第61章

We have already called to mind how important it is to lead on to the content as the content of actuality, of the present; for the rational must have objective truth. The reconciliation of spirit with the world, the glorification of nature and of all actuality, must not be a Beyond, a Futurity, but must be accomplished now and here. It is this moment of the now and here which thereby comes into self-consciousness. But those who make experiments and observations, do not realize what they are really doing, for the sole interest taken by them in things, is owing to the inward and unconscious certainty which reason has of finding itself in actuality; and observations and experiments, if entered upon in a right way, result in showing that the Notion is the only objective existence. The sensuous individual eludes the experiments even while it is being operated upon, and becomes a universal; the best known example of this is to be found in positive and negative electricity in so far as it is positive and negative. There is another shortcoming of a formal nature, and one of which all empiricists partake, - that is that they believe themselves to be keeping to experience alone; it is to them an unknown fact that in receiving these perceptions they are indulging in metaphysics. Man does not stop short at the individual, nor can he do so. He seeks the universal, but thoughts, even if not Notions likewise, are what constitute the same. The most remarkable thought-form is that of force; we thus speak of the force of electricity, of magnetism, of gravity. Force, however, is a universal and not a perceptible; quite uncritically and unconsciously the empiricists thus permit of determinations such as these.

3. Bacon finally gives the objects with which Philosophy mainly has to deal. These objects contrast much with that which we derive from perception and experience. “In the summary which Bacon gives of what he conceives ought to be the objects of philosophical inquiry, are the following; and we select those which he principally dwells upon in his works: ‘The prolongation of life; the restitution of youth in some degree; the retardation of old age, and the altering of statures; the altering of features; versions of bodies into other bodies; making of new species; impression of the air and raising tempests; greater pleasures of the senses, &c.’” He likewise deals with objects such as these, and he seeks to direct attention upon whether in their regard the means could not be found to carry out their ends; in such powers we should be able to make some progress. “He complains that such investigations have been neglected by those whom be designates ignavi regionum exploratores. In his Natural History he gives formal receipts for making gold, and performing many wonders.” (10) Bacon thus does not by any means take the intelligent standpoint of an investigation of nature, being still involved in the grossest superstition, false magic, &c. This we find to be on the whole propounded in an intelligent way, and Bacon thus remains within the conceptions of his time. “The conversion of silver, quicksilver, or any other metal into gold is a thing difficult to believe, yet it is far more probable that a man who knows clearly the natures of weight, of the colour of yellow, of malleability, and extension, of volatility and fixedness, and who has also made diligent search into the first seeds and menstruums of minerals, may at last by much and sagacious endeavour produce gold, than that a few grains of an elixir may so do. . . .

So again a man who knows well the nature of rarefaction, of assimilation, and of alimentation, shall by diets, bathings, and the like prolong life, or in some degree renew the vigour of youth.” (11)These assertions are thus not as crude as they at first appear. In dealing with Medicine Bacon speaks amongst other things of maceration (Malacissatio per exterius) (12) and so forth.

Bacon emphasizes what has reference to the formal aspect of investigation. For he says, “Natural philosophy is divided into two parts, the first consists in the investigation of causes; the second in the production of effects; the causes to be investigated are either final or formal causes, or else material or efficient causes. The former constitutes metaphysics; the latter physics. This last Bacon looks upon as a branch of philosophy very inferior in point of dignity and importance to the other and accordingly to ascertain the most probable means of improving our knowledge of metaphysics is the great object of his Organon." (13) He himself says: “It is a correct position that ‘true knowledge is knowledge by causes. And causes, again, are not improperly, distributed into four kind: the material, the formal, the efficient, and the final.’” (14) (Vol. I. p. 174, Vol. II. p. 138.)But in this connection an important point is that Bacon has turned against the teleological investigation of nature, against the investigation into final causes. “The investigation of final causes is useless; they corrupt rather than advance the sciences except such as have to do with human action.” (15) To Bacon the important matter is to investigate by the study of caus? efficientes.