第119章

Seeing the great disparity there is between different conditions of human life， he ought constantly to endeavour to raise each class， and every individual of each class， to a class above it. This is the true equalization of mankind.

Not to pull down those who are exalted， and reduce all to a naked and savage equality. But to raise those who are abased； to communicate to every man all genuine pleasures， to elevate every man to all true wisdom and to make all men participators of a liberal and comprehensive benevolence. This is the path in which the reformers of mankind ought to travel. This is the prize they should pursue. Do you tell me， "that human society can never arrive at this improvement？" I do not stay to dispute that point with you.

We can come nearer it than we are. We can come nearer and nearer yet. This will not be the first time that persons， engaged in the indefatigable pursuit of some accomplishment， have arrived at an excellence that surpassed their most sanguine expectations.

The result of this part of the subject is， that those persons have been grossly mistaken who taught that virtue was to be pursued for its own sake， and represented pleasure and pain as trivial matters and unworthy consideration.

Virtue is upon no other account valuable， than as it is the instrument of the most exquisite pleasure. -- Be it observed， that it is one thing to say that pain is not an evil， which is absurd， and another thing to say that temporary pains and pleasures are to be despised， when the enduring of the one is necessary， and the declining the other unavoidable in the pursuit of excellent and permanent pleasure， which is a most fundamental precept of wisdom and morality.

Let us proceed to a second point announced by us in the outset， the consideration of how the subject of good and evil has been darkened by certain fabulists and system-builders. The system alluded to under this head， is that of the optimists， who teach "that everything in the universe， is for the best； and that， if anything had happened otherwise than it has happened， the result would have been， a diminution of the degree of happiness and good." That we may escape the error into which these persons have been led， by the daringness of their genius， and their mode of estimating things in the gross， and not in detail， we must be contented to follow experience， and not to outrun it.

It has already appeared that there is in the universe absolute evil：第一章nd， if pain be evil (and it has been proved to be the only absolute evil)， it cannot be denied that， in the part of the universe with which we are acquainted， it exists in considerable profusion. It has also appeared， that there is a portion of absolute evil， which is relatively good， and which therefore， the preceding circumstances being assumed， was desirable.

Such， for example， is the amputation of a gangrened limb.

Whether or no those preceding circumstances were， universally， and in a comprehensive sense， good， which rendered the introduction of the absolute evil in question necessary， is， to say the least， a very doubtful point.

But， if there be some presumption in the negative even in the smallest instance， this presumption against universal good is incalculably increased， when we recollect all the vice， disorder and misery， that exist in the world.

Let us consider what portion there is of truth， that has been mixed with the doctrine of optimism. This is the same thing as to enquire by means of what plausibilities it gained footing in the world. The answer to the sequestions lies in two circumstances.

First， there is a degree of improvement real and visible in the world.

This is particularly manifest， in the history of the civilised part of mankind， during the three last centuries. The taking of Constantinople by the Turks (1453) dispersed among European nations， the small fragment of learning， which was， at that time， shut up within the walls of this metropolis. The discovery of printing was nearly contemporary with that event. These two circumstances greatly favoured the reformation of religion， which gave an irrecoverable shock to the empire of superstition and implicit obedience. From that time， the most superficial observation can trace the improvements of art and science， which may， without glaring impropriety， be styled incessant. Not to mention essential improvements which were wholly unknown to the ancients， the most important characteristics of modern literature， are the extent of surface over which it is diffused， and the number of persons that participate in it. It has struck its roots deep， and there is no probability that it will ever be subverted. It was once the practice of moralists， to extol past times， and declaim without bound on the degeneracy of mankind. But this fashion is nearly exploded. The true state of the fact is too gross to be mistaken. And， as improvements have long continued to be incessant， so there is no chance but they will go on. The most penetrating philosophy cannot prescribe limits to them， nor the most ardent imagination adequately fill up the prospect.

Secondly， the doctrine of necessity teaches us that all things in the universe are connected together. Nothing could have happened otherwise than it has happened. Do we congratulate ourselves upon the rising genius of freedom？ Do we view with pride the improvements of mankind， and contrast， with wonder， man in the state in which he once was， naked， ignorant and brutal， with man as we now sometimes behold him， enriched with boundless stores of science， and penetrated with sentiments of the purest philanthropy？