1. Russia's cognition of soft power

1.1 The appearance of the notion of “soft power” in Russia

Soft power, a notion coined by Joseph S.Nye, Jr. of Harvard University, has sparked a quick response in China and become a hotspot in its studies of international relations and politics as well as an important policy in its state governance. Compared with Beijing, Moscow started late in this arena, with few in-depth and systematic articles prior to 2010. Between 2005 and 2009, there were fewer than 20 theses that included “мягкая сила” or “ мягкаямощь” (meaning “soft power”) in their abstracts. It was not until 2010 that studies on soft power started to heat up in Russia. Since Vladimir Putin explicitly mentioned “soft power” in his presidential campaign in 2012, the number of theses and books on this theme has increased dramatically. Fyodor Lukyanov and other Russian scholars launched theoretical exploration of the definition, research approach, status evaluation and the policy implication of the terminology. State Duma's Foreign Affairs Committee, the country's most important think tank, also organized the compilation of a series of reports on Russia's soft power. In this way, soft power has surged to a state strategy. It was written into the new edition of the Concept in 2013, becoming one of the most significant elements in Moscow's foreign policy.

1.2 “Soft power” in Russia's context

When combing Russia's cognition of soft power, it is easy to spot that the so-called “soft power” has a dense Russian characteristic in the eyes of Russian political elite. “In Russia, no one has ever understood this terminology as defined by Joseph Nye.” It is true that Russia and the West have many differences in recognizing the guiding ideology, composition and source of soft power.

First, Russia's soft power is a diplomatic means promoted by the government.

Moscow defines soft power as a state or government power instead of a public or social resource. In the Kremlin's view, diplomatic work is a crucial part of soft power. According to “Russia and the Changing World” and the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation of 2013, soft power is defined as “a set of tools and methods to achieve foreign policy goals through the use of information and other levers of influence alternative to traditional diplomacy.” The proposal of soft power is always closely related with Russia's diplomacy and therefore is viewed as new diplomacy.

This concept is obviously different from that of the US which attaches great importance to radiating its soft power through various civil or non-governmental organizations (NGO). Some international and regional NGOs and their information media outlets in the US and other Western countries have branches in the Commonwealth of the Independent States (CIS), playing an important role in improving the influence of the West. And Russian organizations responsible for the development of soft power, including the Russian World Foundation, Rossotrudnichestvo (the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation) and the Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund, are affiliated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or closely related to it. Even so-called independent, fair and professional communication platforms like the Valdai International Discussion Club, Yaroslavl Global Policy Forum, and the Paris-based Institute of Democracy and Cooperation are highly official, with limited scope of influence.

Second, Russia's soft power is closely associated with its governing capacity.

Russia is a country whose image is built on government resources and its governing capacity is somewhat related to its soft power. Over the decade after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the power of the Russian government was restricted in various ways and contradictions among different interest groups were hard to reconcile, consequently leading to regime change, social turmoil, and national secession. Since Vladimir Putin assumed office, Moscow has seen apparently improved governing ability and a better national image.

During the period when Russia enjoyed better governing capacity, it enjoys a higher level of social development and a stronger cohesive force. On the contrary, when the country suffers from weak governing capacity, it is subjected to political turmoil, social instability and descending soft power. However, while a mighty government has gained public support, it has also caused vigilance from the West. The Western world has been deeply anxious about Putin's model of promoting governing capacity, contending that Russia under Putin's governance has taken on democratic retreat. The “Russian threat” theme has frequently occurred in media reports across Western countries, severely damaging Russia's national image. This is one of the paradoxes of Russia's soft power strategy: without powerful governing capacity, it is hard for the country to develop cohesive power and attractiveness; but in the eyes of the Western world, strong governing capacity is nothing but resurgence of imperial ambitions. How to strike a balance is key to building Moscow's soft power.

Third, Moscow's ambivalence on soft power.

Moscow has proposed “legal” and “illegal” ways of using soft power. The typical viewpoints come from Putin's “Russia and the Changing World” in which he states, “there must be a clear division between freedom of speech and normal political activity, on the one hand, and illegal instruments of ‘soft power, ' on the other… However, the activities of ‘pseudo-NGOs' and other agencies that try to destabilize other countries with outside support are unacceptable.” Russia has been viewing the Western world's soft power in a critical and vigilant attitude, contending it adopts an “illegal” means and that Moscow itself is on the moral high ground in international relations. “However, Russia does not use or fund national NGOs based in other countries or any foreign political organizations in the pursuit of its own interests.”

Nonetheless, is the fact really like what Putin put it? In the Ukrainian crisis, the Russian Cultural Center, a so-called NGO, has become a powerful weapon to fight against Western public opinion. The center incited local opinion leaders to express their views, agitated the public to stage assemblies and demonstrations and actively promoted the process of “Russification.” “Where there are US and European civil organizations and NGOs, there must be working staff from the Russian Cultural Center.” Crimea's separation from Ukraine and integration into Russia came as a result of multiple factors, but the center's key influence upon local opinion leaders played an important role. Consequently, Moscow adopts a way it has been criticizing in competing with the West in soft power, namely,“giving the West its own medicine.”