第53章 PHILOSOPHY(7)

He really approximates most closely to Hutcheson,who takes a similar view of Utilitarianism,but he professes the warmest admiration of Butler.He explicitly accepts Butler's doctrine of the 'supremacy of the conscience'--a doctrine which as he says,the bishop,'has placed in the strongest and happiest light.'(45)He endeavours,again,to approximate to the 'intellectual school,'of which Richard Price (1723-1791)was the chief English representative at the time.Like Kant,Price deduces the moral law from principles of pure reason.The truth of the moral law.'Thou shalt do to others as you wish that they should do to you,'is as evident as the truth of the law in geometry,'things which are equal to the same thing are equal to each other.'Stewart so far approves that he wishes to give to the moral law what is now called all possible 'objectivity,'while the 'moral sense'of Hutcheson apparently introduced a 'subjective'element.He holds,however,that our moral perceptions 'involve a feeling of the heart,'as well as a 'judgment of the understanding,'(46)and ascribes the same view to Butler.But then,by using the word 'reason'so as to include the whole nature of a rational being,we may ascribe to it the 'origin of those simple ideas which are not excited in the mind by the operation of the senses,but which arise in consequence of the operation of the intellectual powers among the various objects.'(47)Hutcheson,he says,made his 'moral sense'unsatisfactory by taking his illustrations from the 'secondary'instead of the 'primary qualities,'(48)and thus with the help of intuitive first principles,Stewart succeeds in believing that it would be as hard for a man to believe that he ought to sacrifice another man's happiness to his own as to believe that three angles of a triangle are equal to one right angle.(49)It is true that a feeling and a judgment are both involved;but the 'intellectual judgment'is the groundwork of the feeling,not the feeling of the judgment.(50)In spite,however,of this attempt to assimilate his principles to those of the intellectual school,the substance of Stewart's ethics is essentially psychological.It rests,in fact,upon his view that philosophy depends upon inductive psychology,and,therefore,essentially upon experience subject to the cropping up of convenient 'intuitions.'

This appears from the nature of his argument against the Utilitarians.

In his time,this doctrine was associated with the names of Hartley,Tucker,Godwin,and especially Paley.He scarcely refers to Bentham.(51)Paley is the recognised anvil for the opposite school.Now he agrees,as I have said,with Paley's view of natural theology and entirely accepts therefore the theory of 'final causes.'The same theory becomes prominent in his ethical teaching.We may perhaps say that Stewart's view is in substance an inverted Utilitarianism.It may be best illustrated by an argument familiar in another application.Paley and his opponents might agree that the various instincts of an animal are so constituted that in point of fact they contribute to his preservation and his happiness.But from one point of view this appears to be simply to say that the conditions of existence necessitate a certain harmony,and that the harmony is therefore to be a consequence of his self-preservation.

From the opposite point of view,which Stewart accepts,it appears that the self-preservation is the consequence of a pre-established harmony,which has been divinely appointed in order that he may live.Stewart,in short,is a 'teleologist'of the Paley variety.Psychology proves the existence of design in the moral world,as anatomy or physiology proves it in the physical.

Stewart therefore fully agrees that virtue generally produces happiness.

lf it be true (a doctrine,he thinks,beyond our competence to decide)that 'the sole principle of action in the Deity'is benevolence,it may be that he has commanded us to be virtuous because he sees virtue to be useful.In this case utility may be the final cause of morality;and the fact that virtue has this tendency gives the plausibility to utilitarian systems.(52)But the key to the difficulty is the distinction between 'final'and 'efficient'causes;for the efficient cause of morality is not the desire for happiness,but a primitive and simple instinct,namely,the moral faculty.

Thus he rejects Paley's notorious doctrine that virtue differs from prudence only in regarding the consequences in another world instead of consequences in this.(53)Reward and punishment 'presuppose the notions of right and wrong'and cannot be the source of those notions.The favourite doctrine of association,by which the Utilitarians explained unselfishness,is only admissible as accounting for modifications,such as are due to education and example,but 'presupposes the existence of certain principles which are common to all mankind.'The evidence of such principles is established by a long and discursive psychological discussion.It is enough to say that he admits two rational principles,'self-love'and the 'moral faculty,'the coincidence of which is learned only by experience.The moral faculty reveals simple 'ideas'of right and wrong,which are incapable of any further analysis.

But besides these,there is a hierarchy of other instincts or desires,which he calls 'implanted'because 'for aught we know'they may be of 'arbitrary appointment.'(54)Resentment,for example,is an implanted instinct,of which the 'final cause'is to defend us against 'sudden violence.'(55)Stewart's analysis is easygoing and suggests more problems than it solves.The general position,however,is clear enough,and not,I think,without much real force as against the Paley form of utilitarianism.