3. The variables of Sino-Russian partnership of strategic coordination

The “variables” here is not the variables in the general academic research. It refers to the factors which may have negative effects on the Sino-Russian partnership of strategic coordination. The first factor is the US, which is not only the biggest external driving force for China and Russia to facilitate their strategic partnership, but also the external factor which splits and weakens it. As the only super power after the end of the Cold War, the US is the leading power of the current international system. It has the strength and techniques to affect the Sino-Russian relationship. As a matter of fact, it often alienates ties between Beijing and Moscow, or co-opts one and suppresses the other, so the two powers won't get too close to challenge its international status. Meanwhile, both China and Russia need US assistance in economy and security. Hence normally, both countries take their relations with Washington as a priority in their diplomacy, which results in the effectiveness of the US strategy on splitting or weakening Sino-Russian ties.

For example, after the September 11 attacks, the White House took advantage of Russia's need of improving Moscow's relations with the US and Europe. It enhanced collaboration with Russia in terms of anti-terrorism, NATO-related issues and other. All that resulted in an obvious slackness on both Sino-Russian partnership of strategic coordination and their teamwork under the framework of the SCO. For the moment, the US is promoting the strategy of rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region. In the meantime, it is containing the rise of Russia by exploiting the chance of the Ukrainian crisis. Under such circumstance, the Sino-US strategic competition will continue and Russian-US relations will remain chill. But we cannot rule out the situation that the US may compromise with Russia on the Ukrainian issue in the medium or long term, in order to woo the support from Moscow to jointly contain Beijing. Both China and Russia should be vigilant about this. With the deepening of the Sino-Russian common development, plus the two's recognition of US splitting strategy, it is believed that the Sino-Russian bilateral partnership of strategic coordination will be more stable and will not be affected by external factors.

The second factor is the coexistence of China and Russia in Central Asia. Russia takes Central Asia as its “backyard” and “isolation belt” for preventing extremism and terrorism. Russia hopes to, overtly or coverly, exclude other major powers' existence in this area, including China. China has no intention to challenge Russia's dominant role in Central Asia, but it wants to keep its reasonable benefits such as maintaining border security with Central Asian nations, preventing the three evil forces from infiltrating into its Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, and cooperating with Central Asian countries over energy and economy, etc. This is also agreed by Russia. The SCO is a significant achievement of Sino-Russian collaboration in Central Asia. The organization, however, is sometimes taken as a mechanism to affect Chinese policies and cooperative plans in this region by Russia, because Russia still has concerns over China's rising influence and status in this land.

Russia's major anxieties toward China in Central Asia include the following:first, the SCO's rapid development could influence the growth of the Custom Union comprised of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan as well as the establishment of the EEU. Second, China might use its energy cooperation with Central Asia to cut the price on oil importing from Russia. Third, China and Central Asia's joint projects on highway and railway systems may affect Russia's role to be the traffic artery connecting Europe and Asia. China has been trying to gain Russia's trust and reduce its doubt over these issues, which has brought some positive results. But concerns still exist.

After Chinese President Xi Jinping raised the idea of establishing the SREB in 2013, a new problem emerged in Sino-Russian ties when it comes to their relationship with Central Asia – how to deal with the relationship between the construction of the SREB and the establishment of the EEU. Considering China's economic strength, Russia was against Beijing's blueprint at the very beginning, worrying that China might “occupy” the region under the name of the SREB, which would turn into a huge strike to the Russia-led EEU.

After China adopted a series of work to persuade Moscow, especially after Russia was hit by economic sanctions due to the Ukrainian crisis, it began to change its negative view toward the SREB, while seeking for projects that can connect the SREB with the EEU. As a result, Russia and China signed a joint declaration on cooperation in coordinating the development of the EEU project and the SREB on May 2015, which was favorable for coordinating Sino-Russian relations in Central Asia. What's more, if such connection could promote regional economic integration in Central Asia, and even within the scope of the Commonwealth of the Independent States (CIS), it would bring enormous benefits for not only Beijing and Moscow, but also every single country in the region. However, the SREB would objectively compete against the economic integration under the framework of the EEU in infrastructural construction of roads and pipelines, trade facilitation and liberalization, as well as investment. Therefore, China still has a lot of work to do to reassure Moscow, in order to clear up the latter's doubts and push forward connectivity between the two mechanisms.

Another factor is strategic mutual trust between China and Russia, which is an old topic but changes with the times. It needs to be taken seriously. In the 1990s, various versions of the China threat theory were popular in Russia. Even at the beginning of the 21st century, Chinese migrants to the Russian Far East and China's “expansion” in Central Asia were regarded as potential threats by the Russians. So far, given that China has outrun Russia in terms of national strength and global status, strategic concerns over China's emergence have turned into Moscow's major psychological barriers in developing its ties with Beijing. These concerns include whether China could emerge peacefully; what will Beijing's policy toward Russia be after the rise of China; will the change over the previous balance of power put Moscow at a disadvantaged position and will Beijing become Russia's strategic opponent?

For example, a report over Russia's strategy in the 21st century was issued by the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, a famous Russian think tank, on January 21, 2014, when the struggling between Russia and the West was quite fierce over the Ukrainian crisis. It said that Russia will face both hard and soft security threats in the future. The soft one is that as China keeps turning stronger, it will pose huge influence on its neighboring countries. And the hard threat is that Islamic extremism in the Near East is spreading to Russia's sphere of influence and even within the country. As is well-known, the members of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy are all Russian elite from intellectual, political or business circles. However, they simply turned a blind eye to its geopolitical pressure piled by the West, while worrying about China's future policy over its peripheral countries. This obviously showed Moscow's deep strategic concerns toward Beijing.

Of course, there are also some Chinese who have distrust and negative attitude toward Russia's China policy as well as the Sino-Russian partnership of strategic coordination. Hence, from the perspective of keeping a long-term and healthy bilateral relationship, both sides ought to make more effort in reducing misunderstandings, promoting mutual understandings and deepening strategic cooperation in each field. As Putin views it, the “growth of the Chinese economy is by no means a threat, but a challenge that comes laden with tremendous potential for business cooperation, a chance to catch the ‘Chinese wind' in the‘sail' of the Russian economy.”