第52章

Colonel Lewis D.Watkins on the 27th made a gallant charge on the Texas Legion, encamped close to Van Dorn's main command near Spring Hill.Dashing in upon the enemy early in the morning, he was among them before they could rally for defence, capturing one hundred and twenty-eight prisoners, over three hundred animals, and their camp equipage without the loss of a man.

It was during the six months waiting at Murfreesboro that the unfortunate controversy arose between Rosecrans and the authorities at Washington, represented by General Halleck, as Commander-in-Chief, and Mr.Secretary Stanton of the War Department.The Army of the Cumberland, during the period of the active movements of that command, congratulated itself that the field of operations was so far removed from Washington City, that it did not come under the influence of the authority that seemed to paralyze every effort of the commands immediately around the seat of war at the East.But in this they were mistaken.The future student of the history of the war, in the light of the full official records, will wonder most at the fact that, under the orders from Washington, the commanders in the field were at all able to finally crush the rebellion.It was only when the armies at the East were placed under a general who was practically untrammeled in the exercise of his power, and who conducted his campaigns upon military principles, and not as the result of orders from Washington that the beginning of the end of the rebellion in the East began to dawn.In Tennessee we have seen how Halleck gave Buell orders and then attached such conditions to them as to render their proper execution absolutely impossible.

There was nothing to prevent Buell from occupying Chattanooga in June, 1862, as he was directed, while Bragg with his command was in Northern Mississippi, except the utterly useless condition attached to his orders, that he should repair the Memphis and Charleston Railroad as he moved east.Buell urged, in forcible terms, the foolishness and even impropriety of this delay, but Halleck, who knew much of the theory of war as learned from books, and in a general way wished to apply these principles to the practical movements of troops, overruled Buell.The latter knew that the enemy in his front always resolutely refused to be bound in his operations by such rules in conducting campaigns.The result of Halleck's wisdom soon became manifest when Bragg started for Kentucky, after the waste of Buell's time in repairing this railroad, which, when completed, was at once turned over to the enemy in good condition for immediate use against our own forces.On Buell fell the force of the blow that some one had to bear for this failure to take advantage of a patent opportunity.Buell's obedience to Halleck's orders rendered Bragg's advance into Kentucky possible, while Buell's failure to bring Bragg to a decisive action in Kentucky, and his refusal to follow Bragg into the mountains of Eastern Kentucky and Tennessee, was deemed sufficient cause by Halleck to issue the order removing him from his command.If Halleck's order to Buell to repair this railroad had never been issued, Bragg's campaign in Kentucky would never have been made.Halleck's removal of Buell was the direct result of the latter's obedience to orders received from the former.On Rosecrans assuming command, almost the first order he received from Halleck was one directing him to advance into East Tennessee after Bragg.With a full knowledge of the military situation obtained from Buell, Rosecrans proceeded at once to protect the line established by Buell, and await the advance of Bragg in the vicinity of Nashville.The battle of Stone's River was for the time sufficient to prove, even to Halleck, that Buell and Rosecrans were correct, and Rosecrans was allowed for the time to attend to his command without being interfered with.During the encampment at Murfreesboro, the first object of Rosecrans was to properly mount and equip his cavalry.In this he received at first faint encouragement, which soon ceased altogether.

On March 1st Halleck, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the United States, wrote a letter, sending a copy to Rosecrans and Grant, offering the position of the then vacant major-generalship in the regular army, to the general in the field who should first achieve an important and decisive victory.Grant very quietly folded up the letter, put it by for future reference, and proceeded with the plans of his campaign, saying nothing.To Rosecrans's open, impulsive, and honorable nature, engaged with all his powers in furthering the interests of the Government and the general welfare of his command, this letter was an insult, and he treated it accordingly.On March 6th he prepared his reply, and forwarded it to Washington.In this letter he informs the General-in-Chief that, "as an officer and as a citizen," he felt "degraded at such an auctioneering of honors," and then adds: "Have we a general who would fight for his own personal benefit when he would not for honor and for his country? He would come by his commission basely in that case, and deserve to be despised by men of honor.But are all the brave and honorable generals on an equality as to chances?