thoughts enlarge themselves, only as they come to be acquainted with a greater variety of sensible objects, to retain the ideas of them in their memories; and to get the skill to compound and enlarge them,and several ways put them together. How by these means they come to frame in their minds an idea men have of a deity, I shall hereafter show.

§14. Contrary and inconsistent ideas of God under the same name. Can it be thought that the ideas men have of God, are the characters, and marks of himself, engraven in their minds by his own finger, when we see, that in the same country, under one and the same name, men have far different, nay, often contrary and inconsistent ideas and conceptions of him‘ Their agreeing in a name, or sound,will scarce prove an innate notion of him.

§15. Gross ideas of God. What true or tolerable notion of a deity,could they have, who acknowledged, and worshipped hundreds‘Every deity, that they owned above one, was an infallible evidence of their ignorance of Him, and a proof, that they had no true notion of God, where unity, infinity, and eternity, were excluded. To which if we add their gross conceptions of corporeity, expressed in their images, and representations of their deities; the amours, marriages,copulations, lusts, quarrels, and other mean qualities, attributed by them to their gods; we shall have little reason to think, that the heathen world, i.e. the greatest part of mankind, had such ideas of God in their minds, as he himself, out of care, that they should not be mistaken about him, was author of. And this universality of consent, so much argued, if it prove any native impressions, it will be only this: that God imprinted on the minds of all men, speaking the same language, a name for himself, but not any idea: since those people, who agreed in the name, had at the same time, far different apprehensions about the thing signified. If they say, that the variety of deities worshipped by the heathen world, were but figurative ways of expressing the several attributes of that incomprehensible Being,or several parts of his providence: I answer, what they might be in Other Considerations concerning Innate Principles,both Speculative and Practical their original, I will not here inquire; but that they were so in the thoughts of the vulgar, I think nobody will affirm: and he that will consult the voyage of the Bishop of Beryte, c. 13. (not to mention other testimonies) will find, that the theology of the Siamites,professedly owns a plurality of gods: or, as the Abbé de Choisy more judiciously remarks, in his Journal du Voyage de Siam, 107/ 177, it consists properly in acknowledging no God at all.

§16. Idea of God not innate although wise men of all nations come to have it.If it be said, that wise men of all nations came to have true conceptions of the unity and infinity of the Deity, I grant it. But then this.

First, excludes universality of consent in anything, but the name, for those wise men being very few, perhaps one of a thousand,this universality is very narrow.

Secondly, it seems to me plainly to prove, that the truest and best notions men have of God, were not imprinted, but acquired by thought and meditation, and a right use of their faculties: since the wise and considerate men of the world, by a right and careful employment of their thoughts and reason, attained true notions in this, as well as other things; whilst the lazy and inconsiderate part of men, making far the greater number, took up their notions, by chance, from common tradition and vulgar conceptions, without much beating their heads about them. And if it be a reason to think the notion of God innate, because all wise men had it, virtue too must be thought innate; for that also wise men have always had.

§17. Odd, low, and pitiful ideas of God common among men. This was evidently the case of all Gentilism: nor hath even amongst Jews, Christians, and Mahometans, who acknowledged but one God, this doctrine, and the care is taken in those nations to teach men, to have true notions of a God, prevailed so far, as to make men to have the same, and the true ideas of Him. How many, even amongst us, will be found upon inquiry, to fancy him in the shape of a man, sitting in heaven; and to have many other absurd and unfit conceptions of him‘ Christians, as well as Turks, have had whole sects owning, and contending earnestly for it, that the Deity was corporeal, and of human shape: and though we find few amongst us,who profess themselves anthropomorphites, (though some I have met with, that own it) yet, I believe, he that will make it his business,may find amongst the ignorant, and uninstructed Christians, many of that opinion. Talk but with country-people, almost of any age;or young people, almost of any condition, and you shall find, that though the name of God be frequently in their mouths; yet the notions they apply this name to, are so odd, low, and pitiful, that nobody can imagine, they were taught by a rational man; much less,that they were characters writ by the finger of God Himself. Nor do I see how it derogates more from the goodness of God, that he has given us minds unfurnished with these ideas of Himself, than that he hath sent us into the world, with bodies unclothed; and that there is no art or skill born with us. For being fitted with faculties to attain these, ’tis want of industry, and consideration in us, and not of bounty in Him, if we have them not. ’Tis as certain, that there is a God, as that the opposite angles, made by the intersection of two straight lines, are equal. There was never any rational creature, that set himself sincerely to examine the truth of these propositions, that could fail to assent to them: though yet be past doubt, that there are many men, who having not applied their thoughts that way, are ignorant both of the one and the other. If anyone think fit to call this (which is the utmost of its extent) universal consent, such an one I easily allow: but such an universal consent as this, proves not the idea of God, no more than it does the idea of such angles, innate.

§18. If the idea of God be not innate, no other can be supposed innate. Since then though the knowledge of a God, be the most natural discovery of human reason, yet the idea of him, is not innate,as, I think, is evident from what has been said; I imagine there will be scarce any other idea found, that can pretend to it: since if God Other Considerations concerning Innate Principles,both Speculative and Practical had set any impression, any character on the understanding of men,’tis most reasonable to expect it should have been some clear and uniform idea of Himself, as far as our weak capacities were capable to receive so incomprehensible and infinite an object. But our minds being, at first, void of that idea, which we are most concerned to have, ’tis a strong presumption against all other innate characters. I must own, as far as I can observe, I can find none, and would be glad to be informed by any other.

§19. Idea of substance not innate. I confess, there is another idea which would be of general use for mankind to have, as ’tis of general talk, as if they had it; and that is the idea of substance, which we neither have, nor can have, by sensation or reflection. If nature took care to provide us any ideas, we might well expect it should be such, as by our own faculties we cannot procure to ourselves: but we see on the contrary, that since by those ways, whereby other ideas are brought into our minds, this is not, we have no such clear idea at all, and therefore signify nothing by the word substance, but only an uncertain supposition of we know not what (i.e. of something whereof we have no particular distinct positive) idea, which we take to be the substratum, or support, of those ideas we do know.

§20. No propositions can be innate, since no ideas are innate.Whatever then we talk of innate, either speculative, or practical principles, it may, with as much probability, be said, that a man hath 100 l. sterling in his pocket, and yet denied, that he hath either penny, shilling, crown, or any other coin, out of which the sum is to be made up; as to think, that certain propositions are innate when the ideas about which they are, can by no means be supposed to be so. The general reception and assent that is given, doth not at all prove, that the ideas expressed in them, are innate: for in many cases,however the ideas came there, the assent to words expressing the agreement, or disagreement, of such ideas, will necessarily follow.Everyone that hath a true idea of God and worship, will assent to this proposition, that God is to be worshipped, when expressed,in a language he understands: and every rational man, that hath not thought on it today, may be ready to assent to this proposition tomorrow; and yet millions of men may be well supposed to want one, or both, those ideas today. For if we will allow savages, and most country-people, to have ideas of God and worship, (which conversation with them, will not make one forward to believe) yet I think few children can be supposed, to have those ideas which therefore they must begin to have sometime or other; and then they will also begin to assent to that proposition, and make very little question of it ever after. But such an assent upon hearing, no more proves the ideas to be innate, than it does, that one born blind (with cataracts, which will be couched tomorrow) had the innate ideas of the sun, or light, or saffron, or yellow; because, when his sight is cleared, he will certainly assent to this proposition, that the Sun is lucid, or that saffron is yellow: and therefore if such an assent upon hearing, cannot prove the ideas innate, it can much less the propositions made up of those ideas. If they have any innate ideas, I would be glad to be told, what, and how many they are.

§21. No innate ideas in the memory. To which let me add: if there be any innate ideas, any ideas in the mind, which the mind does not actually think on; they must be lodged in the memory, and from thence must be brought into view by remembrance; i.e. must be known, when they are remembered, to have been perceptions in the mind before, unless remembrance can be without remembrance.For to remember, is to perceive anything with memory, or with a consciousness, that it was known or perceived before: without this,whatever idea comes into the mind is new, and not remembered:this consciousness of its having been in the mind before, being that which distinguishes remembering from all other ways of thinking.Whatever idea was never perceived by the mind, was never in the mind. Whatever idea is in the mind, is, either an actual perception,Other Considerations concerning Innate Principles,both Speculative and Practical or else having been an actual perception, is so in the mind, that by the memory it can be made an actual perception again. Whenever there is the actual perception of any idea without memory, the idea appears perfectly new and unknown before to the understanding.Whenever the memory brings any idea into actual view, ’tis with a consciousness, that it had been there before, and was not wholly a stranger to the mind. Whether this be not so, I appeal to every one’s observation: and then I desire an instance of an idea, pretended to be innate, which (before any impression of it by ways hereafter to be mentioned) anyone could revive and remember as an idea,he had formerly known; without which consciousness of a former perception, there is no remembrance; and whatever idea comes into the mind without that consciousness, is not remembered, or comes not out of the memory, nor can be said to be in the mind before that appearance. For what is not either actually in view, or in the memory, is in the mind no way at all, and is all one as if it never had been there. Suppose a child had the use of his eyes till he knows and distinguishes colours; but then cataracts shut the windows, and he is forty or fifty years perfectly in the dark; and in that time perfectly loses all memory of the ideas of colours, he once had. This was the case of a blind man I once talked with, who lost his sight by the smallpox, when he was a child, and had no more notion of colours,than one born blind. I ask whether anyone can say this man had then any ideas of colours in his mind, any more than one born blind‘And I think nobody will say, that either of them had in his mind any ideas of colours at all. His cataracts are couched, and then he has the ideas (which he remembers not) of colours, de novo, by his restored sight, conveyed to his mind, and that without any consciousness of a former acquaintance. And these now he can revive, and call to mind in the dark. In this case all these ideas of colours, which when out of view can be revived with a consciousness of a former acquaintance,being thus in the memory, are said to be in the mind. The use I make of this is, that whatever idea being not actually in view, is in the mind, is there only by being in the memory; and if it be not in the memory, ’tis not in the mind; and if it be in the memory, it cannot by the memory be brought into actual view, without a perception that it comes out of the memory, which is this, that it had been known before, and is now remembered. If therefore there be any innate ideas, they must be in the memory, or else nowhere in the mind; and if they be in the memory, they can be revived without any impression from without, and whenever they are brought into the mind, they are remembered, i.e. they bring with them a perception of their not being wholly new to it. This being a constant, and distinguishing difference between what is, and what is not in the memory, or in the mind; that what is not in the memory, whenever it appears there, appears perfectly new, and unknown before; and what is in the memory, or in the mind, whenever ’tis suggested by the memory, appears not to be new, but the mind finds it in itself,and knows it was there before. By this it may be tried, whether there be any innate ideas in the mind before impression from sensation or reflection. I would fain meet with the man, who when he came to the use of reason, or at any other time, remembered any of them: and to whom, after he was born, they were never new. If any one will say,there are ideas in the mind, that are not in the memory, I desire him to explain himself, and make what he says intelligible.

§22. Principles not innate, because of little use, or little certainty.Besides what I have already said, there is another reason, why I doubt, that neither these, nor any other principles are innate. I that am fully persuaded, that the infinitely, wise God made all things in perfect wisdom, cannot satisfy myself why he should be supposed to print upon the minds of men some universal principles; whereof those that are pretended innate, and concern speculation, are of no great use; and those that concern practice, not self-evident; and neither of them distinguishable from some other truths, not allowed to be innate.Other Considerations concerning Innate Principles,both Speculative and Practical For to what purpose should characters be graven on the mind, by the finger of God, which are not clearer there, than those, which are afterwards introduced, or cannot be distinguished from them‘ If any one thinks there are such innate ideas and propositions, which by their clearness and usefulness, are distinguishable from all that is adventitious in the mind, and acquired, it will not be a hard matter for him to tell us, which they are; and then everyone will be a fit judge, whether they be so, or no. Since if there be such innate ideas and impressions, plainly different from all other perceptions and knowledge, everyone will find it true in himself, of the evidence of these supposed innate maxims, I have spoken already; of their usefulness, I shall have occasion to speak more hereafter.

§23. Difference of men’s discoveries depends upon the different application of their faculties. To conclude, some ideas forwardly offer themselves to all men’s understanding; some sorts of truths result from any ideas, as soon as the mind puts them into propositions:other truths require a train of ideas placed in order, a due comparing of them, and deductions made with attention, before they can be discovered, and assented to. Some of the first sort, because of their general and easy reception, have been mistaken for innate: but the truth is, ideas and notions are no more born with us, than arts and sciences; though some of them, indeed, offer themselves to our faculties, more readily than others; and therefore are more generally received; though that too, be according as the organs of our bodies,and powers of our minds, happen to be employed; God having fitted men with faculties and means, to discover, receive, and retain truths,according as they are employed. The great difference that is to be found in the notions of mankind, is, from the different use they put their faculties to, whilst some (and those the most) taking things upon trust, misemploy their power of assent, by lazily enslaving their minds, to the dictates and dominion of others, in doctrines, which ’tis their duty carefully to examine; and not blindly, with an implicit faith, to swallow: others employing their thoughts only about some few things, grow acquainted sufficiently with them, attain great degrees of knowledge in them, and are ignorant of all other, having never let their thoughts loose, in the search of other inquiries. Thus,that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, is a truth, as certain as anything can be; and I think more evident, than many of those propositions, that go for principles; and yet there are millions, however expert in other things, who know not this at all,because they never set their thoughts on work about such angles:and he that certainly knows this proposition, may yet be utterly ignorant of the truth of other propositions, in mathematics itself,which are as clear and evident as this; because, in his search of those mathematical truths, he stopped his thoughts short, and went not so far. The same may happen concerning the notions we have of the being of a deity; for though there be no truth, which a man may more evidently make out to himself, than the existence of a God,yet he that shall content himself with things, as he finds them, in this world, as they minister to his pleasures and passions, and not make inquiry a little further into their causes, ends, and admirable contrivances, and pursue the thoughts thereof with diligence and attention, may live long without any notion of such a being: and if any person hath, by talk, put such a notion into his head, he may,perhaps, believe it: but if he hath never examined it, his knowledge of it will be no perfecter, than his, who having been told, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, takes it upon trust, without examining the demonstration; and may yield his assent as a probable opinion, but hath no knowledge of the truth of it; which yet his faculties, if carefully employed, were able to make clear and evident to him. But this only by the by, to show how much our knowledge depends upon the right use of those powers nature hath bestowed upon us, and how little upon such innate principles, as are in vain supposed to be in all mankind for their direction; which all Other Considerations concerning Innate Principles,both Speculative and Practical men could not but know, if they were there, or else they would be there to no purpose: and which, since all men do not know, nor can distinguish from other adventitious truths, we may well conclude there are no such.

§24. Men must think and know for themselves. What censure,doubting thus of innate principles, may deserve from men, who will be apt to call it, pulling up the old foundations of knowledge and certainty, I cannot tell: I persuade myself, at least, that the way I have pursued, being conformable to truth, lays those foundations surer. This I am certain, I have not made it my business, either to quit or follow any authority in the ensuing discourse: truth has been my only aim; and wherever that has appeared to lead, my thoughts have impartially followed, without minding, whether the footsteps of any other lay that way, or not. Not that I want a due respect to other men’s opinions; but after all, the greatest reverence is due to truth: and I hope, it will not be thought arrogance to say,that perhaps, we should make greater progress in the discovery of rational and contemplative knowledge, if we sought it in the fountain,in the consideration of things themselves; and made use rather of our own thoughts, than other men’s to find it. For, I think, we may as rationally hope to see with other men’s eyes, as to know by other men’s understandings. So much as we ourselves consider and comprehend of truth and reason, so much we possess of real and true knowledge. The floating of other men’s opinions in our brains,makes us not one jot the more knowing, though they happen to be true. What in them was science, is in us but opiniatrety, whilst we give up our assent only to reverend names, and do not, as they did,employ our own reason to understand those truths, which gave them reputation. Aristotle was certainly a knowing man, but nobody ever thought him so, because he blindly embraced, and confidently vented the opinions of another. And if the taking up of another’s principles, without examining them, made not him a philosopher,I suppose it will hardly make anybody else so. In the sciences,everyone has so much, as he really knows and comprehends: what he believes only, and takes upon trust, are but shreds; which however well in the whole piece, make no considerable addition to his stock,who gathers them. Such borrowed wealth, like fairy-money, though it were gold in the hand from which he received it, will be but leaves and dust when it comes to use.

§25. Whence the opinion of innate principles. When men have found some general propositions that could not be doubted of, as soon as understood, it was, I know, a short and easy way to conclude them innate. This being once received, it eased the lazy from the pains of search, and stopped the inquiry of the doubtful, concerning all that was once styled innate: and it was of no small advantage to those who affected to be masters and teachers, to make this the principle of principles, that principles must not he questioned: for having once established this tenet, that there are innate principles, it put their followers upon a necessity of receiving some doctrines as such; which was to take them off from the use of their own reason and judgment,and put them on believing and taking them upon trust without further examination: in which posture of blind credulity, they might be more easily governed by, and made useful to some sort of men, who had the skill and office to principle and guide them. Nor is it a small power it gives one man over another, to have the authority to be the dictator of principles, and teacher of unquestionable truths; and to make a man swallow that for an innate principle, which may serve to his purpose,who teacheth them. Whereas had they examined the ways, whereby men came to the knowledge of many universal truths, they would have found them to result in the minds of men, from the being of things themselves, when duly considered; and that they were discovered by the application of those faculties, that were fitted by nature to receive and judge of them, when duly employed about them.

§26. Conclusion. To show how the understanding proceeds herein,Other Considerations concerning Innate Principles,both Speculative and Practical is the design of the following discourse; which I shall proceed to,when I have first premised, that hithert to clear my way to those foundations, which, I conceive are the only true ones, whereon to establish those notions we can have of our own knowledge, it hath been necessary for me to give an account of the reasons, I had to doubt of innate principles: and since the arguments which are against them, do some of them, rise from common received opinions,I have been forced to take several things for granted, which is hardly avoidable to anyone, whose task is to show the falsehood, or improbability, of any tenet; it happening in controversial discourses,as it does in assaulting of towns; where, if the ground be but firm,whereon the batteries are erected, there is no further inquiry of whom ’tis borrowed, nor whom it belongs to, so it affords but a fit rise for the present purpose. But in the future part of this discourse,designing to raise an edifice uniform, and consistent with itself, as far as my own experience and observation will assist me, I hope, to erect it on such a basis, that I shall not need to shore it up with props and buttresses, leaning on borrowed or begged foundations: or at least,if mine prove a castle in the air, I will endeavour it shall be all of a piece, and hang together. Wherein I warn the reader not to expect undeniable cogent demonstrations, unless I may be allowed the privilege, not seldom assumed by others, to take my principles for granted; and then, I doubt not, but I can demonstrate too. All that I shall say for the principles I proceed on, is, that I can only appeal to men’s own unprejudiced experience, and observation, whether they be true, or not; and this is enough for a man who professes no more, than to lay down candidly and freely his own conjectures,concerning a subject lying somewhat in the dark, without any other design, than an unbiased inquiry after truth.

亚历山大·蒲柏（1688—1744), 英国伟大诗人，深受洛克思想、风格和语言的影响。

克里斯蒂安·惠更斯（1629—1695），荷兰物理学家、天文学家、数学家。