第64章

During these movements of the army under Rosecrans, what was Bragg doing? On August 20th, the movement of our army over the Cumberland Mountains was reported to Bragg, and he then knew that he might look for an immediate advance.The movement of our army across the Tennessee was also reported to Bragg by his scouts, but was regarded by him as incredible.These reports were soon after confirmed by the news that our cavalry had occupied Trenton and had advanced up the Will's Valley Railroad as far as Wauhatchie, within seven miles of Chattanooga, as a covering force under which Rosecrans's columns of infantry were advancing.Our army was now as near the line of communication of the rebel army, as the latter was to the line to Nashville, and with less risk in its advance movements should Bragg commence operations to the north.Bringing his cavalry forward at once, Bragg soon ascertained that the general movement of our army was toward his left and rear in the direction of Dalton and Rome, keeping Lookout Mountain between the armies.He then determined to meet our army as its columns debouched from the defiles of the mountains.To hold Chattanooga would require at least two strong divisions, and he felt that his force would not permit this and make a successful attack also.Bragg put his army in motion on September 7th and 8th, and took up position from Lee and Gordon's Mills to La Fayette, on the road running south from Chattanooga, with the front to the east side of Lookout Mountain, and on the east bank of Chickamauga Creek, establishing his headquarters at the former place.

The positions of our detached corps was fully known to Bragg on the 8th.Learning of Negley's movement of the 9th into McLemore's cove, Bragg rightly interpreted it to mean that a hurried pursuit was being made after his force, under the idea that he was in full retreat.With his own force concentrated in front of the centre, Bragg at once saw how Rosecrans had exposed the corps of his army to be attacked and defeated in detail, and that evening he gave order to Hindman to prepare his division to move against Negley, and ordered Hill to send or take Cleburne's division, join Hindman, and immediately move upon Negley.On receipt of these orders, Hill replied that his part of the movement was impracticable, as Cleburne was sick, and that both gaps--Dug and Catlett's--had been closed by felling timber which would require twenty-four hours to remove.Hindman having marched during the night of the 9th some ten miles, was now in position, some three miles from Negley in the cove.Bragg not wishing to lose so favorable an opportunity of striking his opponent's force, ordered Buckner with his command to move from Anderson and join Hindman in the cove, which he did during the afternoon of the 10th.After these commands had united, the commanders held a consultation and determined that a change in the plan of operations should be made.Bragg having removed his headquarters to La Fayette, "so as to secure more prompt and decided action in the movements ordered against the enemy's centre," now directed Polk to send his remaining division to support Hindman during the operations in the cove.Despatching an officer to Bragg with a report as to this change of plans, Hindman and Cleburne waited his return.Bragg refused to make any change, and sent a verbal order to Hindman to proceed at once to carry out his previous instruction.Bragg at the same time sent written orders by courier to Hindman, notifying him of the movements of our forces, that Polk had been directed to cover his rear, and ordered him to attack and force his way through Negley to La Fayette at the earliest hour in the morning, and adds "Cleburne will attack in front the moment your guns are heard." Walker's reserve corps was also ordered to move promptly, join Cleburne's division at Dug Gap and unite in the attack.All obstructions were removed from Dug and Catlett's Gaps, and Breckenridge's division of Hill's corps was kept in position south of La Fayette to check any movement of our troops from that direction, thus putting 30,000 troops in position to crush Negley and Baird.Bragg shortly after daylight joined Cleburne, where they waited nearly all day for Hindman's guns to open--when Cleburne was to attack--on the flank and rear of Negley and Baird's divisions.After waiting long past noon in great anxiety for Hindman's attack, about the middle of the afternoon his first gun was heard.Cleburne at once pressed forward and discovered that Negley had fallen back to Steven's Gap.

Bragg, finding his attempt against Thomas's corps a failure, then determined to hurl his columns upon Crittenden's divided corps, approaching from Chattanooga, by withdrawing the troops engaged in the movement on Thomas's command to La Fayette, and directing Polk's and Walker's corps to move immediately in the direction of Lee and Gordon's Mills.Bragg knew Crittenden's corps was divided, but supposed only one division had been sent to Ringgold.At six o'clock on the evening of the 12th, Bragg wrote again to Polk, notifying him of Crittenden's position of the 11th, and stated: "This presents you a fine opportunity of striking Crittenden in detail, and I hope you will avail yourself of it at daylight to-morrow.