PREFACE
It was not an altogether comfortable meeting. My colleagues and I were huddled with our government sponsor to review progress on what we had come to call the “Group Brain” research project. We had completed a number of studies that explored some provocative parallels between brains (which are systems of interdependent neural modules) and groups (which are systems of interdependent members). The findings so far were intriguing, but we had not yet found a way to bring what we were learning to bear on the problem that most interested our sponsor—namely, how best to design and lead the diversity of teams that operate within the U.S. intelligence community.
Then Stephen Kosslyn, a cognitive neuroscientist and co-principal investigator on the Group Brain project, had an idea: “What if Richard wrote a short book that would draw out the implications of our findings specifically for intelligence teams?” he asked. He went on to point out that it could easily be completed within a year and then distributed widely throughout the community. It would be just what we needed—a bridge between scholarly research and leadership practice. Our sponsor thought that was a splendid idea, and everyone looked forward to reading what I would write.
That was four years ago. Writing the book became a rather more involved and interesting undertaking than any of us had imagined, as both the range of teams discussed and the book’s intended audience expanded considerably. For example, the book now incorporates material about other kinds of teams—such as athletic teams, flight-deck crews, healthcare teams, and even musical ensembles—whose work, like that of intelligence teams, can be far from routine. So what started as a short set of research-based guidelines for the intelligence community evolved into a book that also draws lessons from the intelligence community—specifically for those who lead or serve on any team that has to deal with hard problems in a challenging context.
Who the Book Is For
The book was written with intelligence, defense, crisis management, and law enforcement readers in mind, including both experienced and novice team leaders and members. Although this is not a textbook, instructors in national security and law enforcement training organizations will find here material that may be useful in their courses. The book also should be informative to readers who create, lead, or serve on decision-making, production, or service teams in government, the private sector, or nonprofit enterprises. Finally, I hope the book will be of interest to general readers who would like to learn a little about the “backstage” of collaboration in the intelligence and national security communities.
This book therefore can be viewed as a follow-on to my earlier book, Leading Teams, which was published almost a decade ago. A great deal of research on teams has been done since then, and the findings from that research are incorporated here. Recent studies have shown, for example, that the context within which a work team operates is enormously consequential for team behavior and performance. The intelligence community assuredly provides a unique (and often challenging) context for teamwork, and this book gives special attention to what is needed for teams to thrive in such contexts.
I have tried to create a book that will be as interesting and accessible to non-technical readers as it is to those who have experience and expertise working with teams. Although my main aspiration has been to provide guidance that will be useful to team leaders and members, there are no “one minute” prescriptions here—creating, leading, and serving on teams is not that simple. But neither are there excursions into the kinds of arcane theoretical issues that are of interest only to those of us whose day jobs involve intense study of individual and group dynamics. That is a narrow beam on which to balance, and I have tried hard not to fall off in either direction.
Keeping Secrets
No individual is identified by name in the book, except those whose remarks are on the record or for which it is possible to cite a publicly available source. Nor do I identify by name either specific teams or specific organizational units. If I were to provide more details than I do, then some insiders might be able figure out who and what I am describing. That general problem with research confidentiality is especially salient here since the readers of this book will include people who make their living drawing conclusions from sketchy data.
It has been necessary, therefore, to disguise some individuals, settings, and events. My intent has been to alter only details that are of no consequence for the interpretation of the material, but that is a judgment call, and I occasionally may have unknowingly changed something that actually is significant. Readers can be assured, however, that I have taken care never to offer up what my late colleague Brendan Maher liked to call an Irish Truth: “Something that, although not actually true, is required to sustain the narrative.”
Who Helped
Foremost among the many people who helped strengthen this book is Fred Ambrose, the intelligence community veteran with whom we had our difficult conversation four years ago, and to whom the book is dedicated. Fred provided both intellectual and financial support for much of the research discussed here. Although proudly an engineer by disposition and training, Fred has one of the most facile and wideranging intellects I have ever encountered. You never know what is in store when Fred starts to talk—a culinary innovation he has developed, or what can be learned about current international relations from some obscure 19th-century war, or a technological twist that solves a problem long thought to be intractable. But for all his intellectual exploring, Fred always finds his way back to his primary commitment—using his special gifts whenever and however he can to serve his country. Working with Fred has been an education and an inspiration.
Other members of the intelligence community also gave generously of their time and expertise, including James Bruce, Denis Clift, Joseph Hayes, Robert Herd, Rob Johnston, Mark Lowenthal, Michael Mears, Richard Rees, Steven Rieber, Jim Simon, Michael Sulik, and many others. Their comments and suggestions have been especially valuable in deepening my understanding of clandestine operational teams, since my own involvement with the community has been mainly with analytic, science and technology, and leadership teams. Special thanks are due John Phillips, Chief Scientist at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); and Tony Oettinger, Chair of the Intelligence Science Board (ISB). Interactions with colleagues in the Chief Scientist’s Office and on the ISB provided a continuous flow of ideas and perspectives that greatly enriched my understanding of teamwork in intelligence.
Professionals at the MITRE Corporation provided invaluable assistance in both the data gathering and the writing phases of this project. They include Beth Ahern, Craig Cook, Ann Lewis, Michael O’Connor, Beatrice Oshika, Frank Stech, and, especially, Margaret MacDonald, whose sharp editorial pencil both smoothed the flow of the manuscript and purged from it the many errors and ambiguities that somehow crept in.
I am greatly indebted to my colleagues in Harvard’s Group Brain research program, especially Stephen Kosslyn, who was co-principal investigator, and Anita Woolley, who started as a post-doctoral fellow and then, as project manager, provided superb scientific leadership to us all. Other researchers who contributed to Group Brain studies discussed in this book include Sean Bennett, Heather Caruso, Christopher Chabris, Colin Fisher, Margaret Gerbasi, Thomas Jerde, Melissa Liebert, and Jonathan Schuldt. Both the Group Brain research activities and the writing of this book were supported in part by Grant 0106070 from the National Science Foundation to Harvard University and by the CIA’s Intelligence Technology Innovation Center.
Exchanges with my colleagues Mahzarin Banaji, R. Bhaskar, Robert Fein, Phil Heymann, Sujin Jang, Scott Snook, and Ruth Wageman, as well as discussions with members of our informal “GroupsGroup” research seminar at Harvard, have been invaluable in sharpening and extending the ideas discussed here. I also am indebted to Dave Bushy, who kept my analyses of team processes in aviation grounded in reality; to Sanden Averett and Christopher Dial, whose ability to locate even the most obscure research reports continues to amaze me; and to those colleagues-at-a-distance who provided insightful and constructive reviews of the manuscript, including Lynn Eden, Phil Mirvis, Renee Tynan, Jim Wylde, and several anonymous reviewers.
Finally, my heartfelt thanks to my family—Judith, Beth, Trex, Laura, Matt, Catherine, Lauren, Edward, and Mattox—for their support and patience, especially when they did not realize that they were providing exactly what I most needed. But I realized it, and I appreciate it more than I can say.