第82章

d. Fourthly， Descartes goes on to assert： “We must believe what is revealed to us by God， though we cannot understand it. It is not to be wondered at， since we are finite， that there is in God’s nature as inconceivably infinite， what passes our comprehension.” This represents the entrance of a very ordinary conception. Boehme on the other hand says (supra， p. 212)： ‘The mystery of the Trinity is ever born within us.’ Descartes， however， concludes： “Hence we must not trouble ourselves with investigations respecting the infinite； for seeing that we are finite， it is absurd for us to say anything about it.” (22) This matter we shall not， however， enter upon at present.

“Now the first attribute of God is that He is true and the Giver of all light； it is hence quite contrary to His nature to deceive us. Hence the light of nature or the power of acquiring knowledge given us by God can affect no object which is not really true in as far as it is affected by it” (the power of acquiring knowledge) “i.e.， as it is perceived clearly and distinctly.” We ascribe truth to God.

From this Descartes goes on to infer the universal bond which exists between absolute knowledge and the objectivity of what we thus know. Knowledge has objects， has a content which is known；we call this connection truth. The truth of God is just this unity of what is thought by the subject or clearly perceived， and external reality or existence. “Thereby an end is put to doubt， as if it could be the case that what appears quite evident to us should not be really true. We can thus no longer have any suspicion of mathematical truths. Likewise if we give heed to what we distinguish by our senses in waking or in sleeping， clearly and distinctly， it is easy to recognize in each thing what in it is true.” By saying that what is rightly and clearly thought likewise is， Descartes maintains that man comes to know by means of thought what in fact is in things； the sources of errors lie on the other hand in the finitude of our nature. “It is certain， because of God’s truth， that the faculty of perceiving and that of assenting through the will， if it extends no further than to that which is clearly perceived， cannot lead to error. Even if this cannot be in any way proved， it is by nature so established in all things， that as often as we clearly perceive anything， we assent to it from ourselves and can in no wise doubt that it is true.” (23)All this is set forth very plausibly， but it is still indeterminate， formal， and shallow； we only have the assertion made to us that this is so. Descartes’ method is the method of the clear understanding merely. Certainty with him takes the first place； from it no content is deduced of necessity， no content generally， and still less its objectivity as distinguished from the inward subjectivity of the ‘I.’ At one time we have the opposition of subjective knowledge and actuality， and at another their inseparable union. In the first case the necessity of mediating them enters in， and the truth of God is asserted to be this mediating power. It consists in this， that His Notion contains reality immediately in itself. The proof of this unity then rests solely upon the fact of its being said that we find within us the idea of complete perfection； thus this conception here appears simply as one found ready to hand. With this is compared the mere conception of God which contains no existence within it， and it is found that without existence it would be imperfect. This unity of God Himself， of His Idea， with His existence， is undoubtedly the Truth； in this we find the ground for holding as true what is for us just as certain as the truth of ourselves. As Descartes proceeds further we thus find that in reality everything has truth for him only in so far as it is really an object of thought， a universal. This truth of God has been， as we shall see， expressed even more clearly and in a more concise way by a disciple of Descartes， if one may venture to call him so - I mean Malebranche (who might really be dealt with here)， (24) in his Recherche de la vérité.

The first of the fundamental determinations of the Cartesian metaphysics is from the certainty of oneself to arrive at the truth， to recognize Being in the Notion of thought. But because in the thought “I think，” I am an individual， thought comes before my mind as subjective； Being is hence not demonstrated in the Notion of thought itself， for what advance has been made is merely in the direction of separation generally. In the second place the negative of Being likewise comes before self-consciousness， and this negative， united with the positive I， is so to speak implicitly united in a third， in God. God， who before this was a non-contradictory potentiality， now takes objective form to self-consciousness， He is all reality in so far as it is positive， i.e.， as it is Being， unity of thought and Being， the highest perfection of existence； it is just in the negative， in the Notion of this， in its being an object of thought， that Being is contained. An objection to this identity is now old -Kant urged it likewise - that from the Notion of the most perfect existence more does not follow than that in thought existence here and now and the most perfect essence are conjoined， but not outside of thought. But the very Notion of present existence is this negative of self-consciousness， not out of thought， - but the thought of the ‘out of thought.’