第六节 国际私法的体系及研究方法

一、国际私法的体系

国际私法的体系可以从两种意义上来理解：一是国际私法的立法体系，二是国际私法的理论体系或国际私法的学说体系。两者之间既有区别的一面，更有相互联系、相互作用的一面。就其区别而论，前者是一个国家国际私法立法的规范体系，而后者只是学者对国际私法的理解和主张，其区别清晰可辨。但是，更有意义的是如何正确认识两者之间的相互联系和作用。一方面，从国际私法历史看，国际私法学说（学说法）先于国际私法立法，直到今天，国际私法学说作为国际私法的渊源的地位仍然是没有疑义的，它在国际私法的形成和发展中，始终起到了巨大的先行、指引和推动作用。另一方面，我们也可以看到，国际私法立法和司法实践的不断发展，又推动了国际私法理论的繁荣，这是一个永不停息的互动过程。两者之间的这种关系，可以从改革开放以来中国国际私法实践和理论的快速发展之中看得清清楚楚。

（一）国际私法的立法体系

国际私法的立法体系可以理解为一个国家国际私法立法的规范体系及立法模式。由于各国政治、经济、文化、历史及法律传统的差异，各国国际私法的立法体系也呈现出相应的类别化。

由于各国对国际私法范围认识的不一致，在国际私法的规范体系方面，大致可归纳为以下几类：一是按照本国的民法体系制定相应的法律适用法，如1939年《泰国国际私法》和1978年《奥地利联邦国际私法法规》等；二是既包括冲突规范又包括国际民事诉讼法规范，如1982年《土耳其国际私法和国际民事诉讼法》和1982年《南斯拉夫国际冲突法》等；三是包括外国人的法律地位规范、冲突规范以及国际民事诉讼法规范三大部分，如1964年《捷克斯洛伐克国际私法及国际民事诉讼法》。

至于各国国际私法的立法模式，已在本章第三节“国际私法的渊源”中作了详细阐述。

（二）国际私法的理论体系

国际私法的理论体系，实际上就是各国的国际私法学者基于对国际私法的不同认识而建立的自成一体的学说体系。相对于国际私法的立法体系，国际私法的理论体系更是显得五花八门，但是，正是这些五花八门的学说之间的相互碰撞，才使得我们对国际私法的认识一步一步接近全面、真切和透彻。从这个意义上说，我们完全没有必要追求国际私法理论体系的同一。

根据各国学者对国际私法范围的不同理解，国际私法的理论体系也可大致分为以下三类：

一是“小”国际私法体系。这类学者依据传统的国际私法就是冲突法的观点，只探讨涉外民事关系的法律适用问题，或者说只涉及实体民法的冲突问题。此类著作亦主要只对冲突规范及相关制度和各种涉外民事关系的法律适用两方面的问题展开讨论。

二是“大”国际私法体系。这又分为两种不同的观点，一种认为国际私法包括外国人的民事法律地位、冲突规范和国际民事诉讼（含国际商事仲裁）三大块，并在此基础上建立国际私法的理论体系。此类著作在其开始部分也会花大量篇幅讨论冲突规范及相关制度等基本理论，其余则置于分论（各论）之中。

另一种则为目前中国国际私法学界的主流观点，认为国际私法应该包括外国人的民事法律地位、冲突规范、统一实体法规范以及国际民事诉讼和国际商事仲裁四大部分，并在此基础上建立国际私法的理论体系（此外，更有主张将各国“直接适用的法”也包括在国际私法范围中的观点）。但此类著作，仍以冲突规范及其相关制度作基本理论部分。只是在论述法律冲突的解决途径时，阐述将统一实体法纳入国际私法的理由，并将它列作国际私法的重要渊源之一。其各论中几乎仍以论述各种涉外民商事关系的冲突法制度为主线，必要时，或多或少地介绍有关的统一实体法，但均不占主要地位。

二、国际私法的研究方法

传统的国际私法学理论主要分为英美法系和大陆法系两大派别。在研究方法上，大陆学派趋向于从法理学的一些基本原理出发，通过演绎法，试图推导出各种普遍适用的冲突法规则。其代表人物有德国的萨维尼和法国的毕耶（Pillet）。英美学派则注重本国的成案研究，通过归纳法寻求法律适用的各种共同原则。这一学派以美国的斯托雷和英国的戴西为代表。这种研究方法上的差异至今仍未完全消失。其实，这两种不同的研究方法各有千秋，若能兼取二者之长，则可收到相辅相成之效。因为法学既然是一门实践科学，就得重视对各国尤其是本国的司法实践即成案材料的研究和分析。同时，法学作为理论科学，又离不开一定的法理学的指导。

在国际私法的研究工作中，历史的方法无疑是十分重要的方法。这一方法能够使我们通过对国际私法产生和发展的历史条件的准确把握，揭示出不同制度与理论产生的社会背景和历史作用，从而使我们能够透过似乎是纯粹抽象的理论或者纷繁复杂的法律条文的背后，解读其所具有的特定的生活内容和社会职能。历史的研究方法，要求我们必须对国际私法的各种学说和制度，到当时特定的社会生活条件中去探源。研究国际私法的历史方法，作为一种纵向的研究，还有助于我们通过了解国际私法的过去，更好地把握国际私法的现在，预见它的未来。

比较研究方法，在国际私法当中具有特别重要的意义，一些西方学者甚至将比较研究的方法称为“国际私法之母”。进入20世纪后，欧洲大陆国家出现了以德裔美籍学者拉贝尔（Rabel）为代表人物的国际私法中的比较法学派，他们对各国的冲突法进行比较研究，以寻求统一各国冲突法的途径。对于国际私法学来说，比较的研究方法之所以具有与生俱来的特殊意义，从根本上讲，在于国际私法所特有的兼具国际和国内因素或成分的性质，而这一性质又来源于它的调整对象是涉外民事关系。由于涉外民事关系必然涉及到诸多平行的而又互不相同的法律制度，只有通过对有关国家的民商法进行比较研究，才能找出它们之间的差异和法律冲突之所在；也只有比较研究有关各国的国际私法学说、理念和制度，才能判定采用什么制度方可达到国际私法所追求的“判决一致”。而就立法工作而言，也只有通过比较研究各国国际私法立法，方能博采众长，为我所用。而在这种比较中，探讨它们产生的经济、社会和文化的历史背景，分析它们所追求的功能或价值取向，讨论各自为实现这种取向所采取的不同方法与制度，然后结合当今国际社会与中国目前所处的时代，提出我们自己的更符合实际情况的理念与制度设计，当是比较研究的根本目的。

【思考题】

1．下列案件涉及哪些民事关系？根据我国的法律，这些民事关系是否是涉外民事关系？

【案例1.3】“富山海轮”与波兰所属塞浦路斯船籍的集装箱船碰撞案

2003年5月31日格林尼治时间10点30分（北京时间18点30分），在距丹麦博恩霍尔姆岛以北4海里的海域，中国远洋运输集团公司所属的“富山海轮”与一条波兰所属塞浦路斯船籍的集装箱船相撞，外轮撞到“富山海轮”左舷一、二舱之间，导致生活舱突然大量进水，“富山海轮”沉没，船上27名船员获救。

“富山海轮”船员离船前，封闭了船舶上所有的油路，避免了原油外溢造成严重的海域污染。“富山海轮”载有6.6万吨化肥，货主是中国农业生产资料集团公司，货物保险金额为870万美元。“富山海轮”船体保险金额为2050万美元。中国人民保险公司是“富山海轮”船体、货物的独家保险人。中国人民保险公司承保后，进行了再保险。“富山海轮”运载的货物出险后，中国人民保险公司迅速与国际再保险经纪人和再保险人取得联系，启动应急理赔程序，聘请律师等有关中介机构进行前期调查取证工作，分析事故原因，勘验定损，协助船东开展救助。

“富山海轮”出险后，中国人民保险公司于2003年6月6日决定预付赔款7000万人民币。“富山海轮”船体与货物保险金额为2920万美元，中国人民保险公司预计赔付金额在2亿元人民币左右，创我国国内海损赔付之最。

2．谈谈你对国际私法调整对象的理解。

3．如何正确理解国际私法的范围？

4．试述国际私法的基本原则。

5．试述国际私法的性质。

6．你认为我国《民法通则》第142条中“国际惯例”所指为何？

7．通过本章学习，你认为国际私法与国际经济法最大的区别在哪里？

【扩展性阅读材料】

1．韩德培、李双元：《应当重视对冲突法的研究》，载《武汉大学学报（社会科学版）》1993年第6期。

2．李双元等：《关于国际私法的几个理论问题》，载《中国国际私法与比较法年刊》（2001年卷），法律出版社2001年版。

3．李双元、欧福永：《国际私法研究方法之我见》，载《法学论坛》2003年第3期。

4．李健男：《论国际私法的国际法因素》，载《暨南学报（哲学社会科学版）》2005年第3期。

5．李健男：《论国际私法的社会基础》，载《法学评论》2006年第5期。

6．林燕平：《对我国国际私法司法解释现象的法理分析》，载《法学》2000年第5期。

7.Substantivism versus Selectivism

（1）The Original Substantivist Method

The very name of our subject“conflict of laws”, and in particular“choice of law”, presupposes that in all cases that have contacts with more than one state：（a）each involved state has an active or passive desire or claim to have its law applied; （b）that these claims“conflict”in the sense of being of roughly equal intensity and validity; and（c）that the only way to resolve the conflict is to choose the law of one of the involved states.

Each of these premises has been seriously disputed in different periods in history.For example, the last of the above premises has been rejected by what is generally regarded as one of the first recorded methods of resolving multistate problems.That method, which was employed by the Roman praetor peregrinus in adjudicating disputes between Roman and non-Roman subjects, was based on the notion of a constructive blending of the involved laws rather than on a choice from among them.The praetor resolved these disputes by constructing and applying to the case at hand a new substantive rule of decision derived from the laws of both or all involved countries. Thus, the first instinct of the legal mind when confronted with a multistate private-law dispute was one of compromise rather than of choice, eclecticism rather than all or nothing.Instead of choosing the law of one of the involved states regardless of the outcome such a choice might produce for the particular case, the praetor would focus on the needs of that case and devise for it the most appropriate substantive solution， drawn from the laws of all involved states.

This substantivist method died out before the fall of the Roman empire and, by the time Roman law was“rediscovered”in Western Europe, the idea of choosing one of the involved laws rather than blending them had set in.The modern selectivist method was thus born and soon began to dominate the international scene.

（2）Contemporary Scholastic Substantivism

During the twentieth century, the substantivist method made a fairly momentous reappearance in international and interstate commercial arbitration, where it has become the preferred method among arbitrators.The result is the production of a voluminous, if not widely publicized, body of transnational, and at the same time a national, substantive law.

In the United States, the substantivist method has also acquired new and eloquent supporters in the writings of established academic commentators, including two participants in this Symposium, Professors von Mehren and Juenger.

Professor Arthur T.von Mehren has suggested that many true conflicts can be resolved expediently by a compromise of the conflicting policies of the involved states, rather than by a full vindication of the policies of the one state and a complete subordination of those of the other state.This compromise would take the form of a special substantive rule that would be constructed ad hoc for the case at hand and would be derived from the laws of both or all involved states.For example, a true conflict between the strict liability law of one state and the law of another state that does not impose liability could be resolved by a special substantive rule that would allow the recovery of only half of plaintiff's actual damages, or of certain items only， such as medical expenses and loss of earnings.

Professor Friedrich K.Juenger advocated a wider use of the substantivist approach.He proposed that conflicts of laws be resolved by constructing from among the involved states a rule of law that best accords with modern substantive-law trends and standards.For example, for products liability conflicts, Juenger proposed that, from among the laws of the places of conduct, injury, acquisition of the product, and domicile of the parties, the court should choose“[a]s to each issue...that rule of decision which most closely accords with modern standards of products liability.”

Finally, Professor Luther L.McDougal argued that, in constructing the ad hoc substantive rule of decision, courts should not confine themselves to the laws of the states involved in the conflict but should instead look beyond those laws and try to construct“the best”rule of law.

（3）Contemporary Judicial Substantivism

The above scholarly suggestions have not yet had any appreciable conscious following from the bench.However, Judge Jack B.Weinstein, another participant to this Symposium, came close to using the substantive-law solution when he proposed the development of a“national consensus law”for handling a complex product-liability class action brought by the victims of Agent Orange.In his contribution to this Symposium, Judge Weinstein seems to move in a different direction when he proposes the application of the law of the forum qua forum in a similar hypothetical case.Both of Weinstein's proposals seem to be motivated by his profound disillusionment with the selectivist method as practiced in the United States.Such disillusionment on the part of a judge with this breadth and depth of conflicts experience should give all of us a reason for pause.This disillusionment is quite common among judges called upon to decide the complex“mega torts”discussed by Weinstein.Indeed, the selectivist method comes very close to the crashing point in coping with these cases and thus the thought of abandoning the method is entirely understandable.In ordinary single tort cases, however, the selectivist method remains dominant and its use is rarely questioned.

One possible exception to the judicial use of the selectivist method is the increasing use of dépeçage, namely the application of the laws of different states to different issues or aspects of the same cause of action.Dépeçage comes close to the substantivist method in that it leads to the creation of a hybrid substantive rule that does not exist as such in any of the involved states and that springs into existence only for the case at hand.Nevertheless, dépeçage differs from the substantivist method in that it is driven by selectivist rather than substantive considerations.It is not an intended substantive solution, but rather the unintended result of one feature of modern selectivist methods—their insistence in analyzing and resolving each issue separately （called“issue-by-issue analysis”）.

On balance, the lack of contemporary judicial following of the substantivist method should not be surprising.One reason is the fact that for so long“[w]e have become so accustomed by tradition and theory to ideas of conflict, choice and selection.”A more serious reason, however, has to do with contemporary understandings about the appropriate role of judges and the hierarchy of sources of law.For, unlike some arbitrators, judges are expected to decide disputes according to law, not ex aequo et bono.The problem with the judicial version of the substantivist method is that it authorizes the retroactive application to unsuspecting litigants of a“law”that does not in fact exist anywhere until the moment the judge invents and utters it.Although it could be argued that this is no different than what judges have been doing in expanding the common law, the better view is that there is, at a minimum, a large difference in degree（the degree of pretension）and, more likely, an important difference in kind.

（4）Legislative Substantivism

In contrast, the substantivist method does not encounter the above difficulties when employed by the legislature, that is, by the body that has the unquestionable authority to promulgate new law that is meant to be applied prospectively only.During the twentieth century the substantivist method has been employed repeatedly in enacting uniform substantive rules intended to resolve multistate problems directly， without the intervention of choice-of-law rules.

At the international level, these rules originate in international conventions such as the 1980 United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods, which is now in force in 56 countries; the 1929 Warsaw Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to International Carriage by Air; the 1956 Geneva Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road; the 1964 Hague Con vention on Uniform Sales Laws; and the 1973 Washington Convention Providing a Uniform Law on the Form of an International Will.

At the interstate level, one very productive source of uniform substantive rules is the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws, which has produced approximately 200 uniform laws during the twentieth century.One of these uniform laws is the Uniform Commercial Code, which is now in force in all fifty states of the United States.

Obviously, by eliminating the multiplicity of substantive laws, the enactment of these uniform laws has also eliminated the possibility of conflicts of laws in the areas covered by the uniform laws.To that extent, the substantivist method has commensurably reduced the scope of operation of the selectivist method.This reduction is relatively small and, although it should continue to grow in the future, the growth will be slow.Thus, for the foreseeable future, the selectivist method will continue to dominate all efforts to resolve multistate conflicts of laws.