第5章 INTRODUCTORY(4)

Hence there is a distinction between such a history of a sect as I contemplate and a history of scientific inquiry or of pure philosophy.A history of mathematical or physical science would differ from a direct exposition of the science,but only in so far as it would state truths in the order of discovery,not in the order most convenient for displaying them as a system.It would show what were the processes by which they were originally found out,and how they have been afterwards annexed or absorbed in some wider generalisation.

These facts might be stated without any reference to the history of the discoverers or of the society to which they belonged.They would indeed suggest very interesting topics to the general historian or 'sociologist.'He might be led to inquire under what conditions men came to inquire scientifically at all;why they ceased for centuries to care for science;why they took up special departments of investigation;and what was the effect of scientific discoveries upon social relations in general.But the two inquiries would be distinct for obvious reasons.If men study mathematics they can only come to one conclusion.They will find out the same propositions of geometry if they only think clearly enough and long enough,as certainly as Columbus would discover America if he only sailed far enough.America was there,and so in a sense are the propositions.We may therefore in this case entirely separate the two questions:what leads men to think?and what conclusions will they reach?The reasons which guided the first discoverers are just as valid now,though they can be more systematically stated.But in the 'moral sciences'this distinction is not equally possible.The intellectual and the social evolution are closely and intricately connected,and each reacts upon the other.In the last resort no doubt a definitive system of belief once elaborated would repose upon universally valid truths and determine,instead of being determined by,the corresponding social order.But in the concrete evolution which,we may hope,is approximating towards this result,the creeds current among mankind have been determined by the social conditions as well as helped to determine them.To give an account of that process it is necessary to specify the various circumstances which may lead to the survival of error,and to the partial views of truth taken by men of different idiosyncrasies working upon different data and moved by different passions and prepossessions.

A history written upon these terms would show primarily what,as a fact,were the dominant beliefs during a given period,and state which survived,which disappeared,and which were transformed or engrafted upon other systems of thought.This would of course raise the question of the truth or falsehood of the doctrines as well as of their vitality:for the truth is at least one essential condition of permanent vitality.The difference would be that the problem would be approached from a different side.We should ask first what beliefs have flourished,and afterwards ask why they flourished,and how far their vitality was due to their partial or complete truth.To write such a history would perhaps require an impartiality which few people possess and which I do not venture to claim.I have my own opinions for which other people may account by prejudice,assumption,or downright incapacity.I am quite aware that I shall be implicitly criticising myself in criticising others.All that I can profess is that by taking the questions in this order,I shall hope to fix attention upon one set of considerations which are apt,as I fancy,to be unduly neglected.The result of reading some histories is to raise the question:how people on the other side came to be such unmitigated fools?Why were they imposed upon by such obvious fallacies?That may be answered by considering more fully the conditions under which the opinions were actually adopted,and one result may be to show that those opinions had a considerable element of truth,and were held by men who were the very opposite of fools.At any rate I shall do what I can to write an account of this phase of thought,so as to bring out what were its real tenets;to what intellectual type they were naturally congenial;what were the limitations of view which affected the Utilitarians'conception of the problems to be solved;and what were the passions and prepossessions due to the contemporary state of society and to their own class position,which to some degree unconsciously dictated their conclusions.So far as I can do this satisfactorily,I hope that I may throw some light upon the intrinsic value of the creed,and the place which it should occupy in a definitive system.

NOTES:

1.Table Talk,3July 1830.